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Abstract 
This thesis analyses the decision-making within the European Community on 
opening to the People’s Republic of China between 1969 and 1979. The three 
main research themes, which this thesis will make a contribution to, are the 
EC’s decision-making in foreign policy, European integration in the 1970s, 
and the intersection of European integration and the Cold War. Neither the 
historiography of the Cold War nor of European integration have dealt with 
the EC-PRC relationship. This research addresses that deficiency. 
This is the first detailed, systematic historical study of the origins of the 
Community’s response to China that bases on archival sources released 
according to the 30-year rule. The study takes a Community-centred 
perspective, focusing on how the interests of the EC member states, those of 
the EC intergovernmental and supranational actors came together in 
Brussels, Strasbourg and Luxembourg to shape the EC’s response to the PRC. 
It is based on extensive multi-archival and multinational research, including 
records of the Community institutions, the French, British and German 
governments, personal papers, and interviews.  
The thesis argues that the Commission was the principal architect and motor 
behind the EC’s opening to China. Sir Christopher Soames, the first British 
vice-president and commissioner for external relations, was primarily 
responsible for establishing official relations. Personal beliefs and ambitions 
were at the root of his decision-making. Geopolitics were key. However the 
principal factor behind his and the Commission’s subsequent decisions was 
inter-institutional jockeying for power. The main implications of the opening 
were a furthering and deepening of European integration, and an 
acceleration of European détente and détente in Europe. This thesis therefore 
shows that the wrangle for competencies within the EC institutional system 
intertwined with broader trends of history, the end of the PRC’s isolation 
from international affairs and détente. 
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Introduction 
In the turbulent decade of the 1970s, the relationship between the European 
Community (EC) and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) went from non-
existent to institutionalised, from symbolic to substantive. In September 1975 
the PRC accredited an ambassador to the Community, in April 1978 both 
sides concluded a trade agreement, and in July 1979 a textile agreement 
followed. How and why did these changes occur? These are the central 
research questions of this thesis.  
The Community’s opening to China required answers to the 
fundamental questions of what external relations issues the EC should tackle, 
how the Community should tackle them, and who should speak for the EC in 
international politics. The term ‘opening’ used in this thesis means the initial 
establishment of official political and commercial links. ‘External relations’ 
refers to the observation that the very existence of the EC as a political and 
economic entity had implications for the outside world. This existence 
generated – sometimes unintended – contacts and consequences which did 
not necessarily involve any consciously formulated overall policy.1 ‘Foreign 
policy’ means more specifically a purposeful activity: the formulation, 
implementation and evaluation of external choices usually within one 
country, viewed from that country. 2  ‘Foreign policy activity’ in the 
Community is a process of integrating policies and actions of the member 
 
1 Panayiotis Ifestos, European Political Cooperation: towards a Framework of Supranational Diplomacy?, 
(Avebury: Aldershot, 1987), p.6. 
2 Ibid., referencing James Dougherty and Robert Pfaltzgraff, Contending Theories of Internaitonal Relations, (New 
York, Toronto: J.B. Lippincott Co., 1971).  
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states and the EC institutions towards the outside world. This activity is 
directed at non-members and international organisations and concerns 
political, economic, trade, and security-related issues. 3 
Extending the Community’s foreign policy activity to Beijing entailed a 
furthering and deepening of European integration. ‘European integration’ 
refers to ‘the historical process whereby European nation-states have been 
willing to transfer, or more usually pool, their sovereign powers in a collective 
enterprise.’ 4  Although relations with China were not a priority for the 
Europeans in the 1970s, analysing the origins of the Community’s 
relationship with Beijing is significant because it sheds light on the complex 
system of EC competences, institutions, and decision-making procedures 
related to its foreign policy activity in the Cold War era of détente. In order to 
answer the research questions and to shed light on the evolution of the 
European Community as an independent political agent, this thesis analyses 
the EC’s opening to the PRC between 1969 and 1979.  
In early 1975, following a series of secret meetings with the Chinese 
ambassador to Belgium Li Lianpi, Sir Christopher Soames, vice-president of 
the Commission responsible for external relations, accepted the invitation to 
visit Beijing in an official capacity. Only after a press leak did Soames 
announce to member state permanent representatives, en passant over a 
lunch in March, that he was to visit China in early May. As soon as he arrived 
in Beijing on 4 May 1975, Soames proposed to set up official relations in the 
 
3 Roy H. Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community: the Politics of Scale, (Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner, 1989), p.1. 
4 Mark Gilbert, European Integration: a Concise History, (Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012), 
p.1. 
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name of the Community, and then de facto sealed the deal. In an 
extraordinary coup de théâtre Soames confronted the member states with a 
fait accompli. Never before or since had a Commissioner taken such a bold 
initiative that guaranteed high visibility in a policy area which epitomises the 
sovereignty of the nation-state and the prerogative of the member states. And 
perhaps most surprising of all, Soames was successful.  
Contemporary academic works on the relationship between the 
European Union (EU) and China tend to focus on human rights, democracy, 
climate change, trade and investment. Study groups like the UACES 
Collaborative Research Network on EU-China Relations and research centres 
like the Tsinghua-Groningen Centre for China-EU Studies mainly 
concentrate their attention to contemporary challenges. So does research on 
current EU diplomatic service by political scientists.5 In contrast, this thesis is 
a study of the origins of a diplomatic relationship which would subsequently 
grow in importance, and which has the potential to become yet more so in the 
decade ahead. The research sheds light on an earlier phase in the Beijing-
Brussels relationship very different from the post-Cold War period. This 
study therefore forms an essential base for a thorough examination of the 
EU-China relationship in the 21st century. Considering the importance of the 
subject, it is remarkable that historians have given only limited attention to 
it. This is the first systematic historical study of the Community’s decision-
making for opening to the PRC based on archival sources released according 
to the 30-year rule. It introduces the case of the EC-PRC relationship to the 
historiography of the European Union and the Cold War. 
 
5 See for example: http://www.uaces.org/events/conferences/angers/papers/abstract.php?recordID=176. 
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Scope and approach 
The three main research themes, which this thesis will make a contribution 
to, are the EC’s decision-making in foreign policy, European integration in 
the 1970s, and the intersection of European integration and the Cold War. To 
explain the beginnings of the EC’s relationship with the PRC and address 
these themes, the study defines its scope and approach in four main ways. 
First, the research focuses on how the European Economic Community 
(EEC), renamed EC after July 1967 merger treaty, dealt with Beijing. It does 
not look at the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the 
European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM) because these did not 
significantly affect the way the EC dealt with Beijing. Furthermore it 
concentrates on mainland China, and does not include the British colony of 
Hong Kong. The EC dealt with Hong Kong separately from the PRC, in 
political and economic terms, and involves issues of decolonisation and 
bilateral Sino-British negotiations. It therefore offers material for a separate 
research project, but is beyond the scope of this thesis.6 
Second, the study focuses on the period of 1969 to 1979. In 1969 the EC 
Heads of State and Government decided at the Hague Summit to relaunch 
European integration in terms of completion, widening and deepening.7 This 
 
6 See the preferential tariff arrangements set out in the Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2762/72 of 19 December 1972; 
Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3054/74 of 2 December 1974; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 3010/75 of 17 November 
1975; Council Regulation (EEC) No. 2706/77; separate textile agreement set out in Council Regulation (EEC) No 
903/76 of 8 April 1976, Official Journal L 108, 26 April 1976; Yahuda Michael B., 'Hong Kong's Future: Sino-British 
Negotiations, Perceptions, Organization and Political Culture', International Affairs, 69, no. 2, 1993, 245–266; Hook 
Brian, 'National and International Interests in the Decolonisation of Hong Kong, 1946-97', in Judith M. Brown and 
Rosemary Foot (eds.), Hong Kong's Transitions, 1842-1997, (London: Macmillan Press, 1997). 
7 Jan van der Harst (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union: the European Community’s Quest for Deepening, Widening 
and Completion, 1965-75, (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 2007). 
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relaunch coincided with the official end of the Cultural Revolution and a 
turn-around in Chinese foreign policy towards the EC, which Beijing now 
supported as a counterweight to the United States, and later also against the 
Soviet Union.8 1979 is the date that the Community concluded the textile 
agreement with China. It thereby gave concrete substance to a relationship 
characterised so far more by political symbolism.  
Third, as a study in international history this thesis adopts a 
Community-centred approach.9 This approach allows it to address the main 
gap in the literature – namely an assessment of the importance of the 
internal, institutional dimension of Community politics in explaining the EC’s 
opening to China. It concentrates on how the different motivations of 
national and Community decision-makers played out within the EC 
institutions. The Community-centred approach makes it essential to conduct 
multi-lateral and multi-archival research, which is also the research agenda 
driving the field of ‘New’ Cold War History.10 This multilateral approach and 
these multi-archival sources enable new answers to be found and add 
significant value to the existing scholarship. 
Whilst acknowledging that domestic politics are important in the 
conduct of foreign policy, a thorough investigation of their impact goes 
 
8 Lirong Liu, 'The Evolution of China’s EU Policy: from Mao’s Intermediate Zone to a Strategic Partnership Based 
on Non-shared Values', Journal of European Integration History, 18, no. 1, 2012, 11–24; Findorff Barbara, 'China 
und die Europäsiche Gemeinschaft', Aussenpolitik, 23, no. 11, 1972, 656–662. 
9 For further explanation of the approach, see: N. Piers Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 
1960s: Negotiating the Gaullist Challenge, (London, New York: Routledge, 2006), 7–10; For further examples, see: 
Ann-Christina L. Knudsen, Farmers on Welfare. The Making of Europe's Common Agricultural Policy, (Ithaca, 
New York: Cornell University Press, 2009); N. Piers Ludlow, 'The Making of the CAP: towards a Historical Analysis 
of the EU's First Major Policy', Contemporary European History, 14, 2005. 
10 Odd Arne Westad (ed.), Reviewing the Cold War. Approaches, Interpretations, Theory, (London: Frank Cass, 
2000),  p.5. 
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beyond the scope of this thesis. However where a prominent effect is 
apparent, such as in the textile negotiations, the domestic dimension will be 
covered. Lastly, concerning the role of the member states, the research 
focuses on France, Germany and Britain. The first two are selected because 
they represented the two largest EC founding members. Without their 
consent any coordinated foreign policy activity towards China could not have 
been implemented. It includes Britain because, after its accession to the 
Community in 1973, it added a different political and economic dimension to 
European integration, not least due to its relations to the United States and 
the Commonwealth. Within this research framework, the role of other 
member states and of bilateral meetings between the national decision-
makers and Beijing is also discussed, as is the impact of public opinion and 
interest groups, particularly the business community.    
Literature review 
This review of the literature highlights that neither the historiography of 
European integration nor that of the Cold War have concerned themselves 
with the EC-PRC relationship. The few studies specifically dealing with the 
topic lack archival evidence, because most of them were published in the 
1970s and 1980s, are from the disciplines of political science and law, and 
because their focus is predominantly on Chinese and Soviet policies. 11 When 
 
11 For International Relations, see: David L. Shambaugh, Eberhard Sandschneider and Hong Zhou (eds.), China-
Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects, (London, New York: Routledge, 2008); Natee 
Vichitsorasatra, 'The Evolution of Cooperation between the European Community and East Asia', Loughborough 
University, 2007; Reuben Wong, 'Forging Common EU Policies on China', in Gérard Bossuat and Anne Deighton 
(eds.), The EC/EU: a World Security Actor?, 70–93, (Paris: Soleb, 2006); Olaf Griese, 'EU-China Relations - an 
Assessment by the Communications of the European Union', Springer Verlag, 2006; David L. Shambaugh, 'China 
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it comes to the Community, these works stress either economic or 
geostrategic reasons to account for the opening. What is missing is a 
systematic assessment of the evolving institutional framework, the internal 
decision-making and the role of individual actors within the Community. 
Such an evaluation is fundamental to understand the full dynamics of the EC-
PRC relationship. By addressing this deficiency, this thesis breaks new 
ground. 
Boosting the Community’s foreign policy activity 
To date the EC’s external relations are the subject of limited historical 
investigation. The main reason is the commonly-held view that the main 
actors in external relations were, and remain, the member states.12 Historians 
have acknowledged the Community’s role in recent studies relating to the 
General Agreements on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the developing countries, 
 
and Europe', Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 519, 1992, 101–114; Putnam Mundy 
Ebinger, 'The Politics of Potential: the Relations of the People's Republic of China and the European Community 
and its Member-States France and Great Britain, 1969-1979', Tufts University, 1988; Harish Kapur, China and the 
European Economic Community: the New Connection, (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 1986); Dick 
Wilson, 'China and the European Community', The China Quarterly, no. 56, 1973, 647–666; Giovanni Bressi, 'China 
and Western Europe', Asian Survey, 12, no. 10, 1972, 819–845; Barbara Findorff, 'China und die Europäsiche 
Gemeinschaft'. For Law, see: Francis Snyder, The European Union and China, 1949-2009: Basic Documents and 
Commentary, (Oregon: Oxford and Portland, 2009); Xiao Zhiyue, The European Community and China, (London: 
Butterworth, 1993). For History, see: Liu, 'The Evolution of China’s EU Policy'; Michael B. Yahuda., 'The Sino-
European Encounter, Historical Influences on Contemporary Relations', in David L. Shambaugh, Eberhard 
Sandschneider and Hong Zhou (eds.), China-Europe Relations: Perceptions, Policies and Prospects, (London, New 
York: Routledge, 2008); Xiyu Chen, 'From Political Alliance in China's Conception to Comprehensive Partnership in 
Building: the Relations between China and the European Community/European Union', Eberhard-Karl Universität, 
2003; J.Y.P Chang, 'The History of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of China on Taiwan and the 
European Community and its Member States', Cambridge, 1997; John Redmond and Lan Zou, 'The European 
Community and China: New Horizons', Journal of Common Market Studies, XXV, no. 2, 1986. 
12 Giuliano Garavini, 'Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation-State: Conceptualizing the External Dimension', in 
Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori (eds.), European History: Themes and Debates, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), p.190. 
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the Communist bloc, and enlargement.13 But no comprehensive work exists 
that discusses the evolution of the Community’s decision-making in foreign 
policy and the effect this had on international relations. Generally, if 
historians attribute any foreign policy role at all to the EC they do so only in 
the second half of the 1980s under Jacques Delors’s Presidency of the 
European Commission, when the Community approved the Single European 
Act.14 The EC’s active response to China in the course of the period under 
review suggests that this view is misleading.  
The essential questions this research deals with are who the drivers of 
the opening were, and what motivated them. Historians and political 
scientists agree that the EC reacted to the Chinese requests to establish 
formal political and commercial links, rather than having initiated them, and 
that the Chinese controlled the agenda. Whilst this thesis tests this claim on 
the basis of new evidence, it also explores in detail the role of the architects 
and motors within the Community in deciding how to deal with the PRC, i.e. 
the individual member states, the European Political Cooperation (EPC) 
 
13 On GATT, see for example: Lucia Coppolaro, 'The European Economic Community in the GATT Negotiations of 
the Kennedy Round (1964-1967): Global and Regional Trade', in Antonio Varsori (ed.), Inside the European 
Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957-1972, (Baden-Baden, Bruxelles: Nomos, 
Bruylant, 2006). On the developing countries, see for example: Giuliano Garavini, 'The Colonies Strike Back. The 
Impact of the Third World on Western Europe, 1968-1975', Contemporary European History, 16, no. 3, 2007, 299–
319; Véronique Dimier and Mike McGeever, 'Diplomats Without a Flag: the Institutionalization of the Delegations of 
the Commission in African, Caribbean and Pacific Countries', Journal of Common Market Studies, 44, no. 3, 2006, 
483–505; Marie-Thérèse Bitsch and Gérard Bossuat (eds.), L’Europe unie et l’Afrique, de l’idée d’Eurafrique à la 
convention de Lomé I, histoire d’une relation ambiguë, (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2005). On the Communist bloc, see for 
example: Suvi Kansikas, 'Trade Blocs and the Cold War. The CMEA and the EC Challenge, 1969-1976', University of 
Helsinki, 2012; Angela Romano, 'A Single European Voice Can Speak Louder to the World. Rationales, Ways and 
Means of the EPC in the CSCE Experience', in Ann-Christina L. Knudsen et al. (eds.), The Road to a United Europe: 
Interpretations of the Process of European Integration, (Brussels: 2007). On enlargement, see for example: Furby 
Daniel Edwin, 'The Revival and Success of Britain's Second Application for Membership of the European 
Community, 1968-1971', Queen Mary, University of London, 2010; Karamouzi Eirini, Greece, the EEC and the Cold 
War 1974-1979, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, forthcoming 2013). 
14 Garavini, 'Foreign Policy Beyond the Nation-State: Conceptualizing the External Dimension', p.190–192. 
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mechanism, the European Council, the Council of Ministers, the Committee 
of Permanent Representatives (COREPER), the Commission, the European 
Parliament (EP), individual Heads of States and Governments, and 
Community officials. 15 No study so far has offered a conclusive evaluation on 
the basis of newly accessible archival records.   
As regards the role of the member states, the existing literature on the 
foreign policy of the national governments neither investigates the role of 
China in the respective European policies, nor investigates the Community 
dimension of their bilateral relations towards Beijing. 16  This study 
acknowledges that EC relations to the PRC were subordinated to national 
foreign policies. Until 1970, only two out of the then six member states had 
diplomatically recognised the People’s Republic: the Netherlands and 
 
15 The following edited volume looks at the different actors within the Community: Varsori Antonio, Inside the 
European Community: Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957-1972, (Baden-Baden, Bruxelles: 
Nomos, Bruylant, 2006).  
16 On France, see for example: Laurent Cesari, 'Les relations franco-chinoises sous la présidence de Georges 
Pompidou (1969-1974)', in Laurent Cesari and Denis Varaschin (eds.), Les relations franco-chinoises au vingti me 
si cle et leurs antécédents, (Arras:  rtois presses universit , 2003)  Maurice  a sse, 'Changement et continuité dans 
la politique européenne de la France', Paper presented at the Georges Pompidou et l’Europe: colloque, 25 et 26 
novembre 1993, Paris 1993; Thierno Diallo, La politique étrang re de eorges  ompidou,  ol. 7 , (Paris: Librairie 
g n rale de droit et de jurisprudence, 1992); Samy Cohen, La monarchie nucléaire: les coulisses de la politique 
étrangère sous la Ve République, (Paris: Hachette, 1986); Samy Cohen and Marie-Claude Smouts (eds.), La 
politique extérieure de Valéry iscard d’Estaing, (Paris: Presses de la Fondation Nationale des Sciences Politiques, 
1985). On Germany, see for example: Bernd Schaefer, 'Ostpolitik, "Fernostpolitik", and Sino-Soviet Rivalry: China 
and the Two Germanys', in Carole Fink and Bernd Schaefer (eds.), Ostpolitik, 1969-1974. European and Global 
Responses, 129-147, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Wilfried Loth, 'Deutsche Europapolitik von 
Helmut Schmidt bis Helmut Kohl', in Franz Knipping and Matthias Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der 
zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969-1984, (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2004); Helga 
Haftendorn, Deutsche Aussenpoliti    ischen  elbstbeschr n ung und  elbstbehauptung 1945-2000, (Stuttgart 
Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt 2001); Kay Möller, 'Germany and China: a Continental Temptation', China Quarterly, no. 
147, 1996, 706–725; Mechthild Leutner, Bundesrepublik Deutschland und China, 1949 bis 1995: Politik – 
Wirtschaft – Wissenschaft – Kultur: eine Quellensammlung, (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1995). On Britain, see for 
example: David Gowland, Arthur Turner and Alex Wright, Britain and European Integration since 1945: on the 
Sidelines, (Abingdon: Routledge, 2010); James Ellison, 'Britain and Europe', in Paul Addison and Harriet Jones 
(eds.), A Companion to Contemporary Britain, (Oxford: Blackwell Publishing, 2005); John W. Young, Britain and 
European Unity, 1945-1999, 2nd ed, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 2000); Robert Boardman, Britain and the  eople’s 
Republic of China, 1949-74, (London, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1976).  For a comprehensive list see Bibliography. 
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France.17 Belgium, Luxembourg, Italy and Germany had been reluctant to 
establish official relations with the Chinese Communist government. The risk 
that this might strain their relationship with the United States and the Soviet 
Union had proven too high.18 Only once almost all the member states had 
recognised the PRC could the EC engage in official relations with Beijing. Yet, 
a unique feature of the China case is that after 1969, when Mao Zedong 
officially declared the Cultural Revolution over, none of the member states 
had yet established significant political and economic links with the PRC.19  
National governments and the Community bodies operated in 
uncertainty as to what to expect from the Chinese government. The People’s 
Republic was just emerging from the Cultural Revolution. Launched by Mao 
in 1966, its official goal had been to remove capitalist, traditional and cultural 
elements from Chinese politics and society. 20  One of the most dramatic 
illustrations of the fight against capitalism, and symptoms of xenophobia, 
was the ousting of European diplomatic staff from China, and the burning of 
the chancellery building of the British legation in Beijing.21 Many have viewed 
the Cultural Revolution as lasting until the Chairman’s death in 1976. 22 
Although in the early 1970s the Chinese government ended its self-imposed 
 
17 Colin Mackerras and Amanda Yorke (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Contemporary China, (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp.151–155. The dates of the establishment of diplomatic relations are: 
Netherlands (19/10/1954); France (27/01/1964); Italy (06/11/1970); Belgium (25/10/1971); Luxembourg 
(16/11/1972); FRG (11/10/1972) – member states from 1973 onwards: UK (06/01/1950); Denmark (11/05/1950); 
Ireland (22/06/1979). 
18 See for example: Giovanni Bressi, 'China and Western Europe', Asian Survey, 12, no. 10, 1972, 819–845. 
19 Erhard Louven, 'The European Community and Asia', in Robert H. Taylor (ed.), Asia and the Pacific, (Oxford: 
Facts On File Ltd., 1991), p.1231. 
20 See for example: Jonathan Spence, The Search for Modern China, 2nd ed, (New York, London: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1999). 
21 Louven, 'The European Community and Asia', p.1231. 
22 See for example: Rana Mitter, 'Review of Mao's Last Revolution', Reviews in History http://www.history.ac.uk, 
2009. 
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ban on external trade and in 1972 agreed to mend fences with the United 
States, its starkest ideological enemy, Mao’s guiding principle was to ‘rely 
mainly on our own efforts while making external assistance subsidiary’.23 
Ideological campaigns continued. Some of them accentuated the political 
importance of autarchy and criticised imports from abroad such as the anti-
Confucius campaign of 197 . Only with Deng Xiaoping’s ‘Open Door Policy’ 
of 1978 did some of the unpredictability in Chinese politics and economics 
disappear.  
Adding to this situation whereby the member states and the EC 
institutions all acted in the conditions of an institutional tabula rasa – a 
clean (or perhaps better erased) slate, none of member states had ever fully 
colonised China, in contrast to states in Africa and Southeast-Asia. Thus, in 
contrast to the relations with former colonies of the member states, the EC 
institutions were presented with a uniquely wide room for manoeuvre. The 
opening of China does therefore represent a fascinating, if unique, case study 
of how the member states and Community institutions competed for power 
and influence when establishing diplomatic and commercial relations with a 
major partner more or less from scratch.  
Regarding the trade dimension in the EC’s foreign policy activity, 
European firms doing business in countries outside the Community operated 
in the framework of the EC Common Commercial Policy.24 The Treaties of 
Rome provided for procedures developing and putting this policy into effect. 
 
23 Quoted in: Zhou Enlai, 'Report on the Work of the Government to the 4th NPC', 1975. 
24 Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge (henceforward CA), the papers of Baron Soames (henceforward SOAM) 
42/1975 China, Record of a meeting between Sir Christopher Soames and the Chinese Vice Minister for Foreign 
Trade Mr. Yao I-Lin, Beijing, 7 May 1975. 
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The intention was that eventually the Community as such rather than the 
individual member states would sign and overview all trade agreements with 
third countries covering tariffs, quotas and the like. This meant the 
Commission was to negotiate those agreements on behalf of the national 
governments. Yet the Community still had to work out the details for the 
Common Commercial Policy towards the state-trading countries, the name 
used to designate the Communist countries. The existing literature is not 
clear how the EC developed its external commercial policy towards the PRC, 
and who was responsible for it. 
 s far as political issues in the EC’s foreign policy activity were 
concerned, the Treaties of Rome left the institutional responsibilities even 
more ill-defined and open to interpretation than for the Common 
Commercial Policy.25 Elena Calandri goes so far as to argue that between 1958 
and 1960 the Community’s decision-making in foreign policy was ‘sterilised’ 
because they revealed too many frictions and threatened the cohesion of the 
Community.26 The Council of Ministers affirmed its primacy in this area. 
Never could the Commission act on its own initiative on commercial and 
tariff agreements, accession and association agreements. Nor could it take 
action in the international economic organisations, on the Common 
Commercial Policy, on legation rights or the representation of the 
 
25 Gérard Bossuat and Anne Deighton (eds.), The EC/EU: a World Security Actor ?, (Paris: Soleb, 2007), p.11; 
Elena Calandri, 'La CEE et les relations extérieures 1958-1960', in Antonio Varsori (ed.), Inside the European 
Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957-1972, 399–432, (Baden-Baden, Bruxelles: 
Nomos, Bruylant, 2006); Piers N. Ludlow, 'The European Commission and the Rise of Coreper: a Controlled 
Experiment', in Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and Morten Rasmussen (eds.), The History of the European Union: 
Origins of a Trans- and Supranational Polity 1950-72, 189–205, (New York, London: Routledge, 2009), p.191. 
26 Calandri, 'La CEE et les relations extérieures 1958-1960', p.431. 
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Community in external relations.27 COREPER developed as the institution 
which would keep the diplomatic ambitions of the Commission in check.28 Yet 
the Commission did claim general competence, not least in negotiating with 
third countries based on Article 228 of the Treaty of Rome.29 
Specifically regarding China, Dick Wilson locates any foreign policy 
activity with the member states when he describes the Commission as ‘the 
permanent secretariat of the Community’ and the Council as the body ‘from 
which it takes policy instructions’.30 In contrast, Harish Kapur argues that the 
Commission and Soames in particular took the lead.31 He also notes that the 
European Council and the European Parliament expressed themselves in 
favour of opening relations with Beijing. But problematically, all accounts fall 
short of integrating the role of all the EC institutions involved, including the 
EPC. This was a mechanism created in 1970 by which the member states co-
ordinated their foreign policies. 
More generally, an insight into the Commission’s role in the EC’s 
foreign policy activity is offered by Gérard Bossuat’s and  na s Legendre’s 
chapter in Michel Dumoulin’s The European Commission, 1958-72.32 They 
argue that the Commission’s concern moved gradually from trade policy to 
economic policy and then to an explicitly political perspective. This study 
tests this claim. Choosing the case of China, it investigates how the 
 
27 Ibid. 
28 Ludlow, ‘The European Commission and the rise of Coreper’, p.191. 
29 Calandri, ‘La CEE et les relations ext rieures’, p.422. 
30 Wilson, 'China and the European Community'. 
31 Kapur, China and the European Economic Community. 
32 Gérard Bossuat and Anaïs Legendre, 'The Commission's Role in External Relations', in Michel Dumoulin, Marie-
Thérèse Bitsch and European Commission (eds.), The European Commission, 1958-72: History and Memories, 
(Luxembourg: Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 2007), pp.374–376. 
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Commission’s work fitted with the other players such as the Council of 
Ministers. Pascaline Winand investigates specifically the Commission’s 
relationship with the United States, and Veronique Dimier focuses on the 
Commission’s work in respect to the  frican, Caribbean, and Pacific (ACP) 
countries. 33  Choosing the case of China, this thesis investigates how the 
Commission’s work fitted with the other players such as the Council of 
Ministers involved in devising the Community’s external relations. 
Looking in general at the Commission’s interaction with the other 
institutions, a picture emerges whereby the member states more often than 
not side-lined the Commission. Piers Ludlow argues that in the 1960s, the 
Commission failed to have a decisive impact on the resolution of political 
crises and that its leadership ambitions were much reduced.34 Similarly, Keith 
Middlemas argues that European integration proceeded with an emphasis on 
inter-governmental supremacy, with most initiatives decided by the leading 
member states – a pattern of activity set in the 1960s.35 He concludes that the 
limited gains the Commission made, such as establishing its science and 
technology policy, its social action programme, the regional fund, and 
broadening political cooperation, all ‘came about primarily not because the 
Commission initiated policy but because the Council of Ministers willed it.’36 
In the same vein, historians have stressed the importance of the Franco-
 
33 Pascaline Winand, 'The Invention of EU Diplomacy: the European Commission Delegation in Washington D.C.: a 
'Political Delegation' from the Fifties to the 21st century', in Gérard Bossuat and Anne Deighton (eds.), The EC/EU: 
a World Security Actor?, 94–115, (Paris: Soleb, 2006; Dimier Véronique, 'The Birth of a European Diplomatic 
Service: from Contrôleurs-techniques to the Delegates of the Commission in ACP Countries', in Gérard Bossuat and 
Anne Deighton (eds.), The EC/EU: a World Security Actor, 116–131, (Paris: Soleb, 2006). 
34 Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960, p.209. 
35 Keith Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe. The Informal Politics of European Union, 1973-95, (London: Fontana, 
1995), p.83 and p.90. 
36 Ibid. 
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German tandem as a motor of European integration.37 This thesis investigates 
how far the case of China supports this picture. 
Regarding the European Parliament the Treaties of Rome did not 
provide for it to behave as a national parliament at the Community level. It 
also struggled in its claim to represent the European citizens not least 
because until 1979 it was not directly elected.38 Since its creation however, the 
EP had sought to raise its political profile and institutional standing.39 Only 
recently have historians begun to explore why the member states gradually 
endowed the European Parliament with supervisory, budgetary and 
legislative powers. 40  As regards decision-making in foreign policy, the 
Treaties of Rome did not foresee any role for the EP.41 Perhaps this was 
understandable because by its very nature, foreign policy activity requires 
secrecy, speed, coherence, efficiency, and in many national parliaments, the 
parliamentarians were not really involved either. So by the very definition of 
the policy-area at hand, an involvement of the European Parliament was not 
 
37 See for example: Carine Germond, 'Le couple France-Allemagne et l'unification de l'Europe (1963-1969)', 
Université de Strasbourg, 2009; Claudia Hiepel, 'Willy Brandt, Georges Pompidou und Europa. Das deutsch-
französische Tandem in den Jahren 1969-1974', in Franz Knipping and Matthias Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch zum 
Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 1969-1984, (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 
2004); Marie-Thérèse Bitsch and Christian Mestre, Le couple France-Allemagne et les institutions européennes: 
une postérité pour le plan Schuman ?, (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2001). 
38 See for example: Simon Hix, Abdul Noury and Gérard Roland, Democratic Politics in the European Parliament, 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007); Berthold Rittberger, Building Europe's Parliament. Democratic 
Representation Beyond the Nation-State, (Oxford: Oxford Universtiy Press, 2005); Juliet Lodge, Direct Elections to 
the European Parliament 1984, (Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1986). 
39 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: an Introduction to European Integration, 3rd ed, (Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2005), pp.259–280; Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s, p.1. 
40 Emma De Angelis, 'The Political Discourse of the European Parliament, Enlargement, and the Construction of a 
European Identity', London School of Economics and Political Science, 2011; Aurélie Élisa Gfeller, Wilfried Loth and 
Matthias Schulz, 'Democratizing Europe, Reaching out to the Citizen? The Transforming Powers of the European 
Parliament', Journal of European Integration History, 17, no. 1, 2011; Rittberger, Building Europe's Parliament.  
41 See for example: Gerhard Brunn, 'Das Europäische Parlament auf dem Weg zur ersten Direktwahl 1979', in Franz 
Knipping and Matthias Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. Die europäische Einigung 
1969-1984, (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2004). 
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expected, and therefore has found little, if any, attention in academic 
research.42 This research looks at the EP’s involvement in the EC’s opening to 
China. 
The EPC adds a further dimension to the analysis of the Community’s 
decision-making in foreign policy. Following the relaunch of European 
integration at the Hague Summit, the Six created the EPC in October 1970.43 
The EPC was not, however, formally incorporated into the EC framework. It 
therefore added to the complexity and ambiguity of the issue of ‘who does 
what’ between the Commission and the Council of Ministers. 44  Daniel 
Möckli’s study European Foreign Policy during the Cold War examines the 
EPC which prior to that had mainly been analysed in the memoirs and 
testimonies of participants.45 Problematic in Möckli’s methodology is that he 
defines European foreign policy between 1969 to 1974 as the sum of national 
policies and EPC. Similarly, the approach by Maria Gainar in Aux origines de 
la diplomatie européenne – Les Neuf et la Coopération politique européenne 
de 1973 à 1980, published in 2012, implies that a European diplomacy is a 
nation-state affair. Adopting a statist interpretation, both pay minimal 
attention to and do not investigate further other players integral to European 
integration, such as the European Commission and the European Parliament, 
 
42 Stephan Keukeleire and Jenniger MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, (Basingstoke: 
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008), p.128. 
43 See for example: Maria Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne. Les Neuf et la Coopération politique 
européenne de 1973 à 1980, (Bruxelles: PIE Peter Lang, 2012), chapter 1; Daniel Möckli, European Foreign Policy 
during the Cold War: Heath, Brandt, Pompidou and the Dream of Political Unity, (London, New York: I.B. Tauris 
2009), pp.184–247; Ifestos, European Political Cooperation. 
44 Simon Nuttall, European Political Co-operation, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1992), p.1. 
45 Möckli, European Foreign Policy during the Cold War; Elfriede Regelsberger, Phillippe de Schoutheete de 
Tervarent and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), Foreign Policy of the European Union: from EPC to CFSP and Beyond, 
(Boulder, Colo: Lynne Rienner, 1997). 
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without which, as this study contends, the EC response to China, an act of 
European diplomacy, cannot be understood.  
The most important question of this thesis is why the Community as 
such opened up to China at the specific time and in the peculiar way that it 
did. An economic interpretation was advanced in the 1986 article by John 
Redmond and Lan Zou, ‘The European Community and China: New 
Horizons’ in Journal of Common Market Studies.46 Similarly, Xiyu Chen’s 
dissertation argues that ‘The pursuit of economic benefits has always been 
the primary goal for both’ China and the Community.47 In his introduction to 
the Journal of European Integration History issue on EU-China relations, 
Jan van der Harst implies that economic and trade issues were dominant at 
the beginning. Only as ‘the relationship between the two blocs has become 
both comprehensive and diversified’ did the focus come to include politics.48 
By contrast, the majority of works emphasise a political motivation including 
Kapur’s pioneering monograph China and the European Economic 
Community: the New Connection published in 1986. 49  Those works that 
focus on politics emphasise geopolitics to explain the EC-PRC relationship. 
But all of them fail to analyse the internal Community politics involved in the 
Community’s decision to open to China, and the unique constellation of 
individuals. Therefore an essential dimension to the ‘why’ question is 
 
46 Redmond and Zou, 'The European Community and China'. 
47 Chen, 'From Political Alliance in China's Conception to Comprehensive Partnership in Building', p.3. 
48 Jan van der Harst, 'Introduction. The Evolution of EU-China relations', Journal of European Integration 
History, 18, no. 1, 2012, 5–10. 
49 Yahuda, 'The Sino-European Encounter'; Chang, 'The History of Diplomatic Relations between the Republic of 
China on Taiwan and the European Community and its Member States'; Ebinger, 'The Politics of Potential'; 
Shambaugh, 'China and Europe'; Harish Kapur, Distant Neighbours: China and Europe, (London: Pinter, 1990); 
Wilson, 'China and the European Community'; Bressi, 'China and Western Europe'; Findorff, 'China und die 
Europäsiche Gemeinschaft'. 
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missing. With the opening of the archives, this research adds this internal 
dimension, and evaluates its importance.  
A first step in answering the main research questions is to establish the 
chronology of events and the milestones - apart from the obvious ones of May 
1975, April 1978 and July 1979. The questions that follow are on the decision-
making process, the tactics that the Community adopted vis-à-vis China, and 
the tactics that mattered in intra-Community politics when it came to decide 
policy towards China. Answers to these in turn allow an assessment to be 
made as to whether the opening to the PRC was an incremental process, the 
result of a ‘spill-over’ effect, or down to conscious political decisions.50 Did a 
coherent EC China policy exist? This is the first study that deals 
comprehensively with these aspects.  
European integration and the 1970s 
The ‘bigger-picture’ question is whether the case of China supports the 
widely-held view of the 1970s as a decade of ‘Eurosclerosis’. Soames’ 
initiative came at a distinctive time in European history: ‘Europe has been 
confronted with a series of problems which have thrown the Community into 
a state of crisis’.51 Such were the words by Vice-President of the European 
Commission Carlo Scarascia Mugozza speaking to the European Parliament 
on 12 February 1974. Europe had to grapple with global structural changes: 
superpower détente, the growing transatlantic rift, the global economic 
 
50 Ernest Bernard Haas, The Uniting of Europe: Political, Social, and Economic Forces, 1950-1957, 2nd ed, 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1968). 
51 European Commission, Seventh General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1973, 
(Brussels: EEC, 1974), p.xv.  
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downturn marked by the break-down of the Bretton Woods system in 1971, 
the rise of the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), the 
first oil shocks at the end of 1973, and the pressure for a New International 
Economic Order (NIEO) by the developing states organized as the Group of 
77.52 Following the ‘golden 60s’ began a decade of recession in Europe that 
led to protectionist tendencies and social unrest.53 
The sense of disturbance continued. The annual General Report on the 
activities of the European Communities stated:  
‘Early in 197  a crisis had developed in the Community. Economic 
and political difficulties had arisen in many areas, and the 
Community was not sufficiently equipped to cope with these 
properly. The year opened with reticence or refusal as regards the 
implementation of the policy guidelines emerging from the Paris 
and Copenhagen Summit Conferences. It was impossible to set up 
the European Regional Development Fund, there was hesitation 
over the transition to the second stage of economic and monetary 
union, and there was total disagreement on the policy to be 
followed in dealing with the energy crisis besetting the world and 
the Community. In place of endeavours to act for the common 
benefit by strictly applying the arrangements and procedures laid 
down in the Treaties, there emerged a trend towards inter-state 
cooperation based on the achievement of national interests.’54 
 
52 See for example Niall Ferguson et al. (eds.), The Shock of the Global: the 1970s in Perspective, (Cambridge, 
Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010); Giuliano Garavini, 'The Conference for International 
Economic Cooperation. A Diplomatic Reaction to the Oil Shock (1975-1977)', Ann-Christina L. Knudsen and Morten 
Rasmussen (eds.), The Road to a United Europe. Interpretations of the Process of European Integration, 147–162, 
(Baden-Baden, Brussels: PIE, Peter Lang, 2009); ———, 'The Colonies Strike Back.'; Loukas Tsoukalis, The New 
European Economy Revisited, 3rd ed, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997).  
53 Nicholas Woodward, 'The Search for Economic Stability: Western Europe since 1973', in Max-Stephan Schulze 
(ed.), Western Europe, Economic and Social Change since 1945, 63–80, (London, New York: Longman, 1999), 
pp.63–79. 
54 European Commission, Eighth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1974, 
(Brussels: EEC, 1975).  
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And as the Community digested its first enlargement, all these challenges 
contributed to a ‘crisis of confidence, of will and of clarity of purpose’ in the 
EC.55  
A common narrative of the 1970s stresses institutional paralysis, the 
relative impotence of the European Parliament and the undermining of the 
Commission by the member states and the EC intergovernmental 
institutions. 56  Middlemas terms the period ‘The Stagnant Decade’, and 
Richard McAllister describes the mid-1970s as the 'locust years'. 57  Only 
recently has research questioned and revised this pessimistic view.58 The new 
picture is composed of the development of the European Court of Justice, the 
direct elections to the EP, the creation of the European Council, the 
negotiations with the African Caribbean and Pacific countries, the first and 
second enlargement, the setting up of the European Monetary System and 
transnationalization. With the 30-year rule now making archival-based 
studies possible, each of these developments have begun to generate more 
 
55 'Declaration on the State of the Community’, European Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, 
17/1, 1974. 
56 Bino Olivi, L'Europe difficile - histoire politique de l'intégration europénne, (Paris: Gallimard, 2001); Paul 
Graham Taylor, The Limits of European Integration, (London: Croom Helm, 1983); David Coombes ‘Concertation’ 
in the Nation-State and European Community', in Ghita Ionescu (ed.), Between Sovereignty and Integration, (New 
York: Wiley, 1974). 
57 Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe; Richard McAllister, European Union. An Historical and Political Survey, 
(London: Routledge, 2010), chapters 5 and 6. 
58 See for example: Gilbert, European Integration; Eric Bussière, Michel Dumoulin and Sylvain Schirmann, Milieux 
économiques et intégration européenne au XXe siècle: la relance des années quatre-vingts, 1979-1992 (Paris: 
Euroclio, 2007); Franz Knipping and Matthias Schönwald (eds.), Aufbruch zum Europa der zweiten Generation. 
Die europäische Einigung 1969-1984, (Trier: Wissenschaftlicher Verlag Trier, 2004); John Gillingham, European 
Integration, 1950-2003: Superstate or New Market Economy?, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
Richard Griffiths, 'A Dismal Decade? European Integration in the 1970s', in Desmond Dinan (ed.), Origins and 
Evolution of the European Union, 169–190, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006); N. Piers Ludlow, 'From 
Deadlock to Dynamism: the European Community in the 1980s', in Desmond Dinan (ed.), Origins and Evolution of 
the European Union, 218–230, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006). 
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detailed and substantive research which adds to the more nuanced picture.59 
In this respect, the wider significance of the China case concerns the nature of 
European integration: whether it only advances in times of economic 
prosperity, or whether it is in times of crisis that European politicians turn to 
Europe in search of solutions.60  
European integration and the Cold War 
The Beijing-Brussels relationship did not flourish independently of the two 
superpowers and the Cold War. 61  This is the first academic work that 
investigates the impact of the Cold War on the internal decision-making of 
the Community in relation to China, and vice-versa – what impact the 
Community’s opening to China had on the Cold War.62 
The thesis develops the conclusions of recent scholarship on European 
integration history which detect the intersections with the Cold War. 63 
Ludlow’s analysis on the EC institutions and the East-West conflict concludes 
that ‘Fighting the Cold War and integrating Western Europe remained two 
 
59 See for example: Karamouzi, Greece, the EEC and the Cold War 1974-1979; Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, A 
Europe Made of Money, (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012); Guia Migani and Antonio Varsori (eds.), 
Europe in the International Arena during the 1970s. Entering a Different World, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2011); 
Emmanuel Mourlon-Druol, 'Filling the EEC Leadership Vacuum? The Creation of the European Council', Cold War 
History, 2010. 
60 N. Piers Ludlow, 'Governing Europe: Charting the Development of a Supranational Political System', in Wolfram 
Kaiser and Antonio Varsori (eds.), European History: Themes and Debates, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 
2010). 
61 See for example: Yahuda, 'The Sino-European Encounter'; David L. Shambaugh, China and Europe: 1949-1995, 
(London: SOAS-Contemporary China Institute, 1996); Kapur, China and the European Economic Community. 
62  n exception is Marie Julie Chenard, 'Seeking D tente and Driving Integration: the European Community’s 
Opening towards the People’s Republic of China 1975-1978', Journal of European Integration History, 18, no. 1, 
2012, 25–38. 
63 N. Piers Ludlow, 'The New Cold War and the Expansion of the European Community – a Nexus?', Conference on 
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Routledge, 2007). 
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distinct processes throughout the 1960s’.64 This research asks whether this 
also applies to the 1970s. It also tests Takeshi Yamamoto’s conclusion that 
after 1975 both Cold War history and European integration history evolved 
separately and in parallel, which contrasts  ngela Romano’s argument. 65 
Romano finds that the EC relations with the Soviet bloc grew more intense 
and diversified in the mid-1970s, therefore rendering the link between 
European integration and Cold War history evident.66  
Who mattered in the Cold War? This study contributes to the discussion 
on which actors were relevant in the East-West conflict.  rne Westad’s 
monograph The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the 
Making of Our Times has significantly shifted interpretations of the Cold 
War which had so far been analysed primarily from the superpowers’ 
perspective.67 Westad concludes that developments in the developing world 
are essential to understand the evolution of the East-West conflict. The 
present research intends to add the role of the European Community – a 
distinctive political entity, which not least the PRC treated as such – and the 
new relationship between the EC and the PRC as factors of some importance 
to the Cold War. Building on Westad’s findings about Third World decision-
making elites, this research inquires how individual actors within the 
 
64 ———, 'An Insulated Community? The Community Institutions and the Cold War, 1965-1970', in N. Piers Ludlow 
(ed.), European Integration and the Cold War: Ostpolitik-Westpolitik, 1965-1973, (London, New York: Routledge, 
2007). 
65 Takeshi Yamamoto, 'Détente or Integration? EC Response to Soviet Policy Change towards the Common Market, 
1970-75', Cold War History, 7, no. 1, 2007, 75–94. 
66 Angela Romano, 'The Main Task of the European Political Cooperation: Fostering Détente in Europe', in 
Villaume Poul and Odd Arne Westad (eds.), Perforating the Iron Curtain - European Détente, Transatlantic 
Relations, and the Cold War, 1965-1985, (Copenhaguen: Museum Tuscunaum Press, 2010), p.136. 
67 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times, (Cambridge; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005). 
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Community instrumentalised the Cold War for their own power political 
interests. 
The United States President Richard Nixon’s visit to Beijing in 1972 set 
essential conditions for the Western European governments’ willingness to 
normalise their relations with the PRC. 68  But the role the growing 
transatlantic rift played in the Community’s decision to establish official 
relations with China remains unclear, another gap in our knowledge which 
this thesis seeks to remedy. The EC-US relationship faced new strains mainly 
in the areas of economics, defence and diplomacy.69 As American Secretary of 
State Henry Kissinger signposted in his speech on the ‘Year of Europe’ in 
April 1973, the United States sought to define a new modus vivendi with the 
Community. The speech had provocatively reduced the European allies to 
maintaining regional interests in contrast to America holding global 
responsibilities.70 This research explores whether the case of China supports 
political theorist Kenneth Waltz’ claim that the EC’s relations with the United 
States were largely de-politicised; or whether it backs up historian Marc 
Trachtenberg’s argument that European integration ‘was a way for the 
 
68 See for example: Shambaugh, 'China and Europe'. 
69 See for example: Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, chapter 2; Pascaline Winand, 'Loaded Words 
and Disputed Meanings: the Year of Europe Speech and its Genesis from an American Perspective', in Jan van der 
Harst (ed.), Beyond the Customs Union, (Brussels: Bruylant, 2007). 
70 See for example: Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, chapter 2; Aurélie Élisa Gfeller, Building a 
European Identity: France, the United States, and the Oil Shocks, 1973-1974, (Berghahn Books, 2012); Möckli, 
European Foreign Policy during the Cold War; Jussi Hanhimäki, 'Searching for a Balance: the American 
Perspective', in N. Piers Ludlow (ed.), European Integration and the Cold War, 152–174, (London; New York: 
Routledge, 2007), pp.166–168. 
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Europeans to reclaim their political autonomy’.71  
The relationship between the European Community and the Soviet 
Union was at stake too. The contacts with China developed against the 
backdrop of the Sino-Soviet dispute.72 What is more, it developed as the 
Soviet Union refused to recognise the European Community.73 The Kremlin 
made every effort to liaise only with the individual member states and 
imposed on the East European socialist countries and the Council for Mutual 
Economic Assistance (COMECON) a policy of non-recognition. 74  Moscow 
sought to control all relations by the East European countries with the 
Community through COMECON.  
In the late 1960s and early 1970s however the Soviet Union faced 
increased difficulties in controlling the East European states.75 The socialist 
countries turned increasingly to trade with the West because national 
economic reforms and intra-bloc trade proved ineffective.76 In parallel, the 
Common Commercial Policy meant that the Commission was to be in charge 
of all the trade agreements. Therefore economic necessity led to individual 
 
71 Marc Trachtenberg, Between Empire and Alliance: America and Europe during the Cold War, (Lanham, Md.: 
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72 Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp.553–559; Yamamoto, 'Détente or Integration?', 75–79; Yang Kuisong, 
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1, no. 1, 2000, 25–27. 
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75 Ibid., p.1 
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Eastern European countries seeking to liaise with the Commission. 77 
Romania for example had already developed informal contacts with the 
Community; Hungary also sought to discard the official policy of non-
recognition; Czechoslovakia and Poland circumvented COMECON rules to 
export agricultural and manufactured goods to the Community.78 Moreover, 
the first enlargement increased the political and economic weight of the 
Community, which COMECON viewed with anxiety.79 This research clarifies 
on the one hand the extent to which the Community used the China card – 
meaning the extent to which the Europeans played up the Sino-Soviet rivalry 
to pressure the Soviet Union to recognise the competences of the EC. On the 
other hand, it will show whether and how the Community used the Soviet 
card vis-à-vis the Chinese.  
The Community’s opening to China stood out as challenging the bipolar 
Cold War order set by the superpowers. The dissertation investigates the 
usefulness of the ‘Third Force’ concept in explaining the Community’s 
opening to China. The ‘Third Force’ idea had different meanings at different 
times for different people. Prominent proponents included French President 
Charles de Gaulle and British Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin.80 Preceding the 
Marshall Plan the idea applied to the role of Europe in international affairs 
and implied the aim to prevent the East-West confrontation.81 After 1947, the 
 
77 Ibid., p.5. 
78 Ibid. 
79 Ibid., p.156. 
80 See for example: Jeffrey G. Giauque, 'The United States and the Political Union of Western Europe, 1958-1963', 
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concept evolved and rather meant for its European advocates to mediate 
between the East and the West and to prevent the US domination of Western 
Europe.82  
The EC-PRC relationship offers insights into the debate over the 
meaning of détente. Yet, the historiography on the Cold War remains silent 
on the EC-PRC axis. Interpretations of détente are marked on the one side by 
historians who stress that détente was never meant to end the Cold War.83 
Notably, John Lewis Gaddis argues that détente reflected the common 
interests in Washington, Moscow, and the capitals of their allies in reversing 
the diminution of influence of the United States and the Soviet Union.84 On 
the other side are historians who distinguish a European from a superpower 
détente, and argue that it involved seeking a permanent solution to the 
conflict. 85  Jussi Hanhimäki for example concludes that European 
governments initiated and led European détente, best illustrated by the 
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE).86 But even this 
second side pays little attention to non-traditional actors like the Community, 
and individual institutions such as the Commission. Once more this thesis 
will seek to fill part of this gap. 
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Sources 
The multi-archival and multilateral approach adopted in this thesis means 
that this study draws on the records of the EC institutions (Commission, 
Council of Ministers, European Parliament), the French, British and German 
governments, and a collection of personal papers, and interviews. To examine 
the interplay between national and Community level policy-making towards 
China it is essential to explore the historical archives of the Commission, 
which also contain accounts of the COREPER’s workings, and of the meetings 
of the Council of Ministers in Brussels. Reading these helps to establish the 
collective Community decision-making vis-à-vis China post 1969. Of 
particular interest are the papers of Emile Noël, Secretary-General of the 
Commission, and Emmanuele Gazzo, the Director of Agence Europe held in 
Florence to provide an insight to the intricacy of the Brussels bureaucracy. 
Soames’ papers held at the Churchill  rchives Centre in Cambridge are 
important for documenting the pivotal role he played in the establishment of 
EC-PRC diplomatic relations. Unfortunately, the papers are peculiarly sparse, 
which may be attributable to Soames having had dyslexia, meaning that he 
did not receive written briefs.87 
The study also uses the European Parliament’s plenary sessions, 
reports, rules of procedures and the correspondence of the cabinet of 
European Parliament President Emilio Colombo which are held at the Centre 
Archivistique et Documentaire (CARDOC) in Luxembourg. These sources are 
valuable to find out the general discourse in which EC-China relations took 
 
87 Daniel Edwin Furby and N. Piers Ludlow, 'Christopher Soames, 1968-72', in John Young and Rogelia Pastor-
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place. Commission representatives were often more eloquent about their 
motivations when talking to the European Parliament than in their own 
internal deliberations, at least as the latter appear in the usually spare 
internal Commission records. These sources ought to be read with caution 
however since they might reflect more the way the Commission wanted to 
present an issue to the European Parliament, rather than the Commission’s 
internal deliberations. They also illustrate the pressure the European 
Parliament exercised on the Council and Commission to improve relations 
with the PRC. Notably, Colombo was the first EP President to travel to China 
in 1979. 
Not only is the consultation of the French, German and British national 
archives essential to extract member state interests in Community decision-
making vis-à-vis China. They are also important to compensate for the patchy 
sources on COREPER and Council meetings. The official minutes kept in the 
Council archives are very thin and of little use. The best approach to 
establishing what was discussed and decided in each meeting is to use the 
participants’ records of what went on as relayed back to the foreign 
ministries.  
In France, the archives of the Quai d’Orsay at La Courneuve contain the 
files on French policy towards Europe and China. Since the Service Général 
de Coopération Interministérielle (SGCI) was the key institution for devising 
the French stance in Brussels from 1958 onwards the files held at the Centre 
des Archives Contemporaines (CAC) in Fontainebleau are relevant to extract 
the French decision-makers’ perceptions on the coordination of policies 
towards China in the name of the Community. The Ministry of Finance 
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archives at Savigny aid in the assessment of the economic determinant of 
French attitudes towards a concerted EC response to China. This thesis also 
uses the files of Presidents Pompidou and Giscard d’Estaing, available at the 
Archives Nationales in Paris. 
In Germany, a reading of the Bundeskanzleramt files held at the 
Bundesarchiv Koblenz is imperative to identify the top-level stance regarding 
the Community decision to adopt a stance towards China. Working down the 
administrative pyramid of the German government involves working through 
the files of the Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft also held in Koblenz, and 
the files at the Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amt in Berlin. The latter 
contain the diplomatic correspondence and policy-papers of Germany and is 
essential for understanding the national decision-makers’ attitude towards a 
coordination of European foreign policies towards China. The personal 
papers of Helmut Schmidt in the Helmut-Schmidt-Archiv at the Archiv der 
Sozialen Demokratie of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung in Bonn are valuable in 
establishing the extent to which he contributed to the Community opening to 
China. 
Acknowledging that Britain joined the Community only in 1973, the 
investigation of the development of EC-China relations from the British 
government’s perspective concentrates upon the documentation held at the 
National  rchives in Kew. Consulting the Prime Minister’s (PREM), the 
Cabinet papers (CAB), the files of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office 
(FCO) and of the Treasury (T) , the project explores the perception of the 
British government regarding coordinating their foreign policies towards 
China with the other member states. The extensive reports from the 
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European capitals and Brussels contained in the files prove invaluable to gain 
an insight – even if biased – of the perceptions of and attitudes of the nine 
member states (the Nine) towards EC-PRC relations.  
This thesis also draws upon interviews with actors involved in the 
beginnings of the EC–China relationship, and which have been conducted for 
the purpose of this study: Edmund Wellenstein, director general of the 
Directorate of External Relations (DG I) of the European Commission (1973-
1976); David Hannay, Soames’ chef de cabinet (1973-1977); Louis Kawan, 
then principal adviser and task deputy to the CSCE in Europe and for 
relations with the state trading countries at DG I; John Maslen, adviser for 
Relations with State Trading Countries at DG I in the period examined; David 
Ting, then administrator at the Division for Relations with State Trading 
Countries at DG I; and Théophile Junker, head of division at the EP 
Directorate General of Committees and Interparliamentary Delegations 
(1975-1992). In addition, the study uses the oral history section of the 
Historical Archives of the European Union. 
These oral sources come with all the pitfalls known to be inherent to 
their nature, including selective and altered memory, and the possibility of a 
person’s role being played up beyond what they actually did. However these 
sources offer a distinctive living link to the past. The eye-witness-accounts 
convey a different perception, authenticity, and feel for the time which the 
especially dry Community archival sources fail to communicate. Other 
sources available for this period are memoirs, political diaries and 
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biographies of the European decision-makers. 88 They provide insights into 
the intellectual and personal background of individuals and a human face to 
the 1970s. All in all, these additional, non-governmental sources shed light on 
the informal processes involved in decision-making, offering access to what 
took place behind-the-scenes.   
Structure 
The study is organised chronologically. Such an approach offers an overall 
picture of the landmarks and developments in the Community’s dealings with 
the PRC. It also allows an appreciation of the complexities and particularities 
of the time in which individual decision-makers operated. The chronological 
structure moreover conveys the variations in the atmosphere and tone, in the 
expectations and perceptions for the Community to engage with Beijing. 
However within the chapters certain issues and actors are analysed 
thematically. This permits the details of a particular point to be brought 
together rather than having them spread out over periods of several months, 
with the purpose of showing more clearly their significance.  
 The opening chapter discusses how the contacts between the 
Community and the PRC developed until December 1973, when the Nine 
pledged for the first time publicly to strengthen their ties with the People’s 
Republic in the Declaration of European Identity. It examines how China 
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featured in the Common Commercial Policy, and what the first attempts of 
political coordination towards Beijing were. It also analyses the impact of the 
first enlargement, and the beginning of the Sino-Soviet competition for closer 
contacts with the EC. The chapter shows that initially economics were the 
primary concern for the Community in its dealings with China. This changed 
to politics both regarding the Community’s position in the Cold War and 
concerning inter-institutional competences. It introduces the central role that 
Soames came to play. 
The decision to establish official relations with the PRC in May 1975 is 
the focus of Chapter Two. It traces back the extraordinary decision-making 
process, assesses the advantages implied in the setting up of formal relations 
with the People’s Republic, and explains the bureaucratic politics at work. 
For the purpose of this thesis, the term ‘bureaucratic politics’ means the 
attempt by bureaucracies, whether governmental, intra-governmental, 
supranational or transnational, to manoeuvre themselves into strong 
positions in order to define the outcome of decision-making of the larger 
political entity they belong to.89 The chapter highlights the political nature of 
the decision, Soames’ distinctive part in the decision-making process, and the 
peculiar timing of the decision linked to the British referendum for EC 
membership, the first meeting of the European Council, and the culmination 
of the CSCE in Helsinki.  
Chapter Three analyses the Community’s efforts between May 1975 
and January 1977 to use the new momentum in its relationship with the PRC 
 
89 See also: Ginsberg, Foreign Policy Actions of the European Community; Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, 
Essence of Decision: The Cuban Missile Crisis, (New York: Longman, 1999). 
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government. It explains how the European Council involved itself in the new 
diplomatic relationship, and why the Commission’s efforts to speedily 
conclude a trade agreement with the Chinese were frustrated. The chapter 
reveals the effect of the qualitative jump in the EC-China relationship on the 
Community’s dealings with the Soviet bloc, notably COMECON.  
The conclusion of the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement is subject of Chapter 
Four. The chapter argues that essentially politics more than economics 
continued to be at the forefront of the negotiations for an agreement. In the 
period up to 1980, the sixteen months between February 1977 and June 1978 
were one of the most intense phases of interaction amongst the different 
Community institutions. This interaction tended to be cooperative rather 
than antagonistic. Whereas the Chinese government was primarily the one 
that set the pace and timing for the conclusion of the trade agreement, it was 
the Commission which succeeded in negotiating an agreement largely in the 
Community’s favour. Finally, the renewed intensification in the EC-PRC 
relationship paralleled that in the EC-COMECON one, and the Commission 
took advantage of this in the trade negotiations with the Chinese. 
Chapter Five concentrates on the implementation of the trade 
agreement and the wider implications this had for the Community’s external 
relations. It looks at the Community’s visiting diplomacy, the role the private 
sector came to play in it, and the international crisis situation of the Sino-
Vietnamese war. It discusses the various economic instruments the 
Community used, including the textile agreement, to smooth the political 
relations with Beijing. And it shows how the Cold War continued to be a 
defining external factor in shaping the relationship. However the economic 
  
 
46 
competition with the United States and Japan became an increasingly 
important one too. The final chapter draws together the different levels of 
analysis and provides concluding remarks.  
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 Beginnings and a public pledge  
(December 1969 – December 1973) 
‘La Chine multiplie les d clarations favorables à la 
Communauté européenne, mais celle-ci n'a jamais rien 
dit à propos de la Chine.’1 
Etienne Manac’h, French ambassador to China, January 1973 
‘Conscious of the major role played by China in 
international affairs, the Nine intend to intensify their 
relations with the Chinese Government and to promote 
exchanges in various fields as well as contacts between 
European and Chinese leaders.’2 
Declaration of European Identity, December 1973 
The Nine pledged for the first time publicly their concerted effort to intensify 
relations with China in the Declaration of European Identity of 14 December 
1973. 3  Such a pledge was remarkable. Until recently, the majority of 
European governments had not wanted to deal with Mao’s People’s Republic. 
But now, not only did the Nine reach out diplomatically to Beijing, but they 
also used the relationship to demonstrate West European unity in 
international politics. Historians such as McAllister depict 1973 as a 
‘traumatic year’ for the EC which left a legacy that was ‘not a happy one’.4 
Enlargement resulted in the Community being ‘wider but weaker’. 5  This 
 
1 Archives du Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, La Courneuve (henceforward AMAE), Série Service de Coopération 
Economique (henceforward DE-CE), 1967-1975, 1070, La Chine et la Communauté européenne, Manac'h to 
Schumann, Beijing, 17 January 1973. 
2 Declaration of European Identity, in European Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, 12/12, 1973, 
pp.118–122. 
3 Ibid. 
4 McAllister, European Union, p.81. 
5 Ibid, pp.70–1. 
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chapter challenges these views. It shows that in important respects it was in 
1973 that the Community set the political groundwork for its relationship 
with Beijing. Regarding the China dossier the ‘wider and stronger’ thesis 
proves more adequate.  
The purpose of this chapter is to analyse how the European Community 
engaged with the PRC until December 1973. The chapter confirms that US 
President Richard Nixon’s 1972 visit to Beijing was an essential factor in 
allowing the Community as such to liaise with Beijing. It also backs the 
prevalent view that the relationship developed mainly because the Chinese 
government sought more contacts whereas the Europeans reacted to this.6 It 
adds however that in the Community the China issue rose in salience as the 
result of a bottom-up process rather than a top-down one. It demonstrates 
that the European Parliament was the one EC institution which from the 
beginning pushed for a concerted Community approach. Only when Britain 
joined the EC in January 1973 did the member states involve themselves 
more. The Commission took an active interest in the China dossier once Sir 
Christopher Soames became vice-president responsible for external relations. 
Establishing official relations with the Community became his personal 
ambition – what the Americans had done in 1972, he wanted to do in the 
name of the Community. Whereas initially the primary concern in the 
Community’s dealings with Beijing was economics, by 1973 this had changed 
to politics.  
 
6 See for example: Ebinger, 'The Politics of Potential'; Kapur, China and the European Economic Community. 
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First, this chapter analyses the relevance of the PRC in the evolution of 
the EC Common Commercial Policy. Second, it examines the first steps of 
European diplomacy vis-à-vis China. The focus is on the vote on the PRC’s 
permanent seat at the United Nations (UN) Security Council, and the first 
contacts between the Chinese and the Commission. Third, the chapter looks 
at the effects of enlargement on the way the Community responded to the 
PRC. It then analyses how the political contacts intensified and the Nine 
arrived at the definition of a political consensus on China. Next, the chapter 
investigates the consequences of the EC-PRC rapprochement for the 
Community’s relationship with the Soviet bloc. Finally, the chapter examines 
the reference to the PRC in the Declaration of European Identity. 
Institutionalising trade 
The policy area where the Community faced the task of defining how to deal 
with China for the first time in EC history was the Common Commercial 
Policy. The trade articles that the Europeans were interested in exporting to 
China included multiple high technology products, power plants, transport 
and communication equipment, tankers and special ships, electronics, food 
processing machinery, manufactured goods, chemical produce such as 
pesticides and fertilisers, but also agricultural produce like grain and cereals.7 
The goods which the Europeans were keen on importing from the PRC 
 
7 Council of Ministers Archive, Brussels, (henceforward CMA), Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, 
Rapport des Conseillers Commerciaux (2ème Rapport), 26 March 1974; CMA, Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 
2026/1974, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la Communauté économique européenne en 
République populaire de Chine (3ème Rapport), 24 October 1974; European Commission Historical Archives, 
Brussels (henceforward ECHA), BAC 136/1987/629, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la 
Communauté économique européenne en République populaire de Chine (4ème rapport), 3 April 1975. 
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included natural resources such as coal, iron ore, manganese, oil, uranium, 
bauxite, tin, tungsten, and antimony.8 Thus the EC and the PRC economies 
potentially complemented each other. But after the break down of external 
trade during the Cultural Revolution, China remained to the Europeans an 
unknown entity as a market, and the factors that influenced its economy 
remained obscure to them too.9  
A first landmark in the institutional wrangle of how the Community 
should figure out its policy towards the PRC came in March 1965. The 
Commission sought to oblige member states to seek approval for agricultural 
trade deals with all state trading countries. France in particular protested 
against this decision, partially because it had just struck a significant trade 
deal for grain sales to China.10 But the Commission argued that it had the 
right to get involved because under the rules of the Common Agricultural 
Policy (CAP), EC funds were to subsidise agricultural exports. Therefore the 
French decision had consequences that reached beyond France and China. 
The outcome was that the Council of Ministers overruled the Commission.11 
The Council of Ministers decided the next stage in how to deal with the 
state trading countries, when it adopted three regulations to standardise the 
import regimes in 1968.12 During the consultation between the Council of 
 
8 John Robinson, EC-China Trade Trends, (Brussels: EEC, 1975).  
9 See the reports from China: ECHA, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de 
la Communauté économique européenne en République populaire de Chine (3ème Rapport), 24 October 1974; 
ECHA, BAC 136/1987/629, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la Communauté économique 
européenne en République populaire de Chine (4ème rapport), 3 April 1975. 
10 Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s, p.67. 
11 Financement de la politique agricole commune. Ressources propre de la Communaute. Renforcement des 
pouvoirs du Parlement européen. Propositions de la Commission au Conseil. COM (65) 150 final, 31 March 1965. 
12 EEC Regulation n° 2041/68, 2043/68, 2045/68 of 10 December 1968, Official Journal L 303, 18 December 1968. 
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Ministers and the Commission the European Parliament requested the 
Commission to account for its activities.13 Similar to the dispute in 1965, the 
Member of Parliament (MEPs) made their voice heard.14 Again, it took two 
inquiries including a complaint by Hendrikus Vredeling, an MEP from the 
Dutch Labour Party, for the Commission to elaborate an answer. 15  The 
pattern whereby the European Parliament elbowed its way into the 
Community’s decision-making was already emerging at this early stage.  
The Council of Ministers decision of 16 December 1969 on the 
commercial agreements with all third parties refined matters further.16 The 
Commission was to negotiate all commercial agreements with third countries 
in the name of the Community. The decision also contained transitional 
measures. These addressed the problem that originated from the fact that the 
Community did not have official relations with the Communist countries. The 
measures foresaw that until 31 December 1972 the member states could 
negotiate agreements as long as they did not contradict the EC guidelines. 
From 1 January 1973 onwards the Commission was to take over, and any 
existing bilateral trade agreements were to terminate on 31 December 1974.  
The Sino-German trade agreement shows how from 1969 onwards the 
national governments coordinated their external trade relations with each 
other and the Commission. German Chancellor Willy Brandt’s government 
recognised the PRC diplomatically on 11 October 1972. By that date a Sino-
 
13 Written Question No. 140/69, de M. Vredeling à la Commission des Communautés europénnes, Official Journal 
C 112, 28 August 1969. 
14 Written Question No. 18/65, de M. Vredeling à la Commission des Communautés europénnes, Official Journal C 
127, 13 July 1965. 
15 EEC Regulation n° 2041/68, 2043/68, 2045/68 of 10 December 1968, Official Journal L 303, 18 December 1968. 
16 Official Journal L 236, 29 December 1969. 
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German rapprochement proved less liable to upset either the United States or 
the Soviet Union. Nixon had travelled to China and Brandt had cemented his 
Ostpolitik via the Moscow Treaty, the Warsaw Treaty, the Four Power Treaty 
on Berlin, and the preparations of the Basic Treaty.17 Prior to official relations 
the chambers of commerce arranged the trade regulations.18 Now German 
Foreign Minister Walter Scheel discussed the options for a trade agreement.19 
The Chinese asserted they were not yet ready for a Community agreement. 
Therefore Germany asked prior to the opening of bilateral negotiations for an 
EC ‘consultation-coordination’ procedure based on the Council decision of 
December 1969.  
The consultations began on 23 October 1972 at the Permanent 
Representative’s Committee (COREPER) working group which dealt with the 
state trading countries. Such working groups were staffed by national experts 
or from the member states' Permanent Representations and by a Commission 
representative. Although they did not have the authority to take decisions, 
they completed the bulk of the work. They exchanged views, ensured mutual 
consultation, furthered cooperation between specialized national diplomats, 
and identified options for consideration and decisions at a higher level.20 As a 
result of the consultation, the German government asked the Commission to 
approve its project. Carlo Scarascia Mugnozza, vice-president of the 
Commission, did so on 8 November 1972. The Council subsequently accepted 
 
17 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.75. 
18 ECHA, BAC 48/198/4441, Consultation-coordination préalable à l'ouverture des négociations entre l'Allemagne 
et le République populaire de Chine pour la conclusion d'un accord commercial à long terme, Ernst to Dahrendorf, 
Brussels, 26 October 1972. 
19 National Archives, Kew (henceforward NA), FCO 30/1287, Eastern Area Group, de Fonblanque to Gaving, 
Brussels, 24 October 1972. 
20 Keukeleire and MacNaughtan, The Foreign Policy of the European Union, p.75. 
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the Commission’s proposal. This allowed Germany to conclude a trade 
agreement valid between 1972 and 1974.21 This episode illustrates how the 
Community dimension in the member states’ foreign trade policy with China 
had become an integrated part of the process. 
The Council decision of December 1969 also regulated the EC’s 
autonomous commercial measures. This meant a Community scheme of 
liberation measures for products under quotas. Member states could still 
request special national quotas subject to approval from the Council of 
Ministers. Examples of such requests concerned for example dehydrated 
garlic, green beans in tins, and silk.22 The Community classified the PRC in 
the list of state trading countries. This implied higher quantitative 
restrictions on Chinese imports to the EC than if China had featured amongst 
the developing countries.  
As the EC-PRC trade developed the European Parliament advocated 
closer coordination between the member states. It pushed the Council of 
Ministers to account for the effectiveness of the Common Commercial Policy. 
Cornelius Berkhouwer, Dutch MEP of the Liberal and Democratic Group and 
president of the European Parliament from 1973 to 1975, addressed the 
Council in August 1971:  
 
21 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Economic notes on trade with China, Soames cabinet, Brussels, 14 February 1973. 
22 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/625, Recours à l'article 115 du Traité introduit par la France le 5 juillet 1973 pour l'ail 
deshydraté (position 07.04 ex B du TDC) originaires de la République populaire de Chine et mis en libre pratique 
dans les autres Etats Membres, Wellenstein to Soames, Brussels, 18 July 1973; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/625, Recours à 
l'article 115 introduit le 10 avril 1973 par l'Allemagne relatif aux préparations et conserves de haricots verts (position 
20.02 ex G du TDC) originaires de Républiques populaire de Chine et mises en libre pratique dans les autres Etats 
Membres, Wellenstein to Soames, Brussels, 13 April 1973; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/626, Recours à l'article 115 du 
Traité introduit par l'Italie le 14 mai 1973 pour exclure du traitement communautaire les tissus de soie grège 
(position ex 50.09 du TDC), originaires de République populaire de Chine et mis en libre pratique dans les autres 
Etats Membres, Meynell to Soames, Brussels, 21 May 1973. 
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‘In the light of the developing economic relations between the EEC 
and the People’s Republic of China, should the Council not set out 
a Common Commercial Policy to avoid that China can play off the 
member states against each other?’23  
The European Parliament was to continue its pressure in that respect. In 
June 1973 it inquired this time whether the Commission had elaborated a 
global approach for EC trade relations with China.24 
Such a query hit a nerve. The commercial rivalry between the member 
states in China was growing, as the British pointed out once they joined the 
Community.25 Even if the Chinese welcomed the EC collective policy towards 
the Soviet Union and others, they preferred themselves to negotiate with the 
member states individually. Consequently the member states competed for 
Chinese favours against one another.26 The European Parliament’ enquiries 
acted as an uncomfortable reminder of how the member states were 
depriving the Community of any collective bargaining power. 
One attempt to shore up such European bargaining power developed 
when the member states’ commercial and economic representatives in 
Beijing met in July 1972. At a lunch meeting on 26 July 1972 the 
representatives decided on closer cooperation amongst the Europeans in 
China. The Dutch representative took the Chair by virtue of his country’s 
chairmanship of the Council of Ministers. Belgium, France, Italy, Denmark 
and Norway were also represented at this first meeting. Germany, 
 
23 ECHA, BAC 71/2004/92, Written Question No. 243/71, Mr. Berkhouwer to the Council of Ministers, 10 August 
1971. 
24 ECHA, BAC 71/2004/92, Written Question No. 152/73, Mr. Cousté to the Commission of the European 
Communities, 18 June 1973. 
25 NA,  FCO 40/460, The external relations of the European Community: relations with non-European Communist 
countries, 22 March 1973. 
26 Ibid. 
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Luxembourg and Ireland did not join because they had not yet established 
diplomatic relations. The representatives agreed to gather monthly, to have a 
greater exchange of information, and to report every six months on the 
economic and commercial situation in China to the Council of Ministers and 
the Commission.27 
But despite the significant development of the policy framework, the 
EC-PRC trade itself grew only slowly and proved almost negligible in 
quantitative terms.  
Table 0-1: Direction of trade of the Six for 1965 and 1971 in 
million US $28 
Exports of the Six to 1965 1971 
the PRC 231 336 
Hungary 156 441 
Sweden 1594 2297 
the United States 3425 7753 
  
Imports by the Six 
from  
1965 1971 
the PRC 195 282 
Hungary 160 364 
Sweden 1298 2136 
United States 5692 9053 
 
27 NA, FCO 219/79, Hum to Crompton, Beijing, 1 August 1972. 
28 International Monetary Fund (2006): Direction of Trade Statistics (Edition: 1948-1980). ESDS International, 
University of Manchester. 
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For 1971 the Commission noted that the trade did not develop in a 
satisfactory manner. 29  The exports of the Nine regressed from US$ 461 
million in 1970 to US$ 397 million (-14%), whereas the imports of all other 
countries to China saw a global increase of 1% (an increase of US$ 2120 to 
US$ 2148 million). As far as the imports by the Nine from China were 
concerned, the level of 1970 remained (US$ 347 million), but the imports of 
all the trade partners of China taken together progressed in 1971 by 
approximately 13% (from US$ 2052 to US$ 2318 million). Taking as a base 
the year 1965, the Nine’s exports to China increased until 1971 by 30% and 
the imports from China by 20%. In this light the growth in exchanges of 
China was significantly lower than the growth of exchanges in goods between 
the Community and the Eastern European countries. 30  Therefore despite 
further coordination and institutionalisation of trade relations, the evolution 
of EC-PRC trade proved disappointing and the relative volume of trade 
almost insignificant.  
First political coordination 
French President Georges Pompidou denied that a common foreign policy 
towards the PRC existed in the first place. He commented to Henri Froment-
Meurice, director for  sia at the Quai d’Orsay, on his travel account to China 
of 9 February 1971: ‘Il n'y a pas, pour le moment, de politique  trangère des 
Six et nous ne faisons que nous compromettre vis-à-vis de tout le monde en 
 
29 ECHA BAC 136/1987/624, Le Commerce extérieur de la Chine: structure et perspectives de développement, 
Brussels, 23 February 1973. 
30 Ibid. 
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faisant quelques efforts dans ce sens.’31 But a coordination of the member 
states’ foreign policy became topical only a few months later when they faced 
the vote on the PRC’s role at the United Nations. 
The member states discussed the vote within the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC) mechanism and bilaterally rather than through 
COREPER or the Council of Ministers. 32  In the late 1960s the PRC had 
started to lobby intensively to win the seat in the United Nations and the 
accompanying permanent membership of the Security Council vote. The 
Guomindang government on Taiwan had held that membership since 1949.33 
In October 1971 the UN General Assembly voted on a motion sponsored by 
the United States that would have allowed Taiwan to keep its seat.34 But the 
vote turned out in favour of the PRC.35 The PRC managed a further step in 
consolidating its status as a world power following the acquisition of a 
nuclear capability in 1964. For the first time the European delegations 
departed from their former alignment with the United States on the China 
question and did not support American resolution to keep a seat for Taiwan 
 
31 Archives Nationales, Paris (henceforward AN), Papers of Georges Pompidou (henceforward 5 AG 2), 1035, Note 
manuscrite de Monsieur Pompidou sur la note de M. Froment-Meurice: conclusion d'un voyage en Chine et dans le 
Sud-Est asiatique, 9 February 1971. 
32 For examples of meetings at bilateral level see: AN, 5 AG 2, 108, Conversations franco-britanniques sur l'Asie, 4-5 
mars 1971, 10 March 197; AN, 5 AG 2, 108, Conversations franco-britanniques des 22 et 23 octobre 1970 à Paris, 4 
November 1970; examples of EPC meetings: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amt (henceforward PAAA), 
B21/744, Europäische politische Einigung, Sitzung Politisches Komitee vom 20./21. September 1971 in Rom, 
Staden, 24 September 1971. 
33 Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp.596–598. 
34 United Nations General Assembly, 26th session, Annexes, Agenda item 93, Doc. A/8392. 
35 adopted Resolution 2758 (XXVI) in favour of the PRC. 
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in the UN.36 All voted in favour of the resolution except Luxembourg which 
abstained.37 
But it was the European Parliament that turned the UN vote on the PRC 
into a Community affair. Berkhouwer confronted the Council of Ministers on 
26 August 1971 with the question of whether it coordinated a stance on the 
PRC.38 In order to increase the pressure on the Council to reply, Belgian MEP 
Ernest Glinne, from the Socialist Group, put a similar question to the Council 
of Ministers.39 In both cases the member states deflected accountability: they 
answered that the matter was for EPC to deal with and not within the 
competence of the Council of Ministers. 
The EC-PRC relationship took on a new quality in May 1972 because 
Zhou Enlai, prime minister and foreign minister of the People’s Republic, 
mentioned in an interview to Agence France Press the possibility of 
accrediting a diplomatic mission to the Community.40 A moderate Chinese 
foreign policy line emerged with Zhou Enlai’s ascendancy in the context of 
heavy factional infighting as Mao sought to reassert the authority of the party 
 
36 Ebinger, 'The Politics of Potential', p.832. See also on the German position: Bundesarchiv, Koblenz 
(henceforward BAK), Files of the Bundeskanzleramt (henceforward BKA), B136/6244, Minister and Herrn AL II, 28 
October 1971; BAK, BKA, B136/6244, Aufnahme der VR China in die Vereinten Nationen, Sanne to Schönefeld, 
Bonn, 3 November 1971; BAK, BKA, B136/6244, Aussenpolitische Unterrichtung des Kabinetts, Punkt 4 der 
Tagesordnung der Kabinettssitzung am 10. November 1971, Vertretung Chinas in den Vereinten Nationen, 
Heimsoeth an Referat L 1 im Hause, Bonn, 8 November 1971.  
37 http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profile=voting&index=.VM&term=ares2758 
38 Written Question No. 243/71, de M. Berkhouwer au Conseil des Communautés europénnes, Politique commune 
à l'égard de la République populaire de Chine, Official Journal C 5, 21 January 1972. 
39 see ECHA, BAC 71/2004/92; Written Question No. 261/71, de M. Glinne au Conseil des Communautés 
europénnes, 26 August 1971, Représentation de la République populaire de Chine à l'ONU, Official Journal C 5, 21 
January 1972. 
40 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, Information relation extérieures, La République populair de Chine et la Communuté 
européenne, undated. 
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over the military.41 From autumn 1972 onwards the Chinese approached the 
member states via their foreign ministries in the national capitals, via their 
representation to Belgium in Brussels and their embassies in Beijing. They 
also struck up contact with Community officials via international 
organisations, at the Commission in Brussels, and finally they approached 
Soames directly in London. The Chinese sought information on the legal 
aspects of establishing official relations with the EC. They also inquired about 
Community policies which did not link directly to the PRC-Europe 
relationship. This included developments related to the economic and 
monetary union, enlargement, and relations with the United States, the 
Soviet Union and the developing countries. Consequently the Europeans did 
not only discuss the EC-PRC relations in theoretical terms and amongst 
themselves anymore, but they also faced the task of defining the Community 
relationship in direct dialogue with the Chinese themselves. 
The next milestone in the EC-PRC relationship occurred on 4 December 
1972 when two Chinese representatives visited the Commission in Brussels 
for the first time. The approach was not entirely unexpected. In October at a 
session of the United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
(UNCTAD) in Geneva the Chinese representative Chang Tianhua had 
suggested such a visit to a Community official.42 In December, it was Hsieh 
Chen-Li, third secretary of the embassy of the PRC to Belgium, and his 
interpreter, who first had a meeting with the Commission’s Service 
Documentations. Then Louis Kawan, principal adviser and task deputy to the 
 
41 Ebinger, 'The Politics of Potential', p.26. 
42 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1070, CEE-Chine, Ministère d'état chargé de la défense nationale, SDECE, 14 
November 1972. 
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CSCE in Europe and for relations with the state trading countries at DG I, 
met the Chinese.43 Exchanges picked up with a second visit following on 26 
January 1973 and a third one on 5 February 1973.44  
The first manifestation of a concerted and distinctive European 
approach vis-à-vis China was in the making. The member states had 
coordinated their UN vote in favour of the PRC and against American policy. 
Whereas this coordination took place at EPC, the European Parliament did 
its utmost to turn the issue into a Community one. Once Zhou Enlai publicly 
expressed interest in official EC-PRC relations in May 1972, the first direct 
political contacts between the Chinese and the Commission in Brussels 
followed. These contacts enabled the Commission to assume a more active 
role in the wake of the first enlargement.  
Fresh impetus due to Britain joining 
A concerted Community response to China became even more complex when 
Britain, Ireland and Denmark joined the EC in January 1973. One motivation 
for Britain to join the Community was to give more weight to the British role 
in international affairs.45 Prior to joining the Community, the British had 
already fostered contacts with the Chinese on Community matters. Michael 
Butler, the head of European Integration Department at the Foreign and 
Commonwealth Office (FCO), had given the Chinese ambassador in London a 
 
43 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Visite de diplomates chinois, DG I to Dahrendorf, Brussels, 4 December 1972. 
44 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Chine-Communauté, 2ème visite de diplomate chinois, Wellenstein to Soames, 
Brussels, 26 January 1973; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Chine, Wellenstein to Soames, Brussels, 5 February 1973.  
45 Refer for example to: Giulia Bentivoglio, 'Britain, the EEC and the Special Relationship during the Heath 
Government', in Michel Affinito, Guia Migani and Christian Wenkel (eds.), Les Deux Europes the Two Europes: 
Actes du IIIe Colloque International RICHIE Proceedings of the 3rd International RICHIE Conference, (Brussels: 
PIE Peter Lang, 2009), pp.284–285. 
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full account of the Paris Summit of October 1972.46 Moreover, on 31 October 
1972 the FCO Permanent Under-Secretary Thomas Brimelow had agreed 
with the Chinese Assistant-Minister Zhang Wenjin to inform the Chinese 
about European developments.47 Later, on 28 November 1972, Roger Hervey, 
an FCO official, wrote to Richard Evans, FCO head of the Far East 
Department, and Martin Morland, FCO assistant head at the European 
Integration Department, that one of the interpreters at the Chinese embassy 
had enquired which countries proposed to accredit representatives to the 
Commission. Hervey commented that ‘This may an important straw in the 
wind. The Chinese enquiry suggests prima facie that Peking may be 
considering more actively than hitherto accrediting a representative to the 
EEC.’ 48  Similar queries followed in December. 49  Thus in the run-up of 
Britain’s EC membership, the FCO already promoted the EC-PRC 
relationship bilaterally.  
Britain fostered the EC-PRC relationship also working through the EPC. 
Britain was eager to exploit the opportunities of this new mechanism. It had 
joined the Political Committee in February 1972, and the British constantly 
advocated a ‘Europe able to speak with one voice’.50 Considering the growing 
number in Chinese queries about official relations with the Community and 
the prospect of Deng Xiaoping’s visit to Europe in early 1973, the British 
 
46 NA, FCO 30/1281, Chinese interest in European developments, Davies to Samuel, London, 6 December 1972. 
47 NA, FCO 30/1282, Record of conversation at the Chinese embassy at 2.30pm on 27 October, 1972; NA, FCO 
30/1282, Chinese interest in European developments, Davies to Samuel, London, 6 December 1972. 
48 NA, FCO 30/1282, China and the EEC, Hervey to Evans and Morland, 28 November 1972. 
49 NA, FCO 30/1282, China and the EEC, 15 December 1972. 
50 Romano, 'The Main Task of the European Political Cooperation, footnote 126; Giulia, 'Britain, the EEC and the 
Special Relationship during the Heath Government', p.283. 
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pushed for closer European cooperation.51 The Permanent Undersecretary’s 
Planning Committee pointed out that Britain supported such a collective 
approach because it contributed to an eventual common foreign policy and 
safeguarded a benevolent Chinese attitude towards Europe in general, and 
the UK in particular.52  
But the British harboured no illusions about the effectiveness of such a 
collective approach: 
‘there are awkward divisions within the Community; the impact on 
Chinese actions is not likely to be great; and the present 
honeymoon may end before long. The prospects for early and 
significant progress are therefore small, and we should be ill-
advised to give China priority over joint Community action 
elsewhere.’ 53  
Concerning a Community trade agreement with the PRC, Christopher Hum, 
an official in the British embassy in Beijing, informed London that he had not 
yet seen any suggestions. Moreover, judging from the dealings with the 
Italians and West Germans they thought the Chinese were prepared to play it 
long.54 
On the French side the ambassador to China, Etienne Manac’h, 
vehemently brought the issue of EC-PRC relations to the attention of his 
government. The opening quote of this chapter refers to the conclusions 
which Manac’h drew from a lunch he organised with his European 
 
51 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1070, Relations Chine-CEE, Beaumarchais to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, London, 
23 January 1973; AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1070, Coopération politique à neuf - Chine et URSS, 
Beaumarchais to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, Londres, 23 January 1973. 
52 NA, FCO 21/1097, confidential, Permanent Under-Secretary’s Planning Committee, The External Relations of the 
European Community: Relations with Non-European Communist countries, 8 March 1973. 
53 Ibid. 
54 NA, FCO 21/1096, Effect of our entry into the EEC on trading with China, Cochlin to Hum, 22 January 1973. 
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counterparts in early 1973. 55  In a letter to the French Foreign Minister 
Maurice Schumann of 17 January 1973 he urged that the matter be put onto 
the agenda of the European Community.56 Similarly to the British analysis, 
yet more explicitly and illustrating the French view, Manac’h spelled out:  
‘La R publique F d rale  llemande, qui a, parmi les Neuf, le 
commerce le plus développé avec Pékin, s'est empressée de 
conclure un accord commercial bilatéral avant la fin de 1972, afin 
de prendre de vitesse la politique commerciale commune. Le 
Benelux a été moins rapide mais a entrepris des pourparlers et 
espère bénéficier d'une dérogation communautaire pour conclure 
un accord commercial en 1973. La Belgique se montre très 
empressée, et son Ambassadeur souhaiterait, pour sa part, que M. 
Harmel vint à Pékin pendant qu'il assure la présidence du Conseil 
des Ministres de la Communauté. Ne cherchent-t-elle pas surtout à 
profiter de l'aura communautaire pour que son Ministre reçoive un 
meilleur accueil des Chinois? Les derniers venus, j'ai eu l'occasion 
de la noter, sont les plus impatients. Enfin, les Britanniques, bien 
qu'ils manifestent ici un bon esprit de coopération, ne cherchent-
ils pas à s'assurer la part du lion dans les relations des pays 
européens avec la Chine? Ils s'en défendent certes, mais ils 
mettent les bouchées doubles depuis la visite à Pékin de Sir Alec 
Douglas-Home. 57  
Manac’h thus highlighted the national rivalries which made a common 
foreign policy difficult, if not impossible. 
But Manac’h still repeatedly voiced his exasperation about the lack of 
joint Community action, as the opening quote of this chapter illustrates. He 
was particularly concerned about this lack because China continued to issue 
statements in support of European integration in stark contrast to the other 
Communist states, and because of the growing international competition on 
the Chinese market. He viewed the Nine’s silence as particularly striking at 
 
55 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1070, La Chine et la Communauté européenne, Manac'h to Schumann, Beijing, 
17 January 1973. 
56 Ibid. 
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the Paris Summit of October 1972 when only Sicco Mansholt, President of the 
Commission had made an indirect allusion to the relationship with China 
when he stated that the Community ought to be open for collaboration with 
all the state trading countries including the Asian ones.58 He therefore put to 
the Foreign Minister that the member states either via the Council of 
Ministers or EPC should acknowledge the European interest in liaising with 
Beijing. 59  
In September 1973, Pompidou visited the PRC, the first ever Head of 
State and Government of a member state to do so. The Chinese welcomed 
him much more enthusiastically than they had Nixon. 60  Zhou Enlai 
emphasised during a meeting with the French President that China first 
wished to develop its relations with each member state before developing ties 
with the Community.61 Therefore the Chinese strategy to encourage on the 
one hand common European action but on the other hand competition 
between the member states added to the difficulty for the Community to 
develop a common approach.  
Yet the British pushed for more coordination as a result of which the 
EPC Political Committee created on 16 and 17 January 1973 a sub-committee, 
the EPC Asia Group. The mandate of the group was to give priority to the 
examination of questions in relation to links between China and Europe. The 
EPC Presidency was to inform the member states’ ambassadors in Beijing of 
 
58 Ibid. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ebinger, 'The Politics of Potential', p.252. 
61 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1070, Note la Chine et CEE, Froment-Meurice, Paris, 22 November 1973. 
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the work of the Political Committee, and ask them for their input.62 Such an 
input followed as the result of the Belgian ambassador inviting his 
counterparts for a working lunch on 31 January. The ambassadors signposted 
early on that the coordination was not just a matter for EPC. 63 The input from 
the embassies in Beijing illustrates the multi-level and multi-faceted process 
that shaped the Community’s approach to China.  
It was the EPC Asia Group that established the political consensus on 
how to deal with the PRC – a step which proved to be crucial for all further 
developments. On 8 February 1973 the group decided unanimously that the 
‘Chinesen seien diskret und ohne Drängen in ihrem Interesse an Europa, 
insbesondere hinsichtlich der Errichtung einer EG-Vertretung in Brüssel, zu 
ermutigen.‘ 64  In parallel the Belgian Political Director Etienne Davignon 
suggested to his colleagues to include the relations with China in the 
workings of the EPC too.65 Subsequently the nine foreign ministers adopted 
the group’s conclusion at their EPC meeting on 16 March 1973. The Nine had 
given the green light for the Community as such to engage with the PRC.66  
One other consequence of Britain joining the Community was that the 
Commission had to take into account the new constellation of member states. 
It had to accommodate Britain, the new heavyweight, concerned about 
 
62 PAAA, B21/200, Zwischenarchiv 1088883, Réunion Groupe de travail Asie le 14 mars 1974, 8 March 1974. 
63 See 'suggestions pour l'agenda du groupe de travail 'Extrème Orient' du Comité politique des neuf pays membres 
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65 NA, FCO 30/1657, Davignon to Oliver Wright, Brussels, 11 January 1973; PAAA, B21/757, Davignon to Berndt, 
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European integration calling into question its ‘special relationship’ with the 
United States and its relations with the Commonwealth. Partly to reassure 
against such fears, Christopher Soames, the senior of the two incoming 
British Commissioners, obtained the portfolio of external relations.67 Soames 
was Winston Churchill’s son-in-law, a Conservative politician who had been 
involved as Minister for Agriculture in the first British application for EC 
membership (1961-1963). A known Francophile, he had served until 1972 as 
ambassador to France where his main task was to help securing British entry 
to the Community. 68  Soames was as charismatic as voluble, a colourful 
personality, with a great deal of political savoir-faire.69 
Soames also was a close personal friend of Henry Kissinger.70 While 
Soames was still ambassador in Paris he used to meet Kissinger when the 
latter was conducting secret negotiations with the North Vietnamese to end 
the Vietnam war. The first seed of the idea to set up diplomatic relations 
between the European Community and China is thought to have grown out of 
Soames’ private dinners with Kissinger in the French capital. Soames  
‘thought “why can’t I do it, why can’t I do the same thing, surely 
Europe ought to have relations with China too, if the Americans 
can.” […]  nd so Soames had this idea which nagged away at him, 
and because he was a very forceful man, he didn't just allow 
himself to say ‘well that is going to be very difficult, we can't do 
that'.71  
 
67 Laurence Badel and Eric Bussière, Franc ois- avier rtoli: l Europe, quel numéro de téléphone?, (Paris: 
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Finding the best way to do so, remained the question however. Soames kept 
any deliberations secret. The only ones with whom he shared thoughts on this 
were David Hannay, his chef de cabinet, and François-Xavier Ortoli, the 
European Commission President.72  
As a result of the impetus that came from Soames, the Commission 
fostered the EC-PRC relationship increasingly and in multiple ways. Soames’ 
cabinet and the Directorate General for External Relations (DG I) kept a close 
eye on the member states’ activity at COREPER, but also at EPC.73 They 
supported the member states’ favourable attitude towards a Chinese initiative 
to set up official relations. 74  This corresponded with Ortoli telling the 
European Parliament in February 1973 that the Community had to develop 
its relationship with China. 75  Soames also promoted the Commission’s 
activity amongst the business community. Speaking at the London Guildhall 
to the Association of Overseas Bankers on 5 February 1973 he referred to 
China when pointing to the necessity of Europe speaking with one voice.76 
Soames also briefed influential business leaders heading to China on the 
Community’s position because he anticipated that the Chinese would probe 
them about the Commission’s attitude.77 
 
72 Ibid. 
73 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/868, Conférence ministérielle de la Coopération politique - République populaire de la 
China, Meyer to Ortoli and Soames, Brussels, 27 March 1973; see also the hand-written notes on: ECHA, BAC 
136/1987/624, 683rd meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives, meeting of 17 April 1973, Relations 
with the People's Republic of China, Meyer to Ortoli and Soames, Brussels, 24 April 1973. 
74 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, China, (author illisible) to Ortoli, 3 May 1973. 
75 See also: Wilson, 'China and the European Community'. 
76 ECHA, Speech collection, Soames, Discours prononcé le lundi 5 février 1973 au Guildhall de Londres devant 
l’association des Overseas Bankers. 
77 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/628, China, Grierson to Soames, Brussels, 3 May 1973; see also previous correspondance: 
ECHA, BAC 136/1987/628, Visit to China, Soames to Grierson, 12 April 1973. 
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Although Soames was now the vice-president of the Commission and 
supposedly impartial to any member states, he himself and his cabinet 
frequently exchanged views and information with the FCO. For example 
Hannay shared with the FCO in June 1973 his analysis on the increasing 
contacts with the Chinese:   
‘ s you are probably aware members of the Chinese Embassy in 
Brussels are in fact fairly frequent visitors in the Commission 
offices these days and are gluttons for information on every aspect 
of Community life. […]  ll this leads me to suppose that it is not 
the lack of information which is prompting these numerous 
contacts both with us and with representatives of the member 
states. Rather I suspect it is an attempt to probe differences of 
appreciation on such delicate issues as, for example, the scope and 
nature of the common policy. It will no doubt not have escaped 
their attention that a question on that subject put to a Commission 
official and to a French diplomat is likely to provoke two rather 
different replies!’78 
Thus close communication channels between the Soames’ cabinet and the 
FCO existed, and few illusions persisted on how the Chinese navigated in 
between the different institutions.  
The first enlargement gave impetus to a concerted Community 
approach to the PRC. Britain pushed the topic onto the EPC agenda and 
supported the Commission’s participation in the EPC.  t the Quai d’Orsay it 
was Manac’h who urged from Beijing for the Council of Ministers and the 
Commission to publicly welcome the EC-PRC relationship. The member 
states’ ambassadors’ input and the EPC  sia Group crystallised the political 
consensus to encourage the Chinese to set up official relations with the 
Community. Soames supervised an increasingly active role of the 
Commission on the one hand with the Chinese, on the other hand with EPC, 
 
78 NA, FCO 30/1713, EEC-China, Fergusson to Morland, Brussels, 22 June 1973. 
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Coreper, the European Parliament, the FCO and the business community. A 
clear definition of who was to speak for the Community vis-à-vis China 
however was still missing.  
Growing political contacts do not parallel economic ones  
The question of who was to speak for the Community became more pressing 
in early 1973 when the Chinese queried Manac’h at the embassy in Beijing 
about setting up official relations with the Community. The Head of the 
Europe Section at the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs asked how the 
Europeans would receive such an initiative. Whereas previously the member 
states had dealt with the issue at EPC, now COREPER and the Commission 
stepped in and assumed responsibility.79 The increase in political exchanges 
however did not parallel economic ones. 
 The member states agreed on conveying a positive reply through the 
same channel to keep the communication relatively low-key and leave the 
initiative to the PRC to approach the Commission. Still, the British were wary 
of the French acting as the Community spokesperson. Manac’h also perceived 
a competition on who was to speak for the EC: ‘Je sais que certains de mes 
collègues de la Communauté et notamment mon collègue belge, brûlent de 
faire la même communication aux chinois.’80 Perhaps surprisingly, the French 
agreed not to become the EC spokesperson and to leave the initiative entirely 
 
79 NA, FCO 21/1097, Evans to Davies, April 1973; BAC 136/1987/624, 683rd meeting of the Committee of 
Permanent Representatives, 17 April 1973, Relations with the People's Republic of China, Klaus Meyer, Commission 
Deputy Secretary General, to Ortoli, Soames, Brussels, 24. April 1973. 
80 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1070, Chine-CEE, Manac'h to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, Beijing, 4 June 1973. 
  
 
70 
to the PRC. 81  Jean-Pierre Brunet, Directeur des Affaires économiques et 
financières au D partement Europe, emphasised to Manac’h: ‘nous ne 
souhaitons pas que la France paraisse agir, en ce domaine, en porte-parole de 
la Communauté. C'est en réponse à une question qui vous a été posée que 
vous apporterez à vos interlocuteurs l'information souhait e.’ 82  Hence 
Manac’h’s appeal for the Council of Ministers to step up their game did not 
resonate in Paris or in Brussels. And the British and French agreed that 
Manac’h was not to act as a spokesperson for the Community.  
But the rationale behind the Quai d’Orsay’s and the FCO’s position was 
different. The British did not want the French to monopolise a role which 
could give them national advantages. The French were cautious not to act as 
spokesperson because they did not want the Chinese to think that the French 
foreign policy was bound by Community decision-making. Moreover, 
Brunet’s instruction reflected the stance that France did not wish more 
coordination in foreign policy because it wanted to retain its room for 
manœuvre. China was not to create a precedent.  
Compared to their British and French partners, the Germans were more 
eager to see the Commission speak in the name of the Community. Their 
position emerges clearly in the stance the German Foreign Ministry took at a 
session of the ‘ ktionskommittee für die  ereinigten Staaten von Europa’ in 
April 1973. The Action Committee was a European think tank founded in 
1955 amongst others by Jean Monnet. Whereas the Germans agreed to leave 
 
81 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1070, Relations Chine-CEE, Manac'h to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, Beijing, 29 
May 1973. 
82 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1070, Chine-CEE, Brunet to Ambafrance Pékin, Paris, 2 June 1973. 
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the initiative to China, they thought that it would eventually be the role of the 
Commission to take up the dialogue with the PRC after a consultation 
procedure with the Council.83  
The institutional confusion on responsibilities grew when the member 
states decided at the EPC Asia Group on 16 May 1973, rather than at 
COREPER, to give a favourable answer to the Chinese query.84 During the 
meeting itself, the struggle regarding the competencies between the 
Community and EPC surfaced. The French representative argued that China’s 
relation with the EEC was outside the group’s competence. But the Belgian 
President and the rest of the group overruled him. The majority agreed that 
the matter was a political question on which the EPC Asia Group was entitled 
to express its views. 85  Adding to the complexity, the member states 
representatives again tabled the issue one day later, but this time at 
COREPER.86 Now the Commission stepped in and asserted that the EC-PRC 
relations were a matter for the Community to deal with rather than EPC. 
Edmund Wellenstein, director general at DG I of the European Commission, 
expressed his irritation that a sub-level of EPC dealt with the issue during the 
COREPER meeting of 17 May. 87  It is realistic to assume that due to 
Wellenstein’s criticism, the EPC  sia Group ceased to discuss the 
 
83 PAAA, B201/411/422, Sitzung des Aktionskomittees für die Vereinigten Staaten von Europa, Dortige Zuschrift 
vom 19.4.1973, Lautenschlager to Referat 200, Bonn, 24 April 1973. 
84 See reference in: ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, 686ème réunion du Comité des représentants permanents, 
Relations avec la République populaire de Chine, Brussels, 17 May 1973. 
85 NA, FCO 30/1659, European Political Co-operation: Political Committee Meeting, 24/25 May 1973, Item 7: 
Relations avec l'Asie, undated. 
86 For the handling of the matter by the member states in Brussels and the national capitals, see: NA, FCO 30/1712, 
China/EEC Meeting of the Committee of Permanent Representatives Part 2, Palliser to FCO, Brussels, 17 May 1973. 
87 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, 686ème réunion du Comité des représentants permanents, Relations avec la 
République Popularie de Chine, Brussels, 17 May 1973. 
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establishment of official relations, leaving it to COREPER and the 
Commission to deal with the dossier.88 
The press picked up on the growing contacts. Reports circulated that the 
Chinese had visited Wellenstein to indicate the imminent ‘normalisation’ of 
the relations with the accreditation of diplomatic representatives to the 
Community.89 The sensitivity of the matter and the member states vigilance is 
illustrated in the COREPER meeting of 2 October 1973. The Italian 
representative Giorgio Bombassei de Vettor asked for clarification of these 
press reports. Umberto Stefani, the Commission representative, confirmed 
that an official of DG I had had routine contacts with the Chinese officials. 
But Stefani explained that none of the claims about diplomatic accreditation 
were true, and the Commission had issued a rebuttal against those press 
reports.90  
Despite these multiplying and intensifying contacts, EC-PRC trade had 
stagnated since 1969. Chinese imports from the Nine even decreased in 1972. 
The Community of the Nine had for the first time in years a balance of trade 
deficit vis-à-vis the PRC.91 According to the Auswärtiges Amt, the imports by 
the Community from China in 1972 were US$ 280 million, which represented 
 
88 NA, FCO 30/1660, European Political Cooperation: Political Committee meeting Copenhagen 4/5 September: 
Agenda item 5: Asie (Réunion du 27 aout du Groupe de travail Asie), Far Eastern Department, 31 August 1973. 
89 NA, FCO 21/1098, Committee of Permanent Representatives, meeting of 2 October 1973, EEC/China, Palliser to 
FCO, Brussels, 2 October 1973; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Réunion extraordinaire du Comité des représentants 
permanents du 2.10.1973, Contacts entre diplomates de la République populaire de Chine et hauts fonctionnaires de 
la Commission, Stefani to Wellenstein, Brussels, 2 October 1973. 
90 NA, FCO 21/1098, Committee of Permanent Representatives, meeting of 2 October 1973, EEC/China, Palliser to 
FCO, Brussels, 2 October 1973; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Réunion extraordinaire du Comité des représentants 
permanents du 2.10.1973, Contacts entre diplomates de la République populaire de Chine et hauts fonctionnaires de 
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0.3% of the total imports by the Community and 13% of the total exports of 
the PRC. The exports by the Community to China in 1972 were US$ 333 
million, hence 0.3% of the total exports by the Community and 13% of the 
total imports by China. This flat trade trend contrasted with the 1958 to 1969 
period during which it had tripled.92 
The Europeans still did not expect any rapid improvement in trade 
because they viewed the interest of the Chinese in the Community as being 
primarily political in nature. 93  According to the Commission, the 
Community’s part in the PRC’s trade further diminished from 1972 to 12.3% 
in 1973.94 Amongst their EC-partners Germany had in 1973 the biggest total 
trade volume with the PRC, followed by the UK, France and Italy. The 
ranking of the first 12 trading partners with the PRC in 1973 looked as 
follows:95 
Table 0-2:  Ranking of the first trading partners with the PRC in 
total trading volume in 1973 
Country Ranking amongst 
the first 10 
Total trading volume with 
the PRC in million US$ 
Japan 1 2.015 
Hong Kong 2 1.154 
United States 3 753 
 
92 PAAA, B201/411/433, Verhältnis EG-VR China, 8 November 1973. 
93 CMA, Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la 
Communauté économique européenne en République populaire de Chine (3ème Rapport), 24 October 1974; ECHA, 
BAC 136/1987/629, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la Communauté économique européenne en 
République populaire de Chine (4ème rapport), 3 April 1975. 
94 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, Information relation extérieures, La République populaire de Chine et la 
Communauté européenne, undated. 
95 CMA, Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la 
Communauté économiques européenne en République populaire de Chine (3ème rapport), 24 October 1974. 
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Country Ranking amongst 
the first 10 
Total trading volume with 
the PRC in million US$ 
Germany 4 449 
Canada 5 351 
Britain 6 318 
Singapore 7 290 
Soviet Union 8 240 
Australia 9 226 
France 10 224 
The type of goods that the Chinese imported in 1973 remained mainly 
industrial equipment and material for transport. 96  This needs to be 
understood against the background of the Chinese fourth Five-Year-Plan that 
set out to modernise the Chinese economy, i.e. to develop its agriculture and 
industry. 97  In 1973, the principal benefactors regarding contracts for 
industrial plants and equipment were France in the area of petro chemistry, 
the Netherlands with dredges and urea plants, Britain in respect of mines and 
Trident airplanes, and Italy with electrical plants. 98  The German Foreign 
Ministry remarked soberly:  
‘Die  RChina sieht in einem geeinten starken Europa vor alleim 
ein politisches, wirtschafltiches und militärisches Gegengewicht 
zur Sowjetunion. Das wirtschaftliche Interesse Chinas an der 
Gemeinschaft ist demgegenüber nur von nachgeordneter 
Bedeutung. Der Umfang des Handels zwischen der VR China und 
 
96 CMA, Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la 
Communauté économique européenne en République populaire de Chine (3ème Rapport), 24 October 1974. 
97 CMA, Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, Rapport des Conseillers Commerciaux (2ème Rapport), 26 
March 1974. 
98 CMA, Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la 
Communauté économique européenne en République populaire de Chine (3ème Rapport), 24 October 1974. 
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der EG ist […] gering. Anzeichen für eine wesentliche Änderung 
liegen nicht vor’.99  
Thus rather than trade, which seemed limited in the foreseeable future, 
political factors turned out to be the principal concern for the Europeans.  
The issue of the PRC accrediting a representative to the Community 
became more concrete and acute. The Commission ensured that a concerted 
EC approach to China was not left for EPC to deliberate on. The growing 
diplomatic contacts between the Europeans and the Chinese were not 
paralleled in commercial contacts. Politics not trade defined the relationship. 
The nature of the political considerations of the Community were two-fold. 
On the one hand they related to the internal, bureaucratic politics on how to 
conduct the Community’s external relations. On the other hand the issue of 
how to position the EC in international affairs, particularly vis-à-vis the 
United States and the Soviet Union, heightened the salience of the politics 
within the Community.  
New leverage: the Sino-Soviet competition 
The EC-PRC rapprochement provoked more contacts between the 
Community and the Soviet bloc. Closer relations between the EC and China, 
as the French ambassador to Moscow Roger Seydoux reported, meant that 
the Community extended its responsibility into foreign policy, a further step 
of political integration which the Soviets feared.100 Wellenstein recalls the 
Soviet attitude towards the Community, and particularly the Commission: 
 
99 PAAA, B201/411/433, Verhältnis EG-VR China, 8 November 1973. 
100 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1070, La Chine, la Grande-Bretagne et l'Europe occidentale, Seydoux to 
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‘The Russians did not want to have anything to do with us. Taboo. We didn't 
exist. We were destined for the dust-bins of history. So why deal with us. 
There was no contact.’101 The contacts to China offered political legitimacy to 
the Community, particularly the Commission. 
The question the Europeans faced was whether playing the China card 
towards the rest of the Eastern bloc was an advantageous strategy. In other 
words, was it opportune to use the EC-PRC relationship to press the Soviet 
Union for concessions? The British explicitly warned against doing so, even 
before Britain became a member. In a paper of 30 November 1972 on the 
external relations of the EC, the FCO analysed:  
‘In the longer run, the degree of solidarity achieved by the 
Community in its dealings with the Soviet Union will also be 
relevant to its future relations with China […]. The Chinese already 
regard the Community as a potential asset in their own rivalry with 
the Soviet Union. For Western Europe, the value of Chinese 
benevolence must be weighed against the far greater importance of 
relations with the Soviet Union.’102  
In a later note of 22 March 1973 the British continued to insist that ‘playing 
the China card’ was a dangerous strategy because it could jeopardise the 
Europeans’ relationship with the Soviets:  
‘the fact that China is now the enemy of our enemy does not mean 
that Western Europe will ever be able to count on China as an ally. 
To suggest to the Russians that we regarded this as a potential role 
for China could thus be dangerous: it would be just convincing 
enough to arouse resentment, not enough to instil a salutary 
fear….Moreover, although the Sino-Soviet dispute may indirectly 
assist the development of the Community's separate relationships 
with both China and the Soviet Union, it would be unwise to allow 
the dispute to modify the content of Community policies. Nor 
would it be prudent of the Community to make overt efforts to 
 
101 Interview, Edmund Wellenstein, The Hague, 6 January 2010. 
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influence or exploit this dispute. These views are probably shared 
by most of our partners, whose coordination of policy in the 
politico-military sphere is, in any case, likely to be tardy and 
cautious.’ 103  
Consistent with this analysis, Evans noted in April 1973 in the deliberations 
of how to reply to the Chinese approach of Manac’h in Beijing on the 
establishment of official relations: ‘[…] several of the Ministers showed 
concern about the likely reactions of the USSR to closer links between China 
and the EEC’.104 
The British used any opportunity to push their views within the 
Community. Crispin Tickell for example took advantage of a dinner in 
Luxembourg on 8 May 1972 to speak to Mrs Thorn, wife of the foreign 
minister of Luxembourg. Tickell was then Private Secretary to successive 
Chancellors of the Duchy of Lancaster, the minister responsible for the 
negotiations for British entry into the European Community (1970-1972). 
Mrs Thorn had told Tickell that a Chinese friend of hers, Han Suyin, was to 
see Zhou Enlai. Mrs Thorn confided that she had transmitted a ‘message 
officieux’ from the Community to Han Suyin to ask her to find out all she 
could from Zhou Enlai about the Chinese attitude towards the Community 
and Western European integration. Tickell then put it to Mrs Thorn that ‘it 
would certainly be a coup for the Chinese if they could appoint an 
 mbassador to the Community before the Russians’. Tickell calculated that 
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104 NA, FCO 21/1097, Evans to Davies, April 1973. 
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Mrs Thorn shared his message with her husband, who was then acting 
Chairman of the Council of Ministers.105 
The French shared the British assessment on the risk of irritating the 
Soviets if the Community supported a closer relationship with the Chinese: 
‘Si en revanche l'on devait se prononcer sur la suite à donner à une demande 
spontanée de la Chine, le problème serait essentiellement de présenter les 
choses de manière a heurter le moins possible les Sovi tiques.’106 Manac’h 
therefore also advocated the strategy of leaving to China the initiative to liaise 
with the Community. The French ambassador emphasised the necessity for 
caution to his counterparts too.107  
The Conference on Security and Cooperation (CSCE) added a further 
dimension to the risks posed by the Community’s dealings with the PRC. The 
French particularly signposted this. Jacques de Beaumarchais, Directeur 
Politique of the Quai d’Orsay, wrote in a note on 9 January 1973: ‘Medici [the 
Italian foreign minister] parlera sans doute au Ministre de son idée de 
manifester l'intérêt des Neuf pour la Chine. L'initiative est difficile […] parce 
que il y a les Russes et la pr paration de la CSCE.’108 These concerns were 
further reflected in a note a few days later, on 29 January, when preparing for 
a meeting at EPC.109 The strategy for the French therefore remained that the 
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Community was to welcome closer EC-PRC relations, but it was for the 
Chinese to take the initiative. 110   
The member states’ caution and reluctance to use the China card was 
evident at EPC level also. During the meeting of 16 March 1973 the Foreign 
Ministers André Bettencourt, Alec Douglas-Home, Walter Scheel and 
Giuseppe Medici all agreed: good relations with the Chinese represented ‘un 
facteur d'équilibre vis-à-vis de l'URSS. Mais si les Neuf définissaient leur 
attitude à l'égard de la Chine, il fallait qu'ils tiennent compte de leurs 
relations avec les Sovi tiques.’111  
In like manner, the European Parliament had its say on the geopolitical 
dimension of the EC-PRC relationship. In a debate on Tuesday 13 February 
1973, Renato Sandri, an Italian MEP first non-attached then member of the 
Communist and Allies Group, put to Soames:  
‘the hope that the Community will attempt to bring about the 
closest possible relations with the People’s Republic provided that 
it does not become an instrument of the cold war in a new 
international situation, but conducts effective policies to help the 
People’s Republic of China emerge from its stage of 
underdevelopment.’112  
The European Parliament equally warned against instrumentalising China in 
the Cold War.  
 
110 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1070, Note Chine-CEE, 29 January 1973. 
111 AN, 5 AG 2, 1035, Réunion ministérielle de la Coopération politique, Bruxelles, 16 mars 1973, Rapports entre la 
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In contrast, the Commission adopted a more aggressive stance on how 
the Community could exploit the Sino-Soviet rivalry to its advantage. 113 
Soames’ cabinet and the DG I closely followed the member states dealings at 
the EPC as is shown by the reporting of Klaus Meyer, Deputy Secretary 
General, to Ortoli and Soames.114  ccording to Wellenstein, the Commission’s 
aim was to isolate the Soviet Union, leaving it as the only blank spot on the 
world map which had not yet engaged officially with the EC.115  
The press also picked up on the Sino-Soviet competition for links to the 
European Community. On 1 February 1973 the Frankfurter Allgemeine 
published an article by Harry Hamm reporting from Brussels, and the French 
diplomatic translation read:  
‘Depuis longtemps d jà la R publique populaire de Chine accorde 
à la Communauté européenne une attention particulière. Elle 
s'inspire de considérations politiques plutôt qu'économiques et 
c'est pour cette raison qu'à Bruxelles l'intérêt croissant que suscite 
à Pékin le développement institutionnel et l'élargissement de la 
Communauté est quand même accueilli avec une grande réserve, 
en dépit de signes d'une certaine satisfaction. […] Il ne fait pas de 
doute que l'attitude positive qu'adopte la Chine vis-à-vis de la CEE 
représente un problème délicat pour les dirigeants soviétiques. Ce 
malaise se reflète dans l'évolution de la polémique entre Moscou et 
Pékin à propos de la CEE, qui est devenue plus vive précisément 
au cours des dernières semaines. Pourtant l'URSS n'avait jusqu'à 
ces derniers temps aucun motif d'incriminer la politique suivie par 
la Chine à l' gard de la CEE.’116    
 
113 Interviews; see also: NA, FCO 30/1282, China and the Community, Tickell to Mason, 15 May 1972; NA, FCO 
40/460, The external relations of the European Community, Permanent Under-Secretary’s Planning Committee, 22 
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Therefore, the wider implications of the developing EC-PRC relationship for 
the Community’s position in the Cold War were in the open. 
Fuelling the geopolitical calculations, Nicolai Fadeyev, then COMECON 
secretary-general, suggested in August 1973 to the Danish President of the 
Council of Ministers Ivar Norgaard to organise contacts between COMECON 
and the Community. 117  When Norgaard replied that the Commission was 
responsible for such matters, Fadeyev invited the President of the 
Commission on 16 September 1973 to visit Moscow for preliminary talks with 
COMECON.118 The Commission's accepted the invitation but suggested that 
preparatory talks by officials precede any high-level contacts. As Xavier du 
Cauzé de Nazelle, minister-councillor at the French embassy in Moscow, 
reported to Paris, COMECON’s sudden initiative seemed more than simply a 
coincidence, and the potential recognition of the Community by China was 
likely to have played a role.119  
The Chinese in the meantime kept a close eye on Soviet policies towards 
the Community both regarding the CSCE and COMECON. At the twelfth 
session of UNCTAD in Geneva in October 1972, for example, Kuan Qianghua, 
a PRC representative, put it to a Community official that the Chinese were to 
take up contacts with the Community in Brussels before the CSCE began, and 
preferably even before the 22 November, the date of the preparatory meeting 
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to the conference.120 As illustrated by a meeting on 14 September 1973, the 
Chinese also questioned the Commission about Fadeyev’s initiative.121  
A competition between the PRC and the Soviet Union for closer relations with 
the Community began. All member states warned against playing the China 
card because in the final analysis their relationship to the Soviet Union was 
more critical, and so were their objectives for European détente which they 
pursued at the CSCE. The European Parliament consented on the issue. The 
Commission was the party most willing to play up the Sino-Soviet rivalry, 
which future developments confirm. A possible reason was that the 
Commission did not have much to lose, as opposed to the member states. The 
member states’ caution was also apparent in discussions within the EPC. It 
also mattered when the Nine elaborated on the Declaration of European 
Identity, in which they laid out their position towards the rest of the world, 
including the Soviet Union and China. 
Towards a concerted foreign policy: the Declaration of European 
Identity 
The clearest evidence of the rising salience of China within EC politics was 
that the member states pledged to strengthen the cohesion of their foreign 
policies towards the PRC in their Declaration of European Identity.122 The 
foreign ministers published the Declaration on the margins of the 
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Copenhagen Summit of the Heads of State and Government. 123  The 
Declaration reflected a concept of European identity concerned with the 
Community rather than Europe as a whole. The concept was based on three 
aspects: the cohesion of the Community, the position and the responsibilities 
of the Nine vis-à-vis the rest of the world, and the dynamic character of the 
construction of a United Europe.124  
The Declaration followed the decision at the Summit conference in 1972 
to construct a European Union by 1980, and was a response to several 
structural changes in international relations.125 Generally, the Declaration of 
European Identity was important because the Nine sought to include in a 
single document all the main elements on which they agreed in working 
towards a European foreign policy. 126  It defined the extent to which the 
member states were already united, both among themselves and in relation to 
the rest of the world, and set out the intentions for developing a common 
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position in relation to other countries. According to Bo Stråth it was this 
Declaration that introduced the concept of identity to the political agenda of 
the Community.127 Such an introduction was all the more remarkable because 
the Nine did so via their foreign policy.128 
Specifically, the Declaration was significant because for the first time 
the Nine declared publicly their intention to adopt a common approach 
towards China. The member states referred to the PRC in the second section 
of the paper, where they listed the Community’s attitude to different parts of 
the world. The list began with relations to the other Western European 
countries, followed by the Mediterranean, African and Middle Eastern 
countries, the United States, other industrialised countries such as Japan and 
Canada, the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe, China and the other Asian 
countries, Latin America and the developing world. The historian Lutz 
Niethammer correctly interprets the order of the listing as a deliberate 
hierarchy of relations from the most to the least important.129 Moreover, it is 
revealing that the Nine only mentioned certain countries by name. These 
included besides China, the US, the Soviet Union, Japan, and Canada. But 
India and Brazil did not make it onto the list nor did any Arab countries.130  
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The evolution of the reference to China was peculiar. Originally, the 
British prime minister suggested to the French Foreign Minister Michel 
Jobert to conceive a paper in which the Nine defined their identity vis-à-vis 
the United States.131 Subsequently the nine foreign ministers decided in July 
1973 on a mandate for the EPC to design a Declaration of European 
Identity. 132  But when the British proposed a draft in August 1973 that 
focussed mainly on the United States, the French, Italians and others sought 
to widen the scope. 133  In fact, already in January 1973 Davignon had 
suggested to his colleagues to lay out the Community’s relationship to all 
parts of the world. China featured in his considerations too. 134 When the 
French tabled their version of the paper, the British did not mind the 
reference to China. In a letter of 14 September 1973 for instance James Eric 
Cable, FCO head of Planning Staff, commented to Butler that the proposal 
‘might provide an opportunity to ask the French how far they envisage the 
Nine should “define common position” in relations with Peking. Up to now 
they have seemed more interested in preserving their own freedom of 
movement in developing Franco-Chinese relations.’135 Whether to include the 
PRC remained uncertain until November as illustrated in the minutes of a 
Ressortgespräch in the German Foreign Ministry.136  
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Although the Commission and the European Parliament did not 
specifically play an active part in writing the Declaration, they still provided 
the impetus for the Community to define its identity in international 
relations. For example Ortoli underlined the necessity for Europe to speak 
with one voice to the European Parliament on 13 February 1973 and at the 
Royal Institute of International Affairs in the same month.137 Similarly, the 
European Parliament did not have a direct input in the declaration, but, 
ironically, it was the institution that had been most active in calling for a 
concerted European voice when dealing with the PRC.138 
The Chinese government and the European press were attentive to the 
Declaration too. ‘Deutsche Welle’, the German broadcasting agency, for 
example, noted:  
‘Den gleichen Rau, der dem speziellen  erhältnis zum Ostblock 
gewidmet ist, erhält - und das ist eine, wenn auch erklärliche 
Überraschung - das Verhältnis zur Volksrepublik China. Ihr wird 
eine Vertiefung der Beziehungen und der Austausch europäischer 
und chinesischer Führungskräfte angetragen.‘139  
The Chinese attentively followed the drafting of the paper. Evidence is seen in 
a visit to the Commission by Sung Wankuo, attaché at the Chinese embassy in 
Brussels, and Xie Chenlu, third secretary, on 14 September 1973. Whilst 
proving to be well-informed on the subject as far as a reading of the press 
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allowed, they put pressing questions on the content of the paper too.140 Thus 
the Declaration of European Identity mattered not only to the Europeans in 
their attempt to foster the cohesion of the Community but also to the 
Chinese. 
Whereas previously the member states had insisted on a low-key 
approach by the Community to China, the Declaration of European Identity 
amounted to a ‘big bang’. For the first time the Nine publicly pledged to work 
towards a common approach to the PRC. The Declaration epitomises the dual 
function that the relationship to China had. It served the Community to 
position itself in the dramatically changing international affairs of the 1970s, 
and to help towards the cohesion of the Nine. It was a subject that was to help 
the Community’s internal cohesion.  
Conclusion 
Détente enabled the Nine, and therefore the Community as such, to liaise 
with Mao’s China. But still, the Cold War, China’s communism and the 
Cultural Revolution were all factors that held the national governments back 
from jumping ahead.  n extremely cautious attitude characterised the Nine’s 
relation to the People’s Republic. The European Community offered to the 
member states an additional foreign policy instrument they could use to build 
and test national bridges to Beijing. Meanwhile, for the European Parliament 
the EC-PRC relationship held the potential to increase its visibility, and push 
its role as a parliament. For the Commission the China dossier offered the 
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possibility to prove to the Nine how it could add value to purely inter-
governmental coordination. Soames taking up office as Commission vice-
president was the person determined to use that possibility. Not least the 
ensuing Sino-Soviet competition for relations with Brussels showed that the 
Commission wielded a unique political asset, a supranational platform, which 
the member states had an interest in leaving room for manoeuvre for. For 
both, the European Parliament and increasingly for the Commission, China 
represented a political opportunity.  
The Community faced the task of defining how to deal with China first 
in relation to its Common Commercial Policy. The Council decision of 16 
December 1969 was a landmark because it conferred competence upon the 
Commission competence to renegotiate any trade agreement with the PRC on 
1 January 1975. But the commercial contacts did not parallel the growing 
diplomatic ones. Politics not trade shaped the relationship. 
 The politics concerned two interlinked areas. On the one hand political 
wrangling related to the internal, bureaucratic politics on how to conduct the 
Community’s external relations. In this light, a first distinctive approach by 
the Nine was the UN vote in favour of the PRC and against American policy. 
The Commission began to foster direct, if still unofficial, contacts with 
Chinese representatives in Brussels once Zhou Enlai publicly expressed 
interest in official EC-PRC relations in May 1972. Britain’s accession to the 
Community gave the EC-PRC relationship important impetus. Crucially, it 
meant that Soames gained the responsibility of Commission vice-president 
responsible for external relations. A defining political decision came on 16 
March 1973 at the EPC, when the nine foreign ministers gave the green light 
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for the Community as such to engage with the PRC. 141  Meanwhile, the 
Commission and the European Parliament ensured that a concerted EC 
approach to China was not left for EPC alone to deliberate on.  
On the other hand the politics obviously concerned how to position the 
EC in international affairs. By the end of 1973 the member states and the 
Commission were in favour of official EC-PRC relations, and they had agreed 
on a strategy: the Chinese rather than the EC were the ones to take the 
initiative. The underlying reason lay in Cold War politics. These politics 
became apparent in the rivalry between Beijing and the Soviet Union for 
closer relations with the Community. They also explain the consensus in the 
Community that playing the China card was risky. A further layer was added 
by the Declaration of European Identity, where the Nine pledged publicly for 
the first time to work towards a common approach to the PRC. The origins of 
this document lay in the Nine’s endeavour to assert their independence vis-à-
vis the United States.  
But this Declaration of European Identity did not appear to the 
Europeans to have much of an effect on the Chinese. The German 
ambassador reported on 21 December 1973 on his conversation with Qiao 
Guanhua, who would become Chinese foreign minister in 1974. According to 
this report Qiao after all did not yet consider a Chinese permanent 
representation in Brussels as very interesting and the matter would probably 
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still take some time.142 This conversation forecasted how the Chinese refused 
to play the role the member states and the Commission wanted them to, 
namely to take the initiative in establishing official relations. As the next 
chapter shows, this led to an unexpected turn of events.  
  
 
142 PAAA, B37, 341, Zwischenarchiv 100108, Pauls an Bonn AA, Beijing, 21 December 1973.   
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Delegation of the European Commission to China led by Sir 
Christopher Soames, May 1975, courtesy of Lord Hannay of 
Chiswick. 
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 Coup de théâtre 
(January 1974 – May 1975) 
‘ nd so a wonderful process began in which Sir 
Christopher would get into my red little mini car and we 
would drive off to the Chinese embassy. We didn't want 
to go in the official car, because as I said, nobody, 
absolutely nobody was being told about this. None of 
the member states were told, none of the 
Commissioners were told, DGI weren't told, because we 
all knew if it got out, everyone would start waving their 
arms around and say “this is all difficult, and we've got 
to think about it, and is it the right thing to do,” and so 
on, and he was absolutely determined to do it.’143 
Lord Hannay of Chiswick, March 2010 
‘Fascinating though it is going to be, I have seldom felt a 
greater sense of operating totally blind’.144 
Sir Christopher Soames, April 1975 
‘ nd then knock, knock on the door: "Sir Christopher, 
you are not leaving yet, and you have sometime left, 
would it suit you...the Prime Minister would be 
delighted to see you. He heard that you were here." […] 
and we went into the Forbidden City.145 
Edmund Wellenstein, January 2010  
On 4 May 1975, the first day of his visit to China, at a banquet in Beijing given 
by Ke Bonian, vice-president of the Institute for Foreign Relations, Soames 
declared in his speech: ‘This visit gives me personally […] and it gives us in 
the Commission and you in China the opportunity to begin a relationship 
between China and the European Community which I am convinced will 
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prove to be of great and historic significance.’ 146 With these words Soames 
took the initiative and proposed setting up official relations between the EC 
and the PRC. The Chinese had left Soames and the five members from his 
cabinet and DGI, who accompanied him, in complete dark as to the 
programme of their 7-day stay. 147 But once Soames had made this speech, he 
met with all the high-ranking Chinese officials: Zhou Enlai, the Vice-Prime 
Minister Li Xienian, Qiao Guanhua, Li Jiang, and the Vice-Minister of 
external trade Ya Ilin. On 6 May Qiao responded positively to the 
Commission Vice-President’s offer. Soames, ‘speaking for the Community as 
a whole as well as for the Commission’, welcomed such a decision adding ‘the 
question of establishing diplomatic relations could be settled right away 
without any delay whatsoever’.148 His reassurance that ‘ s far as Taiwan was 
concerned […] the Community had no official relations’ meant that this 
meeting de facto sealed the establishment of official EC-PRC relations.149  
 The puzzle is less the fact that the Community and China set up official 
relations. In the long term, this would have come about in some way or other. 
After all the PRC had shown interest and the Nine had consented in principle. 
But the puzzle concerns the agent, the manner and the timing of the event. 
The Nine had given clear instructions that the initiative was to be left to the 
Chinese, and the Community was only to discreetly encourage matters. The 
main reason for such circumspection was the risk of jeopardising the 
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relationship with the Soviet Union. And initially Soames too adopted the 
stance that if the Chinese wanted something from the Community, it was up 
to them to make the move and come to Brussels. But now, not only did 
Soames take the initiative to set up relations, but also he literally went out of 
his way to do so by travelling to Beijing and orchestrated the move in a 
manner which maximised the coup de théâtre. His visit was anything but 
discreet even though he was uncertain of the Chinese reaction, and he chose 
to do so only a few weeks before the opening of stage one of the CSCE in 
Helsinki.  
So far the literature has remained silent on all this ‘behind-the-stage’ 
manoeuvring. It has failed to pick up that this episode constitutes a 
fundamental challenge to inter-governmental supremacy in foreign policy 
making. The case of China contests  ndrew Moravcsik’s claim that ‘European 
integration resulted from a series of rational choices made by national leaders 
who consistently pursued economic interests (…) that evolved slowly in 
response to structural incentives in the global economy.’ 150  The period 
between January 1974 and May 1975 reveals instead that European 
integration resulted from choices, that were not all and not necessarily 
rational. These choices were made by a Commissioner who ultimately 
pursued political interests. And these interests evolved in response to 
geopolitics and bureaucratic politics within the Community.  
The purpose of this chapter is to investigate the enigma of Soames’ 180° 
turn around in attitude vis-à-vis China, and analyse the circumstances that 
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led him to set up official relations in Beijing. It shows that the establishment 
of official relations was not a foregone conclusion. First the chapter examines 
why Soames was able to go ahead in the first place. It looks at the member 
states’ reluctance to follow up with action their pledge to improve relations 
with China outlined in the Declaration of European Identity. It also looks at 
how the European Parliament persisted in putting the matter on the agenda 
of the Council of Ministers and the Commission. It exposes the Commission’s 
initial lax attitude on the China dossier. Second the chapter turns to the 
economic factors that facilitated Soames’ change in attitude. Finally it 
analyses the political dimension. The Chinese hesitated to make a move. 
Soames’ prepared his offer for diplomatic relations in utmost secrecy in order 
to prove the Commission’s capacity for independent action both in 
international affairs and vis-à-vis the member states. Politics more than 
economics ultimately shaped Soames’ China initiative. 
The member states’ laissez-faire opens wider the window of 
opportunity  
Fundamentally, Soames was able to go as far as he did because the member 
states let him to do so. The Nine in principle had consented to setting up 
official EC-PRC relations. Even Ireland, the only member state which did not 
have diplomatic relations with the PRC, made it clear that it agreed.151 But 
after their pledge in the Declaration of European Identity the Nine did not 
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press ahead with any Community action to follow up their striking words 
with Community action. In stark contrast to the European Parliament, they 
adopted a remarkably passive approach. Neither at the Council of Ministers 
nor COREPER meetings did EC-China relations feature in a meaningful 
manner. The Nine simply acknowledged and accepted Soames’ decision to 
visit China which he announced it on 19 March 1975. Concerning the member 
states’ reaction, Wellenstein recalls: ‘They were obviously quite fed up, that 
this had been done behind their backs. Some of them, at any rate I think, 
hoped that we were going to fall flat on our faces.’152 But there was no overt 
condemnation of the Commission initiative. The ambassadors in Beijing 
adopted a dismissive attitude towards the vice-president of the Commission. 
 gain Hannay’s recollection is that they thought: ‘What does he [Soames] 
pretend to be? He is nobody. We are the ambassadors, pah. That man always 
talks about chickens and textile and small stuff.’153 Overall, the member states’ 
low level of involvement may be explained by several reasons. 
The Nine’s attention lay elsewhere. They had to deal with more pressing 
internal issues such as addressing the economic crisis in Europe 
characterised by inflation, recession and high unemployment. Hence items 
that took priority on the EC agenda were monetary cooperation, the regional 
fund and the Community budget. 154  Regarding external relations, the 
relations with Greece, Portugal and Spain, the developing countries and 
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Eastern Europe took priority.155  The member states had all diplomatically 
recognised the PRC (except for Ireland), but they had not yet gone very far in 
developing bilateral political or economic links with the PRC. Therefore, 
almost uniquely in the history of the Community’s external relations, both 
the member states and the Community as such developed institutionalised 
links with China from scratch more or less at the same time. In such 
circumstances it was easier for the Commission to carve out a role for itself.  
For the member states the Community could prove an advantageous 
vehicle to further their national interest. In the end, France welcomed 
Soames’ move in light of Deng Xiaoping’s visit to France in May 1975.156 For 
Germany, official EC-PRC relations offered a useful channel to demonstrate 
to China its interest in liaising, yet to also send the message to the Soviet 
Union that the decision was one taken by the Community. German 
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt was in favour of coordinating between the Nine 
on China as a personal letter to French President Valéry Giscard d’Estaing of 
26 August 1974 shows.157 But a common European policy towards China could 
still jeopardise the FRG’s Ostpolitik.158 It is revealing that the German Council 
Presidency, which began precisely after the Declaration of European Identity, 
dropped China from the list of foreign policy issues to be coordinated. 
Whereas for the German government the Commission’s move offered a cloak 
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for decisions which might be unpopular in individual bilateral relations, for 
Britain Soames’ initiative was an instance where it could use the Community 
to give its foreign policy more weight. Once the FCO knew of Soames’ visit, 
they backed him and eventually supported the preparations for his visit with 
background briefing material in order to make it a success.159 Considering the 
unpredictability the Europeans experienced in their dealings with the 
Chinese authorities, it was not at all impossible that the Commission would 
fail to set up Community relations with China.160 In that case the Commission 
would take the blame. If the Commission however was successful, the Nine 
were confident of being able to keep control of the Commission’s ambitions 
and even take over its role – if deemed opportune. And at this point the 
relationship was mainly about symbolism. 
In stark contrast to the member states’ passive attitude and Soames’ 
initial reluctance stood the activity of the European Parliament. It was the EP 
which persisted after the Copenhagen Summit in putting the issue of the 
Community setting up official ties with China on the agenda of the Council of 
Ministers and the Commission. Oral questions on 9 July 1974 by British 
Conservative Arthur Douglas Dodds-Parker and German Christian Democrat 
Hans-Edgar Jahn, and on 12 September 1974 by the British MEP Charles 
O’Hagan, non-attached, illustrate how the European Parliament repeatedly 
inquired what steps the Council and the Commission were taking to improve 
relations with the PRC. 161  Jahn requested an explicit answer from the 
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Commission when he asked: ‘La RPC a-t-elle fait comprendre à la 
Commission qu'elle était disposée à reconnaitre la CEE? Des pourparlers en 
ce sens ont-ils d jà eu lieu ou non?’162 And Glinne wanted to know on 23 
January 1975:  
‘Bearing in mind the position adopted at the last Paris Summit 
regarding political cooperation, I should like to know whether the 
Council has taken any recent steps towards establishing direct 
bilateral diplomatic relations at a high level between the 
Community and the People’s Republic of China. What have been 
the results to date?’163  
The EP continued to put pressure on the Council and the Commission to 
justify their lack of action. It pushed the Community as such to improve the 
relationship with China. Yet the European Parliament’s pressure was unlikely 
to have decisively changed Soames’ attitude.  
Back in February 1973, in a draft response to the European Parliament, 
Soames had made clear: ‘The Community has been recognised to date by 
about 100 countries. For none of these countries particular steps have been 
taken. Hence, there is no reason to change this general rule [for China]’.164 
Likewise in April 1973, Soames briefed Ronald Grierson, Managing Director 
of the London-based investment bank S.G. Warburg, before his meeting with 
Bank of China representatives. He emphasised that Grierson should 
comment on the Commission’s favourable attitude towards closer relations: 
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‘If they raise it, but only if they do (for it is important we do not appear to be 
running after them).’165 Soames’ tone was even stronger in a confidential note 
to former Prime Minister Edward Heath in May 1974:  
‘We are not panting for recognition by China. We are perfectly 
ready for them to work up their relationship with the Commission 
without going through the business of accrediting an ambassador 
but simply by increasing and raising the level of their contacts.’166  
Likewise, the Commission’s programme for 197  did not even consider China 
under the heading of Europe’s external personality. 167  Concerning the 
increase in the Community’s external representation in 1975, DG I regarded 
the opening of representations in Peru and Canada as more important than 
establishing one in China.168 
Therefore the Declaration of European Identity was a milestone, but it 
did not prove a turning point in the Community’s opening to the PRC. The 
member states quickly reverted to their hands-off approach. It was this 
passivity which eventually gave Soames the room for manoeuvre to launch 
his own China initiative. The European Parliament continued to act as the 
one EC institution which advocated an active EC China policy. Notably, until 
the end of 197 , the Commission under Soames’ leadership did not consider 
actively seeking out the Chinese either.  
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Trade prospects helped, but did not determine the outcome 
The fact that economic benefits outweighed the risks of setting up official 
relations with the PRC facilitated Soames’ change in attitude, but they did not 
decide it. Soames’ decision came in the climate of economic crisis. In 
preparation for the European Council meeting in Dublin the Commission 
summed up the situation:  
‘Pour la Communaut , l’ann e 197  a  t  la plus difficile de son 
existence. Le taux d’inflation et le niveau du chômage n’ont jamais 
été aussi élevés. Les disparités entre pays membres se sont 
accentu es. Il n’a pas encore  t  possible de d gager une politique 
commune de l’ nergie’.169  
The crisis dramatically exposed the EC’s structural problems. The 
Community depended on imports of raw materials. In 1972 primary products 
accounted for more than half the total EC imports and 91% of its imports 
came from developing countries.170 The oil-crisis had made it blatantly clear 
that the EC had to diversify its raw material suppliers.171 Therefore it was not 
a surprise that the EC particularly watched Japan’s ability to import oil from 
the PRC. 172 Learning from the American, Spanish and Greek experiences, 
official relations with the PRC could make it easier to realise at least some of 
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the trade opportunities latent in China, and thereby address an internal 
crisis.173  
The global economic crisis meant that competition amongst 
industrialised countries for new markets like China had grown fiercer. 174 
Whereas the United States, Australia and Canada were primarily competitors 
for agricultural exports to the PRC, Japan, China’s largest trading partner in 
1973, was a rival with its exports of machinery, industrial plant, steel and 
chemical products.175 Therefore the Community had to shore up its ‘power to 
compete’ as  ice-President of the Commission Carlo Scarascia Mugozza set 
out to the European Parliament on 12 February 1974. If the EC engaged with 
China, the chances of success were further helped by the fact that unlike 
Japan, the United States or Australia, the Community did not have official 
relations with Taiwan – a very sensitive topic for the Chinese leadership.176 
The Community could prove a useful vehicle to take on the international 
economic competition more effectively, which was precisely what 
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Washington became wary of. 177  China offered the Commission the 
opportunity to prove itself against the international competition.178 
Certainly one risk was that the Community might appear less reliable to 
traditional partners from Africa and South-East-Asia – often connected by 
former colonial ties to individual member states. Countries such as Vietnam 
and India might react negatively to the Commission welcoming new 
competition from China, which setting up official relations was likely to 
enhance. 179 As a consequence, these partners could withdraw from the EC 
market, cutting off the Community from essential raw materials, and falling 
back upon bilateral negotiations with the member states. Such a reaction 
would weaken the Commission’s authority. But if the Commission managed 
to conclude a trade agreement with the Chinese following the establishment 
of diplomatic relations, the Commission would further demonstrate its 
capacity to act in the name of the Community. So far the Commission’s 
authority in the international economy had only been acknowledged within 
the GATT after the successful Kennedy Round.180 
  more serious gamble related to the Community’s trade relations with 
the Soviet bloc. The Commission sought to prove that it was diplomatic 
player with whom to conduct business irrespective of ideological difference. 
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Such an aim was reflected not least in the negotiations for the Second Basket 
at the CSCE.181 This ‘basket’ or chapter encompassed guidelines and concrete 
recommendations aimed at increasing cooperation in the fields of economics, 
science and technology between the participants – the Western and Eastern 
European states, the Soviet Union and the United States. It was precisely on 
this Second Basket that the Commission had secured its participation in the 
CSCE and contributed with its expertise. After the expiration of bilateral 
agreements on 1 January 1975, the Eastern bloc made no attempt to revive 
trade with the EC.182 It did not respond to the Commission’s so-called Outline 
Agreement. This was the draft the Commission had forwarded to the state 
trading countries in November 1974 to replace all national, bilateral 
agreements on 1 January 1975 as a step towards the implementation of the 
Common Commercial Policy. Since none of the state trading countries 
recognised the Community, DG I had to be creative in finding ways to 
communicating with them:  
‘And some of these people did not have an address. And some of 
these people you could not visit. For instance, I think it was the 
Mongols who were in Paris. They had an embassy, but it was a wall 
with a little door in it which you could never pass. So we threw the 
envelope over the wall. So everybody now knows in the outside 
world, that if they have the wish to talk about trade, here this is the 
address, here that’s our names, here this is our approach, we 
welcome you. Of course, nobody answered. But they all got our 
messages.’183 
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As Soames told Qiao in Beijing, the Eastern bloc ‘did not wish to 
recognise the reality of the common commercial policy’.184 Playing on the 
Sino-Soviet competition, the Commission could use enhanced relations with 
the PRC as a lever in the trade negotiations with the Eastern bloc.185 The 
gamble was delicate because the Commission had to present the enhanced 
relationship to China not as a threat but as an incentive for the other state 
trading countries to reply to the Outline Agreement.186 
But Soames did not initiate official relations simply to upgrade the 
Community’s trade relations with the PRC. First, the Commercial Counsellor 
Reports and the Commission’s internal deliberations show that expectations 
of realising the trade potential remained sober. Several reasons accounted for 
this. The European analyses of the Chinese economy were based only on 
estimates because the PRC did not publish official data and those available 
proved limited in their reliability. The Chinese trade policy changed rapidly 
according to the PRC’s needs which meant that the government arbitrarily 
cut off supplies to European traders. Although China had substantial raw 
material resources, the development of these needed equipment, which the 
Chinese were unable to finance because the government refused to accept 
foreign credits.187  bove all, China’s fourth Five-Year Plan had re-affirmed the 
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aim of achieving autarky.188 Soames admitted to Heath in May 197 : ‘in fact 
Chinese trade with Western Europe is, and is likely to remain, very limited’.189  
Second, the Chinese authorities had not given any guarantee that 
official relations would lead in any foreseeable time to a trade agreement.190 
The Chinese were the ones who called the shots as Emanuele Gazzo, the first 
director of Agence Europe, reflected in an article of 10 January 1974.191 His 
analysis of the Chinese policy was shared in the European decision-making 
corridors. The British Permanent Undersecretary’s Planning Committee for 
example had remarked: ‘Despite the prospects for trade and even industrial 
cooperation, the Chinese will stop well short of dependence on Western 
Europe. […] and in any case the tone will always be set by the Chinese’.192  
Third, even if China opened its doors, it was doubtful whether the 
member states would be able to overcome their national competition and 
agree on a Common Commercial Policy. The resistance to any such 
coordination regarding EC imports of raw materials from the PRC is 
illustrated in a briefing to Soames before his China visit: ‘Finalement il ne 
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faut pas perdre de vue que la Communaut  n’est pas encore en mesure de 
définir de façon cohérente ses besoins et sa politique dans ce domaine.’ 193 
Therefore it was far from certain that the Nine would agree to the 
Commission concluding a Community trade agreement with China in the first 
place. 
Setting up official relations with the PRC offered Soames a way that 
allowed him to be seen as addressing the economic crisis in Europe and to 
shore up the Community’s ability to compete in the international economy, 
and gain leverage for trade negotiations with the Soviet bloc. But the 
economic reasons alone did not prove decisive enough to provoke Soames 
into turning 180° in attitude. It is hence essential to examine the political 
factors behind the move more closely. 
Beliefs, personal ambitions, and politics 
Beijing’s hesitancy, geopolitics, intra-Community politics, personal ambitions 
and beliefs all came together in Soames’ China initiative. The Commission 
continuously struggled to assert itself in the 1970s. This is illustrated in the 
first enlargement negotiations from 1970 to 1973. The Nine insisted on 
bilateral negotiations rather than allowing the Commission to coordinate 
them, and the Council of Ministers eventually was in charge of the 
negotiations.194 The enlargement negotiations with Greece proved similarly 
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challenging.195 During a dinner with the EC Heads of State and Government 
at the Elysée in September 1974 that set the groundwork for the creation of 
the European Council, Wilson noted: ‘Helmut Schmidt’s attack was very 
strong, characterising the Commission as bureaucratic, too costly and over 
staffed’.196 Further Wilson noted: ‘I said we would like the Council to do more 
work of this kind [cooperation over Cyprus], separate from the 
Commission’. 197  Responding to such criticism, Ortoli attested before the 
European Parliament in February 1975: ‘In the next two years, the 
Commission’s political mission will once again occupy a major place in its 
work’.198 An engaged role in improving relations with China was precisely a 
way for the Commission to follow up in action its pledge to have political 
staying-power. 
Soames made any number of efforts to demonstrate the Community’s 
goodwill to the PRC’s representatives, and to get the Chinese to set up official 
relations. In his view: 
‘It has been clear throughout this period of lively Chinese interest 
in Western Europe that it was basically political and not economic. 
To China Western European unity has been attractive not because 
it offers better market or trading conditions […] but rather as an 
element in China’s rivalry with Russia and to a lesser extent, with 
the US. A constant theme in Chinese leaders’ contacts with 
European leaders has been the need to treat détente with great 
circumspection and to sup with the Russians, if at all, with a very 
long spoon.’199 
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Based on this analysis Soames played upon the Sino-Soviet competition. He 
made a point about treating the Chinese more favourably than the Soviets 
and other Eastern European state trading countries. Soames wanted to 
transmit the Outline Agreement in person to the Chinese ambassador to 
Belgium Li Lianpi in November 1974, rather than only via post as had been 
the case with the other state trading countries. 200 He also arranged meetings 
with Li Lianpi in which he emphasised that the Community distinguished the 
PRC government from the other Communist ones. 201   
Yet the Chinese remained cautious: Beijing continued to express its 
interest in official relations, but would not go further than that. 202 Returning 
from Beijing on 6 January 1975, the Dutch Foreign Minister Max van der 
Stoel reported that Beijing wanted to establish permanent contacts with the 
Community. Likewise in April 1975 Zhou Enlai indicated to the Belgian Prime 
Minister Leo Tindemans during his official visit to China that the PRC 
considered sending an ambassador to the Community. 203 But no concrete 
moves followed. The caution of the PRC is illustrated not least by the fact that 
the Institute for Foreign Relations of the PRC rather than the Ministry for 
Foreign Affairs invited Soames.204 And initially the invitation was only an 
unofficial one. Only at Soames’ insistence did this change. Soames still 
confided one week before his visit in a personal letter to Murray MacLehose, 
 
200 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/628, Hannay to Soames, Tea with the Chinese ambassador HE Mr Li Lien-pi, 27 
November 1974. 
201 Ibid. 
202 ECHA, BAC/1987/624, telex nr. 358, Luyten to Soames cabinet, 4 December 1974; see also Kapur, China and 
the E.E.C., p.35; Schaefer, "Ostpolitik, "Fernostpolitik"", pp.145–146. 
203 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, Information relation extérieures, La Republique populaire de Chine et la 
Communauté européenne. 
204 CA, SOAM 42/1975 China, Press notice, Hannay, 18 March 1975. 
  
 
110 
British Governor of Hong Kong: ‘Fascinating though it is going to be, I have 
seldom felt a greater sense of operating totally blind’.205 It became clear that if 
Soames had plans for the Chinese he had to take things in his own hands. 
And a visit from 4 to 11 May proved an opportune time in relation to the 
Chinese since Deng Xiaoping was to visit France from 12 to 17 May and 
Soames visit would be seen in a positive light.  
Engaging directly with the Chinese government was a case where 
Soames could demonstrate that Commission did not merely react in an 
ineffective manner to exceptional crises in world politics such as the Yom 
Kippur war in October 1973 or the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in July 1974.206 
A strong diplomatic act would show that the Commission could take the 
initiative in international relations that were not characterised by armed 
confrontation, and through regular diplomatic exchange. Certainly the 
general EC-PRC relationship was one where it was usually the Chinese who 
set the pace, and the EC officials were conscious of this. 207  But in this 
particular instance a Commissioner could and did take the initiative.208 
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Geopolitics was key.  nd so was Soames’ world view. He ‘just believed 
that the European Community needed to have relations with China. He 
shared the view also that China was a piece on the chess-board of the Cold 
War. And he was after all a child of the Cold War himself.’209 Soames’ move 
fitted with the European endeavour to challenge superpower détente. This 
concept of détente was meant to relax East-West tension by consolidating a 
bipolar international system managed by the United States and the Soviet 
Union. The EC-PRC connection meant strengthening the Community’s 
capacity as a ‘Third Force’.210 This idea had different meanings at different 
times for different actors.211 Applied to the mid-1970s, ‘Third Force’ referred 
to the Community’s aim that European d tente would overcome rather than 
consolidate the bipolar Cold War order, and advance the Community’s 
independence as an international actor in its own right.212 Indeed, Soames 
declared to his Chinese hosts on 4 May 1975 that: ‘We do not believe that the 
world’s problems can or should be resolved only by the action of the two 
superpowers, and we believe it important that Europe should speak with a 
single voice in its dealing with them.’213 Beijing offered political legitimacy to 
the Commission which would join with it in challenging the bipolar system.214 
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The vice-president’s move matched the Commission’s agenda set out by 
Ortoli in front of the European Parliament on 18 February 1975:  
‘Our first objective must be to make Europe less dependent. […] 
Europe offers us an opportunity of exercising to the full the 
modicum of power allowed us in the new centres of decision. […] It 
holds good for international organisations and for our relations 
with our larger partners, notably the US’.215  
Official relations with China meant that the Community linked up with a 
country that encouraged European integration as a counterweight to the 
United States.216 In May 1975, Soames commented sharply to Qiao Guanhua 
on Kissinger’s misguided approach, which his speech for the Year of Europe 
epitomised.217 By opening to China, the Community could also present itself 
as more skilful than Washington which had failed to follow up Nixon’s 
spectacular visit with the establishment of formal diplomatic ties and would 
in fact set up diplomatic relations with Beijing only five years after the 
European Community in 1979. 
But most important of all was the Community’s relationship with the 
Soviet Union. It was a considerable risk for the Commission to reach out 
actively to the PRC because it could nurture the Soviet fear of geo-strategic 
encirclement.218 Soames’ cabinet exercised significant caution and control on 
the Commission’s relations to China. This is illustrated in a response by 
Hannay in October 1974 regarding Delbos, a member of the Directorate 
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General Human Resource and Administration who wished to visit the PRC 
with other Commission officials. Hannay remarked:  
‘where I have very real doubts is over the evident intention of Mr 
Delbos to get some kind of political coverage for this visit. The 
vision of some 20 Commission officials selected at random going 
off to China with the idea of opening up a new chapter in 
Sino/European relations is not a comforting one’.219  
Soames’ timing of his visit, a few weeks before the Helsinki Summit of the 
CSCE in July 1975 points to Soames playing the China card.  
At the CSCE a central objective of the Community was to gain Soviet 
recognition as a unified political actor.220 Reaching out politically to the PRC 
in May 1975 suggests that Soames aimed to set the tone in Helsinki. The 
Commission’s aim was to isolate the Soviet Union, leaving it as the only blank 
spot on the world map which had not yet engaged officially with the EC. 221 On 
16 September 1974, the COMECON Secretary Fadeyev sent a letter to Ortoli 
requesting preliminary talks between the Commission and COMECON.222 But 
when Wellenstein visited Moscow in February 1975 for the first official talks 
with COMECON a rapprochement was not in sight. His judgement was 
devastating. He reported back to the Nine:  
‘Nos interlocuteurs n' taient pas pr par s  le plus grand d sordre 
régnait de leur coté. Conciliabules, chuchotements. Tout cela était 
enfantin et primitif. […] L'atmosphère était celle d'une "mad 
house". Il est difficile de concevoir le degré de confusion, de basse 
qualité, de stupidité auquel nous avons été confrontés. Le mot de 
médiocrité serait un compliment. Il s'agit plutôt de stupidité et de 
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totale inorganisation. […] Notre impression est désastreuse: 
inaptitude et confusion. […] D'après M. KAWAN (qui prend la 
parole), la mauvaise foi de ses interlocuteurs semble en effet avoir 
dépassé les bornes. […] Il a  t  impossible de s'entendre.’223  
The meeting had shown that the Soviet Union and COMECON were not 
prepared to acknowledge the Commission’s jurisdiction over trade policy. In 
this context, Soames’ China initiative was a diplomatic coup that was meant 
to signal to the Soviets and COMECON that they could no longer afford to 
ignore the Commission and the reality of the European Community. For the 
Commission, the move dramatically showed that it was a diplomatic actor, 
that could bridge ideological differences, speak for the European Community, 
and was hence not to be ignored. The significance was ‘Political, because we 
were everywhere in the world. And until then, there were two enormous 
blank spots. That was Eastern Europe and China and surroundings, 
Mongolia. There were enormous blank spots, we had no access. Now we were 
everywhere, except, still, Moscow.’224 
The timing of Soames’ visit hints at a further factor in his decision: it 
was one month before the British referendum on EC membership.225 The 
referendum meant that public opinion in the UK debated the Community’s 
value, and that discussions on the issue pervaded the Community institutions 
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and also the activities’ of DG I.226 Hence the Commission gladly grasped any 
public opportunity to assert its political role and to demonstrate the 
relevance of the EC as such. Considering the large press coverage that foreign 
relations with China attracted, the Commission’s visit to Beijing represented 
such an opportunity. The Commission could also prove it took the advice of 
European business circles seriously. In April 1975 John Maslen, adviser for 
Relations with State Trading Countries at DG I of the European Commission, 
interviewed leading companies involved in trade with the PRC during a visit 
to London. 227 They anticipated that the member states would gain increased 
value as individual trading partners with China in the event of official EC-
PRC relations being established. Therefore Soames’ China initiative 
demonstrated that the Commission spoke for a Community which actively 
addressed national concerns.228 This too would be helpful in the context of the 
British referendum campaign – a campaign with which Soames would be 
actively involved. 
The timing and manner in which he accepted the Chinese invitation and 
announced it to the member states offers an important indication that his 
change of mind also related to important institutional changes, namely the 
creation of the European Council. The European Council, created at the Paris 
 
226 John Young, 'Europe', in Anthony Seldon and Kevin Hickson (eds.), New Labour, Old Labour, (London and 
New York: Routledge, 2004); Young, Britain and European Unity, pp.111–120; see also for example: ECHA, Speech 
collection, Soames, to the Conservative Political Centre Symposium on “Our First Year in Europe”, The Royal 
Festival Hall, 26 January 1974; ECHA, Speech collection, Ortoli, Presentation of the General Report for 1974 and 
programme of the Commission for 1975, 18 February 1975; CA, SOAM 42/1975 China, Record of a meeting between 
Sir Christopher Soames and the Chinese Foreign Minister Mr. Chiao Kuan-Hua, Beijing, 5 May 1975. 
227 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Interviews with Leading Companies in the China Trade, Maslen and Westerby, 30 
April 1975. 
228 See for example: C , SO M  2/1975 China, Bulletin d’Information n°9 , Commission des Communaut s 
européennes, Groupe du Porte-Parole, quoting Reuter, 7 May 1975. 
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Summit in December 1974, represented a major institutional innovation 
because it de facto defined the Heads of States and Governments as the 
ultimate decision-making body within the EC.229 The European Council was 
to meet regularly to provide leadership to the EC in times of economic and 
political crisis such as the mid-1970s.230 It was uncertain what this innovation 
would mean for the Commission. Ortoli addressed the European Parliament 
in February 1975. He warned that the European Council might lead to ‘the 
low road of inter-governmental cooperation when we should be taking the 
high road of integration’.231 Therefore a possibility was that this new body 
would abrogate the Commission’s traditionally held position with regard to 
the Community’s external relations.232  
To counter that and assert the Commission’s role in the conduct of the 
Community’s external relations, Soames changed his attitude towards the 
PRC in early 1975: rather than waiting for the Chinese to come to Brussels 
and take matters further, Soames headed to Beijing and staged a political act 
making a point to speak in the name of the European Community and its 
member states. As the opening quote of this chapter suggests, Soames held a 
series of secret meetings with Li Lianpi where he ‘sat and drank tea and ate 
little cakes and gradually the idea of the visit took shape’.233 He accepted the 
invitation without the knowledge of the Nine on 4 March 1975, just one week 
 
229 Ifestos, European Political Cooperation, p.186; Ludlow, 'From Deadlock to Dynamism', p.227. 
230 Michèle Weinachter, 'Le Tandem Valéry Giscard d'Estaing - Helmut Schmidt et la gouvernance européenne', in 
Wilfried Loth (ed.), La Gouvernance supranationale dans la construction européenne, (Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2005), 
pp.208–209; Gillingham, European Integration, 1950-2003, p.81. 
231 ECHA, Speech collection, Ortoli, Presentation of the General Report for 1974 and Programme of the 
Commission for 1975, 18 February 1975. 
232 Serge Berstein and Jean-Franc ois Sirinelli (eds.), Les Années iscard: Valéry iscard d’Estaing et l’Europe, 
1974-1981, (Paris: A.Colin, 2005), p.141; Badel and Bussière, Franc ois-Xavier Ortoli, pp.153-156. 
233 Interview, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, London, 10 March 2010. 
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before the first meeting of the European Council in Dublin. To reduce the risk 
of the Nine’s obstruction, he informed the national representatives about his 
decision only on 19 March and only after a leak to the press and merely over a 
low-key COREPER lunch: 234 ‘he told the permanent representatives that he 
was going to China, didn't ask them if it was a good idea, or a good thing to 
do, or anything, but just said “I'm going”’.235 Soames confronted the Nine with 
a fait accompli.  
 ll in all, Soames’ China initiative was rooted in his world view and 
personal ambitions. Geopolitics and intra-Community politics allowed 
Soames to act upon on these and take the lead regarding the People’s 
Republic. It was to prove to both superpowers and to the Nine that the 
Commission was a political authority to be reckoned with. The timing which 
Soames’ chose to visit China and announce this to the member states 
suggests that he changed his mind at the beginning of 1975 as a number of 
factors came together. It became clear that the Chinese were not to going to 
step forward and take the initiative of setting up official relations. The 
Chinese were in control of the timing of the visit. But it is realistic to assume 
that at the secret meetings in the Chinese embassy in Brussels, discussing 
over tea and cake, Soames convinced the Chinese that May was the most 
opportune time for both parties.  
First, Deng Xiaoping was to visit France in May which enhanced the 
chances for the Chinese to respond positively to Soames’ proposal. Second, 
Wellenstein’s visit to Moscow in February had proven disastrous. In the light 
 
234 PAAA, B201/411, Reise VP Soames nach Peking, Lebsanft to Bonn AA, 21 March 1975.  
235 Interview, Lord Hannay of Chiswick, London, 10 March 2010. 
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of the impending Helsinki Summit Beijing offered the Commission 
diplomatic leverage against the Soviets. And Soames played the Soviet card 
vis-à-vis the Chinese. Third, Britain was scheduled to vote in a referendum on 
EC membership in June, when Soames would be fully engaged campaigning 
in the UK. The Commission was eager to prove the Community’s worth, as 
were the Chinese as a counterweight to the Soviet Union. Lastly, the 
European Council held its first session in April. It was uncertain where in the 
institutional power structures that would leave the Commission, and 
consequently what would come of the established contact with the Chinese. 
Soames announcement of his visit as a fait accompli to the member states 
just one week before the European Council meeting amounted to a statement 
about the Commission’s sense of purpose. So did his visit in May. 
Conclusion 
The episode reveals elements of independent policy decision-making on 
behalf of the EC, and an assertion of new loci of political power which the 
national governments had to come to terms with as fait accompli. Despite the 
Declaration of European Identity, the rapid establishment of official EC-PRC 
relations was not a foregone conclusion. The member states quickly reverted 
to their hands-off approach after the Copenhagen summit. They did not 
follow up their pledge with action. The Heads of State and Government did 
not involve themselves directly in setting up official EC-PRC relations. And 
the Chinese government refused to play by the member states’ game, which 
assigned to Beijing the role of the initiator of official relations with the 
Community. Soames was primarily responsible for setting up the official EC-
PRC relationship.  
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In the context of the economic crisis, the fact that the PRC held the 
potential to complement the EC economy facilitated Soames’ decision to 
move beyond his initial opposition to taking the initiative vis-à-vis Beijing. 
But the main factor behind his decision was inter-institutional jockeying for 
power. Soames used China as diplomatic leverage outside superpower 
politics to bolster the Commission’s role.  t the root of this bold move, 
unprecedented in the Community’s history, stood personal ambitions fuelled 
by his friendship with Kissinger, and his belief that the European Community 
mattered in the Cold War. 
A central question is the relevance of China for the EC between 1973 and 
1975. After all, the PRC was geographically far removed with marginal 
influence on European citizens’ everyday life.  rchival evidence also shows 
that the PRC did not feature as a priority on the member states’ agenda in 
that period. But not only did relations with China prove uniquely different to 
any of the Community’s other external relations, but also EC relations with 
the PRC in that period linked to major issues on the agenda of national 
governments and the Community: tackling the economic crisis and seeking 
détente in Europe. Most revealingly however, the establishment of official 
EC-PRC relations became intertwined with essential questions of both EC 
membership and institutional changes within the EC. After Walter Hallstein 
had failed to assume greater power for the Commission in the mid-1960s, 
which led to a period of institutional pessimism, the Commission sought to 
redefine its aspirations for political leadership.236  
 
236 Badel and Bussière, Franc ois-Xavier Ortoli, p.121 and p.127. 
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Soames acted upon these aspirations – albeit on an issue where member 
states interests converged.237 His initiative on 4 May 1975 was a landmark in 
the Community’s opening to the PRC.  s a result of Soames’ move, Qiao 
expressed ‘in straightforward language that the People’s Republic of China 
wanted to establish relations with the Community and was prepared to send a 
representative to it.’238 Now the challenge was to move the relationship from 
declarations and symbolism to concrete results. 
 
237 Ludlow, The European Community and the Crises of the 1960s, p.209; ———, 'A Supranational Icarus? 
Hallstein, the Early Commission and the Search for an Independent Role', in Antonio Varsori (ed.), Inside the 
European Community. Actors and Policies in the European Integration 1957-1972, 37-54, (Baden-Baden, 
Bruxelles: Nomos, Bruylant, 2006); Wilfried Loth, William Wallace and Wolfgang Wessels, Walter Hallstein: der 
vergessene Europäer?, (Bonn: Europa Union Verlag, 1995). 
238 CA, SOAM 42/1975 China, Record of a second meeting between Sir Christopher Soames and the Chinese 
Foreign Minister Mr. Chiao Kuan-Hua, Beijing, 6 May 1975. 
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 A difficult follow-up  
(May 1975 – January 1977) 
‘We have to recognize that in the world of today the old 
balance-of-power idea, given a new civilized and 
sophisticated dimension, may be the best guarantee of 
peace in the immediate and near future. There is a 
recognition in this Soames initiative of the fact that we 
are a political as well as a trading community. There is 
recognition of this also in the Lomé Convention. We 
have here two examples in this current year of Europe's 
taking initiatives in the broader political or geo-political 
sense and emphasizing again that we have a positive 
contribution to make in this area where other peoples 
may not have the same sophistication and sense of 
history which this Community had and which enabled it 
to deal on this basis with a very historic people.’1 
MEP Brian Lenihan, June 1975 
‘We need to steer between the extremes of pretending to 
do more than we can do at the present stage of the 
Community's development and doing so little that the 
natural inertia of the Community's procedures, 
combined with Chinese lack of experience and 
hesitation, result in a total loss of momentum.’2 
Sir Christopher Soames, May 1975 
On 15 July 1975 the European Council welcomed emphatically the decision by 
the Chinese government to establish official relations with the Community.3 
Two months later Li Lianpi took office as the first ambassador of the PRC 
accredited to the Community. The Commission began parallel discussions for 
an EEC-PRC trade agreement. Five preparatory meetings took place in 
Brussels until February 1976. But the talks came to a stand-still which 
 
1 Debates of the European Parliament, Report of Proceedings from 16 to 20 June 1975, Official Journal C 192, 1975 
2 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Follow-up on China, Soames to Wellenstein, Brussels, 13 May 1975. 
3 The European Council, Brussels, 16-17 July 1975. 
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endured until January 1977, by which time Soames had left the Commission. 
The reason for the stagnation of the relationship was that the Chinese 
government embroiled itself in domestic politics.  
The Community progressed in liaising with the Chinese mostly because 
Soames pushed for a speedy and comprehensive follow-up of his visit. The 
European Parliament continued its pressure on the Commission and the 
Council in order to enhance the freshly woven connection. Whilst the 
member states concerted at the EPC, they hardly did so at COREPER or the 
Council of Ministers. And the Nine carried on their hands-off approach in 
shaping a distinctive Community approach towards China. The literature 
portrays the period after the establishment of official relations until January 
1977 as a time of stagnation. 4  This research agrees that the EC-PRC 
relationship as such came to a stand-still. But it demonstrates that the 
opening to China brought about new movement in the Community’s 
relationship with the Soviet bloc. The EC work on China in this period 
continued to contribute to détente because it provoked more contacts with 
Moscow, the Eastern European states and COMECON.  
This chapter analyses the efforts of the European Community between 
May 1975 and January 1977 to use the new momentum in its connection to 
the PRC government. First, the chapter examines the period up to the 
completion of diplomatic relations from Soames’ visit to Beijing until on 15 
September 1975. Of particular interest is the European Parliament’s reception 
of Soames’ initiative and the reasons for having China on the agenda of the 
 
4 See for example: Olivi, L'Europe difficile; Taylor, The Limits of European Integration; Coombes '‘Concertation’ in 
the Nation-State and European Community'. 
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second European Council meeting in Brussels in July 1975. Second, the 
chapter investigates the preparatory work for a trade agreement, and third 
how this came to a stand-still. Fourth, it looks at the various ways in which 
the Community sought to give political impetus to the EC-PRC relationship. 
The focus is on the Commission’s work, the Tindemans Report and the 
Community’s response to a natural disaster in China, followed by Zhou 
Enlai’s and Mao Zedong’s death. Finally, the chapter considers the effect of 
the EC rapprochement with the PRC upon the Community’s relationship with 
the Soviet bloc.  
The EP’s critical acclaim and the European Council’s support 
In stark contrast to the member states’ passive reaction to Soames’ initiative, 
MEPs from across the political spectrum reacted very enthusiastically and 
underlined the significance of the new developments. Soames then pushed 
for a speedy follow-up to his visit. This included putting the China dossier 
onto the European Council’s agenda. The Heads of State and Government did 
not discuss the issue further at their Brussels meeting in July 1975.5 Instead 
they gave the matter high visibility in the Council’s conclusions. Li Lianpi’s 
accreditation as ambassador to the Community sealed the establishment of 
official relations with the PRC.  
Whereas individually, the French and British government reacted 
positively to the Commission’s work, their support hardly translated to 
 
5 CARAN, 5 AG 3, 909, Compte-rendu du Conseil Européen de Bruxelles, 16/17 juillet 1975, Verbatim établi à partir 
des notes de M. Sauvagnargues.  
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COREPER level.6 Charles Malo, Manac’h’s successor as French ambassador 
to China, praised Soames’ direct, efficient and straight-forward language that 
had speeded up conclusions. 7  The Quai d’Orsay’s Direction des  ffaires 
Economiques et Financières welcomed the outcome of Soames’ visit too.8 
French officials interpreted the Chinese motivations as essentially political. 
They viewed it as being partly linked to Deng Xiaoping’s visit to France that 
May, and partly to the ambition to be the first Communist country to accredit 
an ambassador to the Community. 9  The British ambassador in Beijing, 
Edward Youde, also took into account the context of the impending British 
referendum for EEC membership. He thought that the Chinese wanted to 
demonstrate their support for the unity of Western Europe as a 
counterweight to the Soviet Union. 10  What this meant for British policy, 
Youde concluded pragmatically, was: ‘since the effect of their policy is helpful 
to us rather than otherwise there is no reason for us in this case to look a gift 
horse in the mouth.’11 Yet none of these or other deliberations led to an 
exchange of views at COREPER.  t its restricted session on 12 May Soames’ 
visit met only with acknowledgement. 12  Michael Palliser, the British 
permanent representative to the Community, reported ‘There was no 
 
6 ECHA, BAC 259.80, PVS 340, 21 May 1975. 
7 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1967-1975, 107, Visite de M. Christopher Soames, Malo to Adresse Diplomatie 
Paris, Beijing, 9 May 1975. 
8 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 107, Récentes décisions chinoises à l'égard de la Communauté économique 
européenne, 9 May 1975.  
9 Ibid. 
10 NA, FCO 21/1390, Visit of Sir C Soames, Youde to Bentley, 12 May 1975. 
11 Ibid. 
12 CMA, Intermediate Archive, 40281/1975, Extrait du projet de compte-rendu sommaire de la 769ème réunion du 
Comité des représentants permanents, Brussels, 7-12 May 1975. 
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discussion.’13 A desire amongst the member states to muscle into the China 
dossier was not apparent at Community level.  
The European Parliament by contrast responded very actively and 
encouragingly. On 14 May Jean-Joseph Schwed, the official at the 
Commission’s General Secretariat responsible for liaising with the European 
Parliament, warned Soames of the amount and fervour of MEP’s questions.14 
The MEPs vehemently discussed at the sitting on 18 June, and asked Soames 
to explain the state of the EC-China relationship.15 The session offers not only 
evidence of the European Parliament holding the Commissioner accountable 
for his initiative, but also of the Parliament’s own stance. The accent 
throughout lay on the political. The opening quote of this chapter by Lord 
Gladwyn, vice-president of the European Parliament’s Political Committee, 
captures the significance the EP gave to Soames’ visit. 16  The EC-PRC 
connection showcased that the Community was a reality the Soviet Union had 
to recognize, and the move had the potential to stabilise relations between 
the industrialised and industrialising countries. 17 According to the European 
Parliament the new developments proved that the Community had a role as a 
Third Force, although the MEPs did not explicitly used this term.  
The MEPs from Britain praised Soames most highly. The British 
Conservative Peter Kirk regarded it as ‘the most far-reaching event to take 
 
13 N , FCO 21/1390, Sir Christopher Soames’ visit to China, Palliser, 12 May 1975. 
14 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Problèmes des relations de la Communauté avec la Chine à la session du Parlement 
du mois de juin, Schwed to Hannay, Strasbourg, 14 May 1975. 
15 Debates of the European Parliament, Report of Proceedings from 16 to 20 June 1975, Official Journal C 192, 
1975. 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid. 
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place in the field of the Community’s external relations’. Lord Hugh Dykes, a 
Liberal, termed it even as a ‘first new, small step for mankind.’  nd Lord 
Gladwyn congratulated Soames ‘on the able way in which he dealt with 
potentially explosive questions such as the recognition, or otherwise, of 
Taiwan.’ 18  The support suggests a certain loyalty amongst the British in 
Brussels, but it also corresponds to the British generally pushing most 
actively for a pronounced role of the Community in world politics. But the 
praise for Soames came also from quarters less known to be in favour of the 
British. Brian Lenihan, an Irish MEP from the European Progressive 
Democrats, quoted in the opening, described Soames’ mission as ‘a milestone 
in the development of relations between the Community and the rest of the 
world’. His acclaim is remarkable considering that he was from the Fianna 
Fáil Party, at this point in time strongly anti-British. 
In front of the European Parliament, Soames agreed that the 
establishment of an official Community-China relationship was ‘a notable 
diplomatic and political event’, but expressed caution about the future 
economic benefits. Consistent with his attitude prior to his visit to Beijing, 
Soames stressed that trade prospects had to be seen in the long-term. As in 
his report to the Commission and COREPER, he emphasised that his visit 
was important in the context of the North-South dialogue.19 
After May 1975 Soames remained in charge of pushing forward the 
Community’s links with the Chinese. Soames’ approach is illustrated in a note 
to Wellenstein on 13 May cited in the opening quote of this chapter. The vice-
 
18 Ibid. 
19 ECHA, BAC 259.80, PVS 340, 21 May 1975. 
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president personally ensured that DG I implemented his instructions as his 
written comments in the margins of official documents illustrate.20 And his 
chef de cabinet kept a close watch too. For example, Hannay remarked 
critically on a draft note on EC-PRC relations written by the Directorate 
General of Information: ‘This is really not very good and needs extensive re-
drafting’.21 He also pointed out that the European Parliament debate of 18 
June needed mentioning, which shows the importance the Commission 
attached to the Parliament’s involvement. Thus Soames’ cabinet held a tight 
grip on the activities of the other Commission Directorates too. 
The follow-up consisted also in Soames’ cabinet sending the records of 
the meetings between the Commission and the Chinese officials in Beijing in 
very strict confidence to the British Permanent Representative. Peter Edward 
Hall, First Secretary of Britain’s Permanent Representation to the European 
Community, noted that ‘their possession should not be revealed, and on no 
account should they be shown to our Community partners’.22 Undoubtedly a 
loyalty to the Commissioners’ country of origin remained whatever the degree 
of socialisation in Brussels, which meant the respective member states often 
had privileged access to information.23  
To increase the political significance of the new relationship Soames 
worked through the European Council. At the EPC meeting on 26 May, he 
 
20 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Accreditation of Chinese ambassador, Fielding to Hannay, Brussels, 4 June 1975. 
21 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Projet de note d'information visant la Chine, Collowald to Klein, Brussels, 3 July 
1975. 
22 N , FCO 21/1391, EEC/China: Sir C Soames’ visit, Hall to Neville-Jones, 3 July 1975. 
23 On the process of identifying with the Community in spite of their basic national loyalty: Coombes David, Politics 
and Bureaucracy in the European Community - A portrait of the Commission of the EEC, (Sage Publications: 
Beverly Hills, 1970), p.89.  
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suggested to the foreign ministers that the European Council should welcome 
the Chinese engagement at its next meeting in July.24 Soames’ rationale was 
that this would demonstrate in public that the Community endorsed the 
relationship. It would also offer a counterweight to the statements on détente 
linked to the CSCE which contained important concessions to the Soviet 
Union. In line with the previous laissez-faire attitude none of the ministers 
spoke, which translated into an agreement with Soames.25 This pattern was 
replicated at the COREPER lunch on 3 July. 26  Taking advantage of this 
acquiescence, Soames went further. By 9 July he had proposed a precise 
formula for the Heads of States and Government to use in expressing their 
approval. He advised using the official press briefing on 17 July to say: ‘the 
European Council warmly welcomed the decision by the Chinese People’s 
Republic [...] and considered that this decision opened the way to the 
development of closer relations between China and Europe to which they 
attached great importance.’27 
Considering that the Commission’s suggestion caused controversy 
amongst the member states, the absence of debate at COREPER and the 
Council of Foreign Ministers is striking.28 The Foreign Office briefed on 10 
 
24 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Follow-up on China, Soames to Wellenstein, Brussels, 13 May 1975. 
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27 NA, FCO 21/1391, Council 15/16 July: préparations for the European Council, Palliser to FCO, Brussels, 8 July 
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28 AMAE, Série Direction des Affaires Politiques, Sous-Direction Asie-Océanie (henceforward AO), côte provisoire 
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July that ‘On balance we are against this proposal.’29 First, it ‘could create an 
undesirable precedent. The Community has opened relations with many 
other countries with much less fuss.’ Second, the European Council already 
planned a statement on détente related to the CSCE and one on the United 
Nations, and ‘Too many declarations devalue the currency.’ Third, ‘the 
disadvantages of possibly provoking them [the Russians] further with a 
statement concerning relations with China will not be balanced by the 
advantages to be gained.’ Thus a solution had to be found to ‘give the Soviet 
Union less ground for annoyance’.30 Such remarks reflect the risks to détente 
that the Foreign Office continued to see in any improvement in the EC-PRC 
relationship. But in a turn-around one day prior to the European Council 
meeting James Callaghan, the Foreign Secretary, instructed his diplomats to 
support the Commission’s proposal.31 
Therefore the British delegation accepted Soames’ suggestion without 
raising any concerns to its counterparts, who did not report any misgivings 
either. Albeit an internal note to the German Chancellor on 14 July cautioned 
about a statement on the establishment of diplomatic relations: ‘Es liegt nicht 
in unserem Interesse, wenn die hierzu in Aussicht genommene mündliche 
Erklärung des präsidenten des ER vor der Presse zu emphatische ausfällt.‘32 
This suggests that within the German Foreign Ministry, similar debates as to 
the ones in the FCO had taken place. But the foreign ministers agreed on 15 
 
29 NA, FCO 30/2589, EEC/China: statement by European Heads of Government, 10 July 1975. 
30 Ibid. 
31 NA, FCO 21/1391, EEC-China: Fenn's letter to March 6/8 of 2 July, Callaghan, 14 July 1975. 
32 Original emphasis. Archiv der sozialen Demokratie (henceforward AdsD), Helmut-Schmidt-Archiv 
(henceforward HSA), 1/HSAA006654, Tagung des Europäischen Rats am 16./17. Juli 1975 in Brüssel, Loeck to Chef 
BK and Bundeskanzler, Bonn, 14 July 1975. 
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July without discussion that the Heads of State and Government were to 
adopt a statement along the lines Soames had proposed.33 This proved to be 
the first and only time in the 1970s that the European Council concerned 
itself with the EC-PRC relationship.34 The Commission’s push through the 
EPC proved effective.35  
Tangible results of the Commission’s work came with the accreditation 
of Li Lianpi. Though the original Chinese request had been an accreditation 
to the ‘Communities’ rather than only the EEC, the Commission did not see a 
problem in the last minute changes by the Chinese side. Hannay remarked: 
‘We always expected the Chinese would gag on Euratom and the request to 
open relations solely with the EEC. It is of no practical significance at all.’36 
The press accorded attention to the event too. The Times correspondent 
David Bonavia reported from Beijing on the setting up of official relations, as 
did all the major daily newspapers including the Financial Times, the New 
York Herald Tribune, Le Monde, Frankfurter Allgemeine, and Die Welt.37 
The setting up of diplomatic EEC-PRC relations also featured as the opening 
of the script for the audio-visual documentary ‘Le Monde Change,  oici 
l'Europe’ which Emmanuele Gazzo, Director of  gence Europe, meant to 
 
33 NA, FCO 21/1391, Meeting of the Council of ministers 15 July: preliminary session: EEC/China, my telegram No. 
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Leadership Vacuum?. 
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write.38 Furthermore, the BBC contacted Hannay to receive more information 
on the accreditation for its planned weekly programme starting on 15 
September.39  
The PRC became the 103rd country and the first Communist country 
besides Yugoslavia to establish official relations with the EEC.40 The period 
shows that Soames remained firmly in charge of the China dossier for the EC. 
The member states carried on with their ‘wait-and-see’ attitude on a 
Community level. The episode also crystallised how the Commission, the 
European Council and the European Parliament shaped the EC opening to 
China working under different conditions. The Commission used China to re-
assert a role which had arguably already been conferred upon it by the Rome 
Treaties. The European Parliament sought to create a new role for itself 
which these Treaties had not elaborated upon at all. And for the European 
Council, China became a topic that contributed in legitimising its new role in 
the integration process, a role for which it did not yet have a formal legal 
basis. 
The Commission pushes ahead with trade talks 
Next to the accreditation, the most important follow-up item for Soames was 
the trade agreement. The steps for the Community to conclude a trade 
agreement were as follows: first, the Commission had to conduct preparatory 
talks with the country in question during which the parties discussed 
 
38 Historical Archives of the European Union, Florence (henceforward HAEU), Papers of Emmanuele Gazzo 
(henceforward EG) 183, Information et Communication par l'audio-visuel (ICA), Cassigneu to Gazzo, Paris, 30 July 
1975; HAEU, EG 183, Gazzo, 15 August 1975; HAEU, EG 183, Gazzo, 23 August 1975. 
39 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Clarke to Hannay, 29 August 1975. 
40 Dick Wilson, 'China comes to Brussels', European Community, 1975, 9–12. 
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preliminaries such as scope and content of the agreement. The next step was 
for the Commission to lead exploratory talks. If these were successful, the 
Commission would recommend negotiating directives to the Council. Once 
the Council approved these negotiating directives, the Council would 
mandate the Commission to begin official negotiations. At the end of this 
official negotiating phase, the Commission and the respective country would 
initial the trade agreement. If the Council approved the initialled trade 
agreement, a representative of the Council and the Commission would sign it. 
The last step before the agreement could enter into force was its ratification 
by the European Parliament.  
To advance the trade discussions Soames instructed Roland de 
Kergorlay, one of the three deputy director general of DG I, to work closely 
with Manfred Caspari, another deputy director general of DG I, who held 
special responsibility for coordination and who oversaw relations with Asia. 
Two meetings took place during which the Commission clarified the technical 
workings of the EEC to the Chinese delegation headed by Yen Judaic, 
counsellor at the Chinese embassy. They explained the EEC’s Generalised 
Preference Scheme (GSP), the definition of quantitative restrictions and 
liberalisation, and the possible competences of a joint committee that would 
administer the trade agreement. The Commission also provided 
documentation regarding the EEC market for agricultural products such as 
cereals and pig meat. Furthermore, it restated that the agreement would be 
based on the Outline Agreement.41 As a result of these meetings Hannay 
thought that ‘[a] lot of ground has now been covered’, which indicates the 
 
41 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Second meeting with representatives of the Chinese embassy, Brussels, 23 July 1975. 
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positive attitude by the Chinese towards progress in the months following 
Soames’ China visit.42  
Three further meetings took place in Brussels February 1976. Both sides 
agreed to have a general framework agreement rather than one concerned 
with detailed measures on specific products.43 Once the agreement had been 
signed, a joint committee was to deal with concrete issues such as the Chinese 
wish to see the Community’s quantitative restrictions on Chinese exports to 
the EC removed. The Chinese came to accept that the Community’s 
preferential treatment for Chinese products via the GSP remained an area for 
autonomous decision-making by the Community. Both sides also agreed on 
the inclusion of a most-favoured-nation (MFN) clause, a principle which in 
international law meant that countries could not discriminate between their 
trading partners.44 Both sides wanted to reach a rapid conclusion. 
The trade discussions show the impact of the Cold War on the 
Commission’s work in so far as they reveal the wider concerns regarding the 
contacts with the other Communist countries. Remarkably, the Commission 
took the lead in implementing in relation to China what the Nine had put 
down in the Second Basket of the Helsinki Final Act concerning economic 
relations between East and Western Europe. Ideological differences were not 
 
42 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Second meeting with representatives of the Chinese embassy, Brussels, 23 July 1975. 
43 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Fourth meeting with representatives of the Chinese mission, Brussels, 21 February 
1976; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Fifth meeting with representatives of the Chinese mission, Maslen, Brussels, 23 
February 1975. 
44 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Fourth meeting with representatives of the Chinese mission, Brussels, 21 February 
1976. 
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to hinder the evolution of economic relations. 45  Moreover, based on 
contextual evidence, the Commission effectively enacted in relation to the 
PRC the aims of the Third Basket which dealt with ways of cooperation aimed 
at increasing cultural and educational exchanges, broadening the 
dissemination of information, facilitating human contacts, and solving 
humanitarian problems. At the CSCE, EPC was exclusively responsible for 
this policy area.46 But regarding China, the Commission upheld its role in this 
area too: it pushed successfully for a clause on more human contacts, and it 
insisted on including concrete measures such as training exchanges, visits, 
trade fairs, exhibitions. 47  Therefore, whether intentionally or not, the 
Commission put into practice some of the Community’s aims for détente in 
Europe in respect to détente in international relations as a whole.  
An EEC-PRC trade agreement also exposed the economic competition 
the Community perceived vis-à-vis the United States. The question of the 
Community securing a competitive advantage in the Chinese market against 
the Americans flared up particularly in the discussions over the Chinese 
meaning of ‘favourable considerations’ towards Community exports to 
China.48 Despite Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, the  merican and the PRC 
government did not normalise diplomatic relations until 1979. Until then a 
US-China trade agreement proved unfeasible. Yet, as the reports from Beijing 
by the member states’ commercial counsellors from Beijing showed, 
 
45 Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, chapter 5; Romano, From Détente in Europe to European 
Détente, p.45. 
46 Gainar, Aux origines de la diplomatie européenne, chapter 5; Romano, From Détente in Europe to European 
Détente, p.159. 
47 ECHA, BAC/136/1987/624, Fourth meeting with representatives of the Chinese mission, Brussels, 21 February 
1976. 
48 Ibid. 
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American businesses managed to secure advantageous deals with the Chinese 
even in the absence of a trade agreement.49 When the Chinese Mission offered 
to include a statement on ‘favourable consideration’, Louis Kawan wished to 
know what exactly this meant. He asked what would happen in the event of 
the PRC concluding a trade agreement with the United States too. The 
Chinese reassured Kawan that they would reserve such treatment exclusively 
for the Community.50 
  deadlock arose on two principles, ‘balanced trade’ and ‘safeguard 
measures’, which epitomised the technical obstacles in concluding the trade 
agreement. The Chinese delegation insisted on ‘balanced trade’, which they 
understood as the aim to reach an equilibrium between imports and exports 
from and to the Community. The reason for this request was that they sought 
to close their trade deficit with the Community. But the Commission did not 
accept this principle. The Community was a market economy and therefore 
could not force firms to carry out certain imports or exports. And the 
Commission was concerned about its position at the GATT. If it adopted such 
a clause, it would have to grant it to all GATT members.51 At the same time, 
the Commission insisted on a safeguard clause which it could invoke 
 
49 CMA, Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la 
Communauté économiques européenne en République populaire de Chine (2ème Rapport), 26 March 1974; CMA, 
Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la Communauté 
économiques européenne en République populaire de Chine (3ème Rapport), 24 October 1974; ECHA, BAC 
136/1987/629, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la Communauté économiques européenne en 
République populaire de Chine (4ème Rapport), 3 May 1975. 
50 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Fourth meeting with representatives of the Chinese mission, Brussels, 21 February 
1976. 
51 CMA, Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la 
Communauté économiques européenne en République populaire de Chine (3ème Rapport), 24 October 1974; 
ECHA, BAC 136/1987/629, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la Communauté économiques 
européenne en République populaire de Chine (4ème Rapport), 3 May 1975. 
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unilaterally without prior consultation with the Chinese party. This clause 
proved important to prevent Chinese exports to the EC coming in below 
international market prices. But the Chinese side rejected this clause. Yen’s 
comment after the fifth meeting that ‘even if not much progress had been 
made the two sides know each other better’, was a diplomatic way to describe 
the technical impasse.52  
Remarkably as the Commission laid the basis for the scope and content 
of the trade agreement, the Nine did not involve themselves in framing or 
steering its work. They certainly kept a watch though and realised the 
political nature of the trade talks. The Italian government put relations with 
China on the agenda of their Council Presidency from July to December 
1975.53 At the FCO, Christopher William Roberts from the Department of 
Trade, asked the British Permanent Representation in Brussels about the 
possible timing of discussions à Neuf on EEC-China relations.54  And the 
Service de cooperation  conomique at the Quai d’Orsay recognised the 
essentially political nature of the Chinese decision to engage in trade talks.55 
But despite this awareness, the Nine did not think it necessary to intervene. 
The French simply wished that the Council could as soon as possible examine 
a formal proposal by the Commission and give it the mandate to open official 
negotiations.56  
 
52 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Fifth meeting with representatives of the Chinese mission, 18 February 1976, Maslen, 
Brussels, 23 February 1975. 
53 AMAE, Série DE-CE, 1967-1975, 1113, Programme de travail de la présidence italienne, July 1975. 
54 NA, FCO 21/1391, EEC - China meetings, Hall to Roberts, Brussels, 23 July 1975. 
55 AMAE, AO, prov. 2158, Chine - CEE, Service de coopération économique, Paris, 10 November 1975. 
56 Ibid. 
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The member state’s permissive attitude is noteworthy in a period when 
they heavily contested the Commission’s authority on the Common 
Commercial Policy. During this very period, the member states engaged in 
trade negotiations with Japan and Eastern European countries which 
infringed upon the Commission’s territory. For instance, the UK bilaterally 
negotiated export restraint measures for footwear and textiles from Eastern 
Europe, and the Benelux pressed Japan to continue export restraint on 
electronic items. 57  Such actions were exclusive to the Community’s 
competences and therefore for the Commission to handle. Consequently the 
Commission repeatedly complained that it could not ‘ignore such flagrant 
breaches of the Treaty without losing its credibility both with member states 
and with third countries.’58 Hence the institutional dynamic regarding an 
EEC-PRC trade agreement was another example of how the case of China 
bucked the usual trend. 
The limited importance the member states accorded to the 
Commission’s work on China was also striking considering that in 1975 EC-
PRC commercial exchanges increased. And the establishment of official 
relations was very likely to have contributed to this trend. In 1975 the global 
trade between the EC and China increased by 14 %, from US$ 1889 million in 
197  to US$ 2150 million in 1975. This meant that China’s external trade with 
the EC increased by 2 %, representing 17 % of China’s total external trade. In 
contrast, China’s trade with the United States decreased by 4 % and 
 
57 ECHA, BAC/3/1978/1517, Illegal negotiations by Member States, Hijzen to Soames, Brussels, 7 July 1976. 
58 Ibid. 
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represented 7 % of China’s total external trade.59 The Community’s exports to 
China increased by 35 %, from US$ 1018 million to US$ 1378 million, and the 
Community’s imports from China decreased by 12 %, from US$ 871 million to 
US$ 771 million. Therefore the deficit of China in relation to the EC increased 
from US$ 147 million in 1974 to US$ 610 million in 1975. 60  The most 
important change concerned the balance of trade with France which had a 
deficit of US$ 25 million with China in 1974, and in 1975 recorded a surplus 
of US$ 198 million. As in 1974, Germany obtained the largest surplus, and 
together with France it accounted for 83 % of the total surplus the EC had in 
relation to the PRC in 1975. 61 Hence compared to 1974, the EEC exports to 
China in 1975 showed the following distribution: 
  
 
59 ECHA, BAC 28/1980/883, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la Communauté économiques 
européenne en République populaire de Chine (1) (7ème rapport), Brussels, 8 September 1976. 
60 Ibid. 
61 Ibid. 
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Table 0-1:  Distribution of EC exports to China in 1974 and 1975 
 1974 1975 
FRG 45 % 38 % 
France 17 % 26 % 
UK 17 % 12 % 
Italy 10 % 10 % 
Netherlands 6 % 9 % 
UEBL 3 % 3 % 
Denmark 1 % 1 % 
Ireland - - 
The EC imports from China were distributed as below:  
Table 0-2: Distribution of EC imports from China in 1974 and 
1975 
 1975 1974 
Germany 29  % 24  % 
France 22  % 23  % 
Britain 16  % 14  % 
Italy 15  % 18  % 
Netherlands 10  % 12  % 
UEBL 5  % 5  % 
Denmark 3  % 4  % 
Ireland - - 
The variation in the trade in 1975 compared to 1974 between the EC and 
China for Germany, France and Britain individually looked as follows: 
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Table 0-3:  Variation in trade in 1975 compared to 1974 between 
the EC and China for Germany, France and Britain 
 
EEC exports 
to the PRC 
EEC imports 
from the 
PRC  
Germany +15  % +8  % 
France +110  % -15  % 
Britain -5  % -24  % 
In their previous reports, learning from the American, Spanish and Greek 
experience, they had considered such a political development beneficial for 
trade.62 It is all the more notable that the commercial counsellors did not 
analyse the effect of the diplomatic relations. In their previous reports they 
had written that such a political development would be beneficial for trade. 
At least this is what the American, Spanish and Greek experience had 
shown.63  
The Nine’s continuing passive attitude might be explained by the fact 
that the Commission had not yet gone very far in the trade discussions, and 
in the last instance the Council of Ministers was the body which would have 
to sign off any EEC-PRC trade agreement. Moreover, the trade continued to 
be limited. The trade figures gathered by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) in 2006 below differ from the ones the commercial counsellors used. A 
possible explanation is that the IMF had more accurate data available in 
2006. But irrespective of the difference, the figures support the general point 
 
62 See for example: CMA, Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 2026/1974, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des 
pays de la Communauté économiques européenne en République populaire de Chine (3ème rapport), 24 October 
1974. 
63 Ibid. 
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about the relatively small proportion that the trade with China represented 
for the Community in 1974 and 1975.   
Table 0-4: Direction of trade of the Nine for 1974 and 1975 in 
million US $64 
Exports of the Nine to 1974 1975 
the PRC 965 1421 
Hungary 1275 1197 
Sweden 8378 8972 
the United States 19056 16902 
 
Imports by the Nine from  1974 1975 
the PRC 821 812 
Hungary 840 863 
Sweden 8060 8219 
United States 23723 24788 
The establishment of official EC-PRC relations and the Commission’s trade 
talks also did not inhibit each of the Nine from pursuing their own 
commercial activities in the PRC.65  The member states continued to sign 
bilateral agreements, establish mixed committees and organise exhibitions 
and trade fairs.66 
 
64 International Monetary Fund (2006): Direction of Trade Statistics (Edition: 1948-1980). ESDS International, 
University of Manchester. 
65 Compare: McAllister, European Union, p.102. 
66 See aviation agreement: FRG, Beijing, 31 October 1975; navigation agreement: Netherlands, Beijing, 4 July 1975; 
France, Beijing, 28 Septembre 1975; FRG, Beijing, 31 October 1975; agreement on textile brands: France, Beijing, 15 
July 1975; FRG, Beijing, 28 August 1975; Joint Committees: Italy, Rome, 25 October 1975 (meeting); Denmark, 26 
October 1975 (meeting); FRG, Beijing, 31 October 1975 (agreement setting up the joint committee); exhibitions: UK, 
Italy, Belgium and the FRG in 1975; ECHA, BAC 28/1980/883, Rapport des conseillers commerciaux des pays de la 
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The Nine asserted their national economic interest vis-à-vis the 
Commission in different ways, as individual requests, separate from 
preparatory talks for an EEC-PRC Trade Agreement. For example, they called 
on the Commission to exclude Chinese products such as umbrellas and 
ceramics from Community treatment.67 They also asked the Commission to 
discuss their concerns with the Chinese regarding the dumping of Chinese 
products on the European market.68 The seemingly minor issue of imports of 
Chinese mushrooms into the EC, over which France and West Germany in 
particular had differences, required the Commission to discuss the matter 
numerous times.69 Furthermore, so long as no EEC-PRC Trade Agreement 
existed, the Nine sought autonomous quotas for imports. 70  A revealing 
instance was when in 1976 the German government pushed for an earlier 
publication of the autonomous quotas for 1977. Germany wanted the list to be 
 
Communauté économiques européenne en République populaire de Chine (1) (7ème rapport), Brussels, 8 
September 197. 
67 See for example: Council decisions 75/454/EEC, 75/496/EEC, 75/718/EEC, 76/39/EEC, 76/529/EEC. 
68 ECHA BAC 136/1987/626, Compte-rendu d'une entrevue avec des fonctionnaires de la Mission chinoise le 
08.10.1976, Exportation de chemises chinoises vers le Royaume-Uni, Kasselhoff, Brussels, 8 October 1976. 
69 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Fifth meeting with representatives of the Chinese mission, 18 February 1976, Maslen, 
Brussels, 23 February 1975; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/625, Imports of Chinese canned mushrooms, Maslen, Brussels, 
30 September 1975; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/625, Imports of Chinese canned mushrooms, Maslen, Brussels, 17 
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70 European Commission, Ninth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1975, (Brussels: 
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contingents d'importation arrêtés pour l'année 1976 à l'égard de la République Populaire de Chine par la décision du 
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available before the Canton fair in mid-October 1976. 71  The timing was 
important because companies wanted to know the import possibilities for 
1977 from China to Germany in order to conclude appropriate trade 
contracts. But Britain was concerned that such an early publication would 
constitute an unwanted precedent vis-à-vis the other state trading countries.72 
The Commission mediated between the member states and facilitated a 
solution: a provisional list and a Council of Ministers statement that 
underlined the exceptional circumstances of an early publication.73 Thus the 
Nine requested the Commission to take up an administrative, coordinating 
and mediating role in the Common Commercial Policy which the 
Commission willingly played. 
In the nine months following the establishment of diplomatic relations, 
five preparatory meetings for an EEC-PRC trade agreement took place 
between the Commission and the Chinese mission. The member states barely 
involved themselves in the discussions or steered the Commission. Instead 
the Nine worked with the Commission in its mediating role in the framework 
of the Common Commercial Policy. In 1975, the commercial exchanges 
between the EC and the PRC increased which was likely to be linked to the 
setting up of official relations. But a deadlock in the trade talks crystallised 
around two technical issues: a balance of trade clause, which the Chinese 
 
71 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC 1369, van der Stoel to Ministre des affaires étrangères, Brussels, 8 October 1976; 
referring to: Décisions du Conseil portant reconduction provisoire anticipée pour l'année 1977 des contingents 
d'importation arrêtés à l'égard de la Republique populaire de Chine par la décision 75/210/CEE pour l'année 1976. 
72 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, Décision du Conseil portant reconduction provisoire anticipée pour l'année 1977 
des contingents arrêtés pour 1976 a l'égard de la Chine - Résultats des travaux du Groupe des Questions 
Commerciales (réunion du 24 septembre 1976). 
73 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, van der Stoel to Schumann, Brussels, 8 October 1976. 
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insisted upon, and the safeguard procedures, which the Commission did not 
want to compromise on. 
Stagnation due to Chinese domestic turmoil   
February 1976 marked the beginning of a period of stagnation in the talks for 
an EEC-PRC trade agreement. Even if the Commission and the Chinese had 
reached a solution over the technical deadlock, they would have waited in 
vain for a delegation from Beijing to begin exploratory talks. The reasons 
were that the domestic turmoil in the PRC, which stemmed from an 
intensifying three-cornered leadership struggle between Premier Hua 
Guofeng, Vice-Premier Deng Xiaoping and the Gang of Four, paralysed 
China’s foreign policy.74 The Gang of Four comprised the four radical leaders 
of the Cultural Revolution, Jiang Qing, Zhang Chunqiao, Yao Wenyuan, and 
Wang Hongwen. Indeed, Endymion Wilkinson from the Commission’s 
delegation in Tokyo sent a note on 22 April 1976 predicting that ‘Until the 
new Premier [Hua Guofeng] has consolidated his political position Chinese 
initiatives will be limited’.75 He advised that the Commission should lower its 
expectations for progress, and Soames commented: ‘I fear, a correct analysis. 
We shall see.’76   
But the lack of Chinese cooperation did not mean that the Commission’s 
efforts came to a stand-still. When no response from Beijing arrived 
regarding the next stage in trade discussions, Soames seized the opportunity 
 
74 Roderick MacFarquhar (ed.), The Cambridge History of China (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), 
pp.360–317; Ebinger, 'The Politics of Potential', p.384 and p.395. 
75 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Vulpitta to Hannay, Tokyo, 22 April 1976. 
76 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Vulpitta to Hannay, Tokyo, 22 April 1976 and hand-written side-note by Soames, 9 
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of the presence of Yu Huimin, the Chinese counsellor, at a session of the 
European Parliament in Strasbourg in March 1976 to discuss the trade talks. 
Soames addressed in particular how to deal with the two outstanding 
difficulties: the balanced expansion of trade and the safeguard procedures. 
Soames even offered to raise the matter to a political level, doing away with 
the technicalities.77 Since the only response Soames received was that Yu 
promised to transmit his offer to Beijing, and no response followed, Soames 
even addressed a letter directly to the Chinese Minister for Foreign Trade Li 
Jiang on 1 April. In this letter Soames stressed that there was a basis for a 
trade agreement, which he believed had considerable political importance.78 
He attached a draft for a trade agreement in which the Commission outlined 
the structure of the clauses and suggested formulae to solve the 
controversies. But Soames never received a reply. The one, albeit small step, 
which indicated that the Chinese remained tuned into the relationship was 
that the government announced an extension of its representation in Brussels 
by accrediting a commercial counsellor to the EEC.79 
Soames also tried to push forward with a Community trade fair in 
China. The ambassadors in Beijing had advised him during his visit in May 
1975 that a trade fair focussing on European advanced technology would be a 
‘particularly useful form of follow-up’.80 Soames’ motives in picking up the 
idea were mainly political, not least to seal the relationship with the PRC and 
 
77 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, China, Hannay, 11 March 1976. 
78 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, Soames to Li Chiang, 1 April 1976. 
79 NA, FCO 98/136, Article, BØrsen Danish news agency's Peking correspondent, China wishes to extend her EEC 
contacts, Beijing, 19 March 1976. 
80 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Community exhibition/trade fair in China, Klein to Meynell, 22 January 1976. 
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use the new momentum created by his visit.81 When the EC-PRC relations 
came to an almost complete halt, the fair became even more of a political 
instrument as John Maslen, China desk officer at the Commission, stressed 
to the Council of Ministers Working Group on 12 May 1976. 82  But 
coordinating the project between the ambassadors and commercial attachés 
in Beijing, the national representatives of the Council of Ministers Working 
Group in Brussels, the national Foreign Ministries and the Chinese proved so 
tedious that Soames did not see its realization during his time in office.83 In 
fact, no Community trade fair saw the light in the 1970s. It was a project that 
illustrates how coordination could be frustrated when a multitude of different 
bureaucracies were involved, when national commercial advantages proved 
minimal, and when the political will was not forceful enough. 
The European Parliament still persisted in pushing for progress and 
asserting its institutional role. Back in August 1975, Cornelius Berkhouwer, 
vice-president of the European Parliament, had visited China at the invitation 
of the Chinese Institute of Foreign Affairs. He had used the opportunity to 
speak to the press and meet with the ambassadors of the member states in 
Beijing.84 The MEPs had continued to put pressure via written questions 
directed towards the two more powerful Community institutions. Pierre-
Bernard Cousté, Member of the Group of European Progressive Democrats, 
 
81 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Follow-up on China, Soames to Wellenstein, Brussels, 13 May 1975. 
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for example asked in October 1975 whether the Commission had opened 
negotiations for a trade agreement, and how far they had progressed.85 Now, 
as the trade talks came to a halt Alain Terrenoire, French Christian 
Democrat, asked during the 16 June 1976 session whether the Council 
intended to concern itself with the China dossier. He even put an unforeseen 
question, asking which rules governed relations with China once the current 
bilateral ones had expired on 1 January 1975.86 Gaston Thorn, the acting 
Council President and Prime Minister of Luxembourg, replied that he was not 
prepared for such a question. MEPs thus again used the China issue to raise 
its profile 
The suspension of the Commission’s trade talks with the Chinese did 
not prevent the member states’ trade with China from increasing. The Nine 
increased their share in the external trade of China by 2 %, up to a level which 
now represented 20 % of total Chinese external trade.87 As in 1975, the trade 
between China and the United States and Australasia diminished, now 
representing 5.8 % of China’s total trade. 88  The commercial counsellors 
estimated that one important reason for the deteriorating trade relations 
between the United States and China was the absence of diplomatic 
relations.89 Total trade between the Nine and China went from US$ 2150 
 
85 Written Question No. 450/75, by Mr. Cousté to the Commission of the European Communities, Official Journal 
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million in 1975 to US$ 2199 million in 1976.90 The Community’s exports to 
China diminished by 8 %, from US$ 1378 million in 1975 to US$ 1269 million 
in 1976, whereas the Community’s imports from China increased by 20.6 %, 
from US$ 771 million in 1975 to US$ 930 million in 1976.91 Thus the deficit 
of China vis-à-vis the EEC diminished from US$ 610 million in 1975 to US$ 
339 million in 1976.92 The most significant change concerned the balance of 
trade between Germany and the PRC. In 1975 all of the EC countries had a 
surplus trade. In 1976 only two remained, France and Germany. But only the 
latter increased its surplus by US$ 53 million, from US$ 298 million in 1975 
to US$ 351 million in 1976.93 Hence in 1976 the distribution of the EC exports 
to China looked as follows:94  
Table 0-5:  Distribution of EC exports to China in 1975 and 1976 
 1975  1976  
Germany 38 % 49 % 
France 26 % 25 % 
Britain 12 % 9 % 
Italy 10 % 11 % 
Netherlands 9 % 3 % 
UEBL 3 % 3 % 
Denmark 1 % 1 % 
Ireland - - 
 
90 Ibid. 
91 Ibid. 
92 Ibid. 
93 Ibid. 
94 Data according to the exchange rate of the US $ at the end of December 1975 and 1976; CMA, IA 39129/1975, 
Rapport des Conseillers Commerciaux des Pays de la Communauté Économiques Européenne en République 
Populaire de Chine (1) (9ème Rapport), Brussels, 25 January 1978. 
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The shares of EC imports from China were allocated as below:95 
Table 0-6:  Distribution of EC imports to China in 1975 and 1976 
 1975 1976 
Germany 29 % 29 % 
France 22 % 20 % 
Britain 15 % 16 % 
Italy 16 % 16 % 
Netherlands 10 % 10 % 
UEBL 5 % 6 % 
Denmark 3 % 3 % 
Ireland - - 
In 1976, the variation in the trade in 1976 compared to 1975 for Germany, 
France and Britain looked as follows (in brackets are the percentage 
calculated on the basis of statistics in national currencies, to prevent 
distortion caused by the variation in exchange rates):96  
Table 0-7:  Variation in trade in 1975 compared to 1976 between 
the EC and China for Germany, France and Britain 
 
EEC exports to the 
PRC 
EEC imports 
from the PRC  
Germany +19 % (+22 %) +21 % (+23 %) 
France -14 % (+0,5 %) +8 % (+25 %) 
Britain -28 % (-15 %) +24 % (+46 %) 
 
 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
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The IMF data acts as a reminder of how small a proportion of total 
Community trade that with China continued to represent.  
Table 0-8: Direction of trade of the Nine for 1975 and 1976 in 
million US $97 
Exports of the Nine to 1975 1976 
the PRC 1422 1314 
Hungary 1197 1194 
Sweden 8972 96123 
the United States 16902 18246 
 
Imports by the Nine 
from  
1975 1976 
the PRC 812 949 
Hungary 864 943 
Sweden 8219 8730 
United States 24788 27623 
The positive trend seen in 1975 in trade relations between the Community 
and China continued in 1976. But the EC was not yet able to operate as an 
actor in its own right and fully implement its Common Commercial Policy 
vis-à-vis China. To this end the Commission was to be in charge of an EEC-
PRC trade agreement. The trade talks stalled because the Chinese first had to 
sort out their domestic political issues. This showed how much the dynamic 
between the Community and China depended on the Chinese willingness and 
ability to cooperate.  
 
97 International Monetary Fund (2006): Direction of Trade Statistics (Edition: 1948-1980). ESDS International, 
University of Manchester. 
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Attempts of more political presence: the Tindemans Report, 
emergency relief and messages of condolence 
Once official relations had been established, the Commission and the 
European Parliament sought to promote and enhance the diplomatic side of 
the relationship with the PRC too. But whereas these two institutions kept 
their eyes on the ball, the member states returned to their characteristic 
hands-off attitude after the European Council meeting in July 1975. Only the 
Belgian Prime Minister Leo Tindemans confronted the Nine with the 
necessity to develop a common Community approach to the PRC. 
The Commission used a variety of instruments to further the EC-PRC 
relationship. It prepared a visit by Ortoli to China, and invited a group from 
the Chinese Institute for Foreign relations to visit the EC institutions at the 
Commission’s expense.98 Particularly with regard to the latter the political 
intention to reinforce the link with the Chinese government becomes 
apparent. Camille Becker, Commission official working at the Directorate for 
Information, wrote to Hannay about possible dates for the visit. She noted 
that although ‘From a financial point of view DG X would prefer to postpone 
this visit until 1976. Political consideration should, however, prevail.’99 To 
ensure that the Chinese visitors also witnessed the Community workings in 
Luxembourg and Strasbourg, the Commission proposed times when the 
European Parliament was in session. The dates suggested reflect the 
 
98 See for example: ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Follow-up on China, Soames to Wellenstein, Brussels, 13 May 1975; 
ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Third meeting with representatives of the Chinese mission, Maslen, Brussels, 10 
December 1975; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Relations avec la Chine, Klein, Brussels, 16 December 1975. 
99 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Information China, Becker to Hannay, 11 September 1975. 
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Commission’s endeavour to associate the European Parliament closely with 
the building up of relations with China. 
In light of the new political momentum in the relationship with China, it 
is noteworthy that still neither the Council of Ministers nor COREPER 
concerned themselves much in their weekly and monthly sessions with a 
Community policy vis-à-vis China. Not even the British raised the issue, 
although Youde recommended to William Bentley, FCO Head of the Far 
Eastern Department, via a teleletter of 11 November 1975, a common 
Community approach to China.100 According to Youde, the advantage of using 
the EC rather than NATO was twofold. First, it did not include Portugal, 
whom ‘The Chinese believed to be in the pockets of the Russians’.  nd it did 
not include the United States whom the Chinese assumed dictated NATO. 
Thus the PRC government was likely to be less suspicious of a Community 
policy than a NATO one. Second, the French were unlikely to cooperate in a 
NATO context, which made the EC the more promising machinery to use. 
Such deliberations illustrate the British view that the European Community 
was more a means to an end rather than an end in itself, but also how the 
Cold War furthered European integration.   
It was Tindemans’ report for a European Union which brought the issue 
of a common European policy towards the PRC directly to European Council 
on 29 December 1975.101 This report was the result of an instruction by the 
Heads of States and Government during the Paris Summit in December 1974 
 
100 NA, FCO 21/1380, Consultations on China, Youde to Bentley, Beijing, 21 November 1975. 
101 Leo Tindemans, 'European Union', European Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 
1/76, 1976.  
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to investigate a definition for a ‘European Union’. The report aimed to 
provide a base for a revival of the European integration process which the 
economic and political crisis threatened. Tindemans’ task was to consult the 
European institutions, who submitted reports to him on the subject, but also 
prominent people from politics, the economy, the trade unions, and 
intellectuals amongst the member states.102 In these consultation meetings, 
Tindemans thought that external policy was a determining preoccupation 
amongst his interlocutors. Therefore his report tackled the external relations 
of the Community prior to its internal development and institutional 
structure.103 He found that it was ‘essential for the European Union to have an 
external policy.’104 Though the main areas for coordination which Tindemans 
picked out were the Middle East, the United States and the Mediterranean 
region, part of the Community’s external policy had to concern China too, not 
least because it showed ‘increasing sympathy for the task of European 
unification’.105 
The initial official reaction of most member states to the report was 
reserved.106 The French were very sceptical of a closer cooperation in foreign 
affairs, and China was of no special concern.107 This links to the member 
 
102 Leo Tindemans, De Memoires. Gedreven door een overtuiging, (Tielt: Lanoo, 2003), pp.307–318. 
103 NA, FCO 30/3190, Discours de Leo Tindemans, Premier Ministre de Belgique, au déjeuner du cercle de 
l'opinion et du mouvement européen, Service de Presse, Paris, 16 February 1976. 
104 European Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/76, 1976, p.14. 
105 European Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, Supplement 1/76, 1976, p.18. 
106 AMAE, Série Direction des Affaires Politiques, Sous-Direction Europe (henceforward E- CE) 3775, Premières 
réactions de nos partenaires, 15 January 1976; NA, FCO 30/3190, Tindemans Report, Shepherd to Collings and 
Fretwell, undated; AMAE, E-CE, 3775, La Grande-Bretagne et le rapport Tindemans, Sous-Direction d'Europe 
occidentale, Paris, 9 March 1976. 
107 AMAE, E-CE, 3775, Rapport Tindemans, Service de Coopération Economique, Paris, 25 February 1976; AMAE, 
E-CE, 3775, Rapport Tindemans, 23 March 1976; AMAE, E-CE, 3775, Visite à Paris de M. Van der Stoel, Ministre 
néerlandais des affaires étrangères, Paris, 17 June 1976. 
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states’ typical reluctance to integrate in the foreign policy field. Yet, the 
British were more positive than the French about closer coordination in 
external relations, and consistent with their activity at EPC, they agreed that 
China was one area for such cooperation. 108  Internal analysis and 
consultation meetings with other member states show that the British 
supported Tindemans’ recommendation on China. 109  Butler suggested to 
Henri Froment-Meurice, director d’Asie-Océanie at the Quai d’Orsay, that 
‘the Community might concert more on policy towards China in future’.110 
Overall, however, the importance the Tindemans Report gave to China did 
not notably affect the workings of the European Council, the Council of 
Ministers, or COREPER.  
Despite the lack of engagement by the Chinese government from 
February 1976 onwards, the Commission continued its diplomacy. When on 
28 July 1976 an earthquake struck the area of Tientsin with devastating 
effects, Soames decided to offer emergency assistance in the name of the 
Community to the PRC government. This was done in the face of opposition 
from the Nine.111 On 29 July the Dutch ambassador in Beijing had called 
 
108 NA, FCO 30/3190, Cabinet papers: The Tindemans Report, undated; FCO 30/3194, Annex A, shortened version 
of brief for European Council, Luxembourg, 1/2 April 1976, Tindemans Report, undated; FCO 30/3194, Annex B, 
Note by officials, Tindemans Report on European Union: foreign policy aspects, March 1976; FCO 30/3190, EEC: 
meeting with MM Froment-Meurice and Bernard, Paris, 8 March, Butler to Arculus, Paris, 25 February 1976. 
109 AMAE, E-CE, 3775, Réactions des neuf au rapport Tindemans, Sous-Direction d'Europe Occidentale, Paris, 4 
March 1976; NA, FCO 30/3194, Annex B, Tindemans Report on European Union: Foreign Policy Aspects, March 
1976; AMAE, E-CE, 3775, La Grande-Bretagne et le rapport Tindemans, Sous-Direction d'Europe occidentale, Paris, 
9 March 1976; AMAE, E-CE, 3775, Opinion britannique sur le rapport Tindemans, Paris, 24 February 197. 
110 NA, FCO 30/3190, EEC: meeting with MM Froment-Meurice and Bernard, Paris, 8 March, Butler to Arculus, 
Paris, 25 February 1976; AMAE, E-CE, 3775, Opinion britannique sur le rapport Tindemans, Paris, 24 February 
1976; AMAE, E-CE, 3775, Réactions des neuf au rapport Tindemans, Sous-Direction d'Europe Occidentale, Paris, 4 
March 1976. 
111 AMAE, E-CE, 4196, Tremblement de terre, Soulier to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, Beijing, 29 July 1976; AMAE, E-
CE, 4196, Réunion communautaire, Soulier to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, Beijing, 30 July 1976; AMAE, E-CE, 4196, 
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together his counterparts from the other member states to exchange views on 
the response their respective governments should give to the earthquake. 
Subsequently the Nine had sent individual messages of sympathy and 
proposed humanitarian relief aid.112 On the question however, of whether the 
Nine ought to offer a concerted aid package in the name of the Community, 
the member states had been unanimously against.113 But on 3 August, on 
Soames’ initiative which Ortoli supported, Friedrich Klein, Director at DG I in 
charge of relations with the state trading countries, met with Xie Zhenliu, 
second secretary at the Chinese mission to the EEC, to offer emergency 
assistance in the name of the EC.114 What was more, Klein asked whether the 
Chinese would mind were the press to report on their offer.115 This illustrates 
how the Commission also saw relations with the PRC as an opportunity to 
shore up its role in public. Since the Chinese representatives did not mind, 
 
Catastrophe sismique en Chine, The Hague Coreu to all Coreu, The Hague, 30 July 1976; AMAE, E-CE, 4196, Seisme 
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Associated Press reported the proposal on 4 August. 116  In an irritated 
message, the Quai d’Orsay asked Jean-Marie Soutou, the French permanent 
representative in Brussels, who had decided on a policy which so blatantly 
contradicted what the Nine had agreed.117 But the matter was settled because 
in the end the PRC declined any foreign assistance. Soames’ action did not 
cause more of a stir. It is not certain whether Soames knew about the Chinese 
principle of refusing foreign aid before he offered the emergency aid. It is also 
open to interpretation whether he knew about the Nine’s opposition to a 
concerted Community gesture. Yet, similar to his initiative in May 1975, this 
instance offers further evidence of how Soames carved out a diplomatic role 
for the Commission using the relationship with China. Soames simply by-
passed the Nine, and created yet another fait accompli. 
Premier Minister Zhou Enlai’s and Chairman Mao Zedong’s death on 8 
January and 9 September 1976 respectively show further cases of Community 
diplomacy. No institution took action in the name of the Community as a 
whole. Only the Commission and the European Parliament sent messages of 
condolence.118 The attention the Commission paid to the PRC is depicted in 
its response to Zhou Enlai’s death. Wellenstein was ‘very anxious that the 
reaction should be immediate’ because of the importance the Chinese 
attached to matters of protocol. He did not even wait until Soames’ return 
from Bucharest to arrange for Ortoli to send a telegram of regret to Mao and 
Zhu De, the president of the Permanent Committee of the National Popular 
 
116 AMAE, E-CE, 4196, Aide de la Communauté à la Chine, Noiville à Delfra Bruxelles, Paris, 5 August 1976. 
117 Ibid. 
118 On the EP: Centre Archivistique et Documentaire, Luxembourg (CARDOC), Correspondance, PE1 P1 244/EXET 
EXET/1979/230, Spénale to Li Lianpi, 10 January 1976; CARDOC, Correspondance, PE1 P1 244/EXET 
EXET/1979/230, Spénale to Li Lianpi, 9 September 1976. 
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Assembly of China. 119  Moreover Wellenstein arranged that he himself, de 
Kergorlay and Klein went to the Chinese embassy to meet Li Lianpi to hand 
over messages of condolence from Ortoli and Soames, and sign the book of 
condolence.120 Similarly, when Mao Zedong died eight months later, Ortoli 
sent a message to the Permanent Committee of the National Popular 
Assembly and Premier Minister Hua Guofeng.121 Ortoli’s choice of words led 
Hannay to remark to Soames that ‘You cannot get much more purple than 
that.’122 Ortoli again only spoke in the name of the Commission rather than of 
the entire Community. In the context of a relationship that was in its infancy, 
and had so far proved of rather limited economic and political scope, these 
diplomatic gestures were significant in order to cement the European 
Parliament and Commission’s roles in liaising with the Chinese government.  
 fter Soames’ initiative in Beijing in May 1975, the Commission set out 
to avoid being in the position of demandeur in relation to the Chinese 
government. This stance was reflected for instance de Kergorlay’s brief to 
Ortoli for the latter’s lunch with Li Lianpi in October 1975 during which he 
was to discuss the trade talks. 123  But from February 1976 to the end of 
Soames’ term as vice-president of the Commission it proved impossible to 
avoid being a demandeur. De Kergorlay summed up matters soberly to 
Hannay on 14 May 1976:  
 
119 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Hay to Soames, 9 November 1976; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Ortoli to Chu The, 
Brussels, 9 January 1976; ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Ortoli to Mao Zedong, Brussels, 9 January 1976. 
120 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Relations avec la Chine, Décès du Premier Ministre Chou Enlai, Klein, Brussels, 9 
January 1976. 
121 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, Ortoli to Huan Hsiang, Brussels, 9 September 1976. 
122 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/838, hand-written side note, Hannay to Soames, 9 September 1976 on Ortoli to Huan 
Hsiang, Brussels, 9 September 1976. 
123 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Déjeuner avec l'Ambassadeur de la R.P.de Chine, Kergorlay to de Margerie, 13 
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‘Lors du voyage à P kin de Sir Christopher Soames, nous avions 
invit  l’Institut de Relations Internationales à nous rendre visite. 
Malgré un accord de principe, aucune date n'a été avancée du côté 
chinois pour concrétiser ce voyage et nos entretiens de cette 
semaine ont montré que les Chinois n'étaient nullement pressés. 
Par ailleurs, nous avions suggéré dans le cadre de nos 
conversations au sujet de la conclusion d'un accord que des 
fonctionnaires de Pékin viennent directement discuter à Bruxelles. 
Nous n'avons reçu ni acceptation ni refus mais les faits ont montré 
que personne n'est venu. Les missions économiques chinoises 
viennent régulièrement dans les Etats membres et récemment une 
mission est venue au Benelux dans le cadre d'une Commission 
Mixte. Les missions n'éprouvent pas le besoin, pour le moment, de 
[illisible] de leur passage pour discuter avec nous.’124 
Although within the Community work on the EC-PRC relationship had 
continued in different institutions, at various levels, with different intentions 
and with varying degrees of intensity, Soames expressed his regret at his 
farewell meeting with Huan Hsiang in December 1976 that the relationship to 
which he ‘personally attached great importance’ had not progressed much 
further.125 
Following Li Lianpi’s accreditation in September 1975 the European 
Parliament and the Commission continued as the two institutions which 
consistently sought to improve the political dimension of the EC-PRC 
relationship. The Commission also sought to work together with the 
European Parliament to establish the Community as a diplomatic actor in its 
own right. The call for a common European policy towards China in 
Tindemans’ report on a European Union did not significantly change the 
laissez-faire attitude of the European Council, the Council of Ministers and 
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COREPER. Between February 1976 until January 1977 the EC-PRC 
relationship stagnated.  
Soviet alarm and the reactivation of EC-COMECON talks 
In contrast to the stand-still in the relationship with the PRC, the relationship 
of Community vis-à-vis the Soviet bloc did not stagnate, and the China factor 
played a role in this. The setting up of official relations with the PRC and the 
beginnings of talks for a trade agreement provoked reactions from the 
Kremlin, individual Eastern European countries, and COMECON. The 
Chinese kept a close watch on each of these developments and communicated 
their adverse views on these to the Commission too. 
The unofficial contacts between the Commission and Eastern European 
diplomats like Stehno, the first secretary of the Czechoslovak embassy in 
Brussels, show how closely Eastern European countries followed the 
Commission’s activity in relation to China. They even inquired directly what 
the Commission’s objectives were.126 A further example was how Jan Zoubek, 
editor of the East-West journal, informed Klein about the considerable 
concerns in Eastern Europe over the opening to China.127 Partly due to that 
concern Zoubek expected COMECON to resume talks with the Commission 
which had started in Moscow in February 1975. Apparently most of the 
Eastern European countries opposed the Soviet Union’s refusal to negotiate 
with the EC. He therefore anticipated that some of them would violate the 
COMECON rules to discuss partial or technical agreements with the EC to 
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help alleviate their economic problems. Zoubek suggested that the 
Commission should take measures regarding EC imports from Eastern 
Europe to reduce the adverse impact of the prospective agreement with 
China.128 
The diplomats of the member states reported two kinds of reactions 
from Eastern Europe. From Hungary, the French ambassador Raymond 
Bressier informed Jean Sauvagnargues, French Foreign Minister, about the 
disquiet caused.129 The official news agency of the Hungarian government, the 
Magyar Hirlap, viewed the Chinese move as directed against Moscow. 
Bressier thought that the unilateral criticism of the PRC was intended to 
remind the West that the Hungarian government would take it badly if the 
Community played along with Chinese designs. Although Hungary sought to 
liaise with Western Europe, and had expressed dissent within COMECON, it 
still firmly backed Moscow’s line in foreign policy. 130  Albania in contrast 
welcomed the move. This was not surprising considering that in 1961 Albania 
had broken off relations with Moscow, and it supported the PRC not least 
since the Sino-Soviet split in the 1960s.131 Abdi Beleta, director of the Second 
Directorate at the Albanian Foreign Ministry and in charge of relations with 
China, keenly told François Desbans, French Ambassador to Albania, that his 
government shared with Beijing the opposition to Soviet aims. Albania 
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wished Europe had the capacity to oppose the Soviets.132 The condemnation 
about the PRC engaging officially with the Community on the one hand, and 
the support given to the PRC on the other reveal the continuing 
fragmentation of the Communist world. The reactions to the EC-PRC 
relationship epitomise the growing challenge that the Kremlin faced in 
controlling Eastern Europe.133  
The reports heightened the member states’ caution when deciding on 
the future course of EEC-USSR and EEC-COMECON relations. The Quai 
d’Orsay for example remarked that:  
‘si - comme on peut le penser - l'URSS établit des relations des 
pays d'Europe de l'Est avec la Communauté, un déséquilibre 
pourrait se trouver crée dans les relations extérieures de la CEE 
vis-à-vis de l'URSS et de la Chine. On sait en effet que Pékin vient 
d'accréditer un ambassadeur auprès de Communautés et que des 
négociations commerciales CEE-Chine pourraient être engagées 
dans les prochains mois.’134 
The European Parliament was quick to ask the Commission for its opinion on 
the issue. This illustrates how the Cold War transposed directly into the 
workings of the EC. During the debate on 18 June Kirk put it to Soames:  
‘Clearly it is of interest to us to know what is the Commissioner's 
assessment of the effect of this development [the opening to 
China] on our relationship with the state trading countries to the 
East of us, with whom our relations up to now have been of a 
rather prickly nature.’135  
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Soames in response addressed critics who thought that the Chinese 
willingness to negotiate a trade agreement with the Community was likely to 
inhibit the Soviet Union and Eastern European states from doing so too. He 
stated that  
‘These governments will make their own judgements for their own 
reasons on when they will be ready to treat with the Community as 
such on commercial matters, as does not only China but the whole 
of the rest of the world.’136  
Talking to the European Parliament, Soames did not believe that Chinese 
actions could influence the Soviet decisions in this matter.137  
But Soames’ statements in public did not entirely correspond with the 
politics he, his cabinet and DG I pursued. Hannay, Wellenstein and Maslen 
all pointed out that in the final analysis, the decision to engage with China 
was to a great extent about geopolitics, about the wish to pressurise the 
Soviet Union to engage with the European Community as a political and 
economic actor in its own right. 138  They believed that the opening of 
negotiations for an EEC-PRC trade agreement might have a galvanising effect 
on the Eastern European countries’ attitude towards the Community.  
COMECON’s alarm over the PRC’s improving ties with the Community 
became more apparent when the Commission moved closer to the next phase 
of negotiations for the EC-PRC trade agreement . Suddenly COMECON 
stepped up its interest in the EC. On 9 February 1976 Gerhard Weiss, 
chairman of the COMECON Executive Committee and vice-president of the 
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German Democratic Republic, proposed the conclusion of an agreement with 
the EC.139 This was one of the first signs of COMECON’s wish to reactivate 
talks since Edmund Wellenstein’s visit to Moscow a year earlier. According to 
the Nine, a primary reason for this fresh approach was of domestic nature. In 
light of the impending CPSU Congress, Soviet leader Leonid Brezhnev sought 
to use this proposal to present the Soviet Union as progressive and ready for 
compromise.140 The Commission however was well aware of the possibility 
that COMECON might also be reconsidering its policy towards the 
Community because of the progress in the EC-China relations.141  
The Chinese kept track of the new developments. They inquired about 
COMECON’s initiative during the fifth meeting for trade talks with the 
Commission on 18 February. 142  And they approved of the Council of 
Ministers’ reply to the COMECON initiative. That reply stated that the 
Community was willing to negotiate an agreement on acceptable procedures. 
The Council reiterated that it was ready to begin trade negotiations only with 
individual CMEA member countries.143 Huan Hsiang commented to Soames 
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Europe de l'Est: réunion du 14 avril 1976, Lux Coreu to all Coreu, Luxembourg, 15 April 1976. 
141 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Jan Zoubek to Klein, Brussels, 6 May 1975. 
142 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Fifth meeting with representatives of the Chinese mission, 18 February 1976, 
Maslen, Brussels, 23 February 1975. 
143 European Commission, Twelfth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1978, 
(Brussels: EEC, 1979), p.285. 
  
 
164 
in his farewell discussion in December 1976 that he ‘believed that the 
Community had made an “intelligent response” to Comecon’.144 
The upgrading of the EC-PRC relationship between May 1975 and 
January 1977 led to more contacts between the Community and individual 
Eastern European countries, the Soviet Union, and – at least in the opinion of 
the member states and the Community officials – with COMECON. The EC’s 
opening to China continued to contribute to détente in Europe because it 
provoked quantitatively and qualitatively new exchanges between the two 
sides of the Iron Curtain. 
Conclusion 
The momentum in the EC-PRC relationship following Soames’ initiative did 
not last long. Starting in February 1976 a year-long stand-still began due to 
Chinese domestic paralysis. This emphasised how much any progress in the 
relationship was dependent on the Chinese government, and how 
unpredictable the relationship remained. But still the Community’s dealings 
with the PRC between May 1975 and January 1977 bring into the open four 
ways in which the Community persisted in shaping its role in external 
relations. It therefore shows that the opening of the Community to the PRC 
continues to challenge the picture of European integration in the 1970s as 
one of ‘Eurosclerosis’.  
 
144 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, Fifth meeting with representatives of the Chinese mission, 18 February 1976, 
Maslen, Brussels, 23 February 1975; ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, Note for the record, China, Richardson, Brussels, 10 
December 1976. 
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First, the Community succeeded in setting up official relations with an 
accredited Chinese ambassador in Brussels in September 1975. Second, the 
Commission began talks for an EEC-PRC Trade Agreement. Even though 
these temporarily came to a halt in February 1976, they still lay the ground-
work for the eventual conclusion of the agreement. They were fundamental to 
carve out an advantageous position in the Chinese market against the 
competition from the United States. Third, concerning the Community’s 
position in the Cold War, the accreditation and the beginnings of trade talks 
based on the 1974 Outline agreement meant a first in the Community’s 
relationship with the Communist world.   
Finally, the period shows the progressive maturing of the EC internal 
decision-making regarding external relations. The member states maintained 
their hands-off attitude at Community level. The Commission pursued its role 
as the institution to lead the EC-PRC relationship. It worked not least 
through the newly created European Council to push for progress. The 
European Council proved a channel which the Commission used to assert its 
role within the Community in external relations, rather than a political actor 
in its own right that set the agenda. The European Parliament continued to 
use the relationship as a way to further its competences.  
On 8 December 1976, David Ting, administrator at the Division for 
Relations with State Trading Countries at DG I of the Commission, explained 
in an internal communication that the PRC government held the Gang of 
Four responsible for having sabotaged China’s foreign policy. Hua Guofeng 
succeeded Mao as chairman of the Central Committee of the CCP and 
chairman of the Military Affairs Commission. He had ordered the arrest of 
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the four leaders. Now, the road was clear to reactivate the trade relations.145 
The disruption in Chinese politics also accounted for the failure to respond to 
Soames’ letter of 1  pril 1976 to Li Jiang. Hannay remarked on Ting’s note 
that this explained much, whilst Soames commented: ‘I suspect this will see 
some movement in 1977.’146 And movement did indeed come about. 
 
145 ECHA, BAC 136/1987/624, L'importance du commerce extérieur est confirmée en Chine, Ting to Kawan, 
Brussels, 8 December 1976. 
146 ECHA, BAC136/1987/624, L'importance du commerce extérieur est confirmée en Chine, Ting to Kawan, 
Brussels, 8 December 1976; handwritten remark by Hannay 13 December 1976; handwritten remark by Soames, 21 
December 1976. 
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 A multi-level deal  
(February 1977 – June 1978) 
‘The Russians were fond of talking about the march of 
history. In this case they were in great danger of being 
left behind, and greatly to their own disadvantage. The 
kind of difficulties that had arisen with the fisheries 
agreement were only an indication of other more 
serious ones which would arise in the future if the 
Russians maintained their present attitude. In this 
respect I referred to the happy development of our 
relations with China.’1  
Crispin Tickell, December 1977 
‘En effet, c'est la première fois que la Communaut  en 
tant que telle s'engageait dans une négociation bilatéral 
destinée à établir un lien contractuel avec un "pays à 
commerce d'état" l'ayant reconnu officiellement et 
entretenant avec elle des relations diplomatiques. Ce 
faisant, et indépendamment de l'intérêt économique de 
l'entreprise, elle souhaitait, d'une part donner quelque 
éclat a sa reconnaissance par un membre éminent du 
camp socialiste et, d'autre part, créer un précédent utile 
avance que ne s'engage, en mai 1978, la négociation 
avec le Comecon.’2  
Luc Barre de Nanteuil, February 1978 
On 14 February 1977, Huan Hsiang went to see Wilhelm Haferkamp, the new 
Commission vice-president responsible for external relations, to announce 
that the PRC government wished to continue as quickly as possible with 
discussions for a trade agreement.3 The French Permanent Representative, de 
Nanteuil, noted the intensity with which the Commission and the Chinese 
 
1 Private papers shown by N. Piers Ludlow, Note for the record, Tickell, Brussels, 14 December 1977. 
2 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, Accord CEE-Chine, Nanteuil to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, Brussels, 6 February 
1978. 
3 ECHA, BAC 259.80 PVS, 419, 23 February 1977; Compare: Kapur, China and the European Economic 
Community, p.42. 
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took up contacts again.4  Only a little over a year later, on 3 April 1978, 
Haferkamp signed the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement in Brussels. In his speech 
at the signing ceremony the Commission Vice-President stressed: ‘L’accord 
commercial entre la Communauté européenne et la République populaire de 
Chine est empreint non seulement d’une signification  conomique, mais 
aussi, et surtout, d’une signification politique.’5 
This chapter shows that politics more than economics continued to be at 
the forefront of the negotiations for the trade agreement. Of the period up to 
1980, the phase between February 1977 and June 1978 was the one of the 
most intense interaction amongst the different Community institutions. 
Contrary to a common view in European integration history that ‘the conflict 
between the Council and the Commission, latent ever since 1965, produced a 
condition of immobility’ in Community politics, the interaction in the 
negotiations for the trade agreement tended to be cooperative, and effective.6 
Whereas the Chinese government was primarily the actor that set the pace 
and timing for the conclusion of the trade agreement, it was the Commission 
which succeeded in negotiating an agreement largely in the Community’s 
favour. The renewed intensification in the EC-PRC relationship also 
paralleled that in the EC-COMECON one, and the Commission took 
advantage of this to assert itself both vis-à-vis the member states and vis-à-
vis the Chinese. The historiography on the Cold War and European 
 
4 MAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, CEE-Chine, Brussels, Nanteuil to Diplomatie Paris, 24 February 1977. 
5 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, Discours de M. Haferkamp, Vice-Président de la Commission des Communautés 
europ ennes, à l’occasion de la c r monie de signature de l’accord commercial CE/Chine, Brussels, 3 April 1978. 
6 Middlemas, Orchestrating Europe, p.90. 
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integration fails to pick up on this milestone in East-West relations, which 
not least the opening quote of this chapter refers to.  
First, the chapter examines the continuation of the trade talks up to the 
start of their exploratory phase. Of particular interest is the way in which the 
Commission convinced COREPER to move forward with the trade talks, and 
how the European Parliament stepped up the game. Second, the chapter 
investigates the exploratory phase, particularly the results of de Kergorlay’s 
mission to Beijing in July 1977. Third, the chapter analyses the official 
negotiations between the Chinese and the Community in Brussels, and finally 
the signature of the agreement.  
Swift resumption of trade talks which the Sino-Soviet rivalry spurs 
on 
Following a year of paralysis, the dossier concerning an EEC-PRC Trade 
Agreement suddenly picked up speed. In parallel, the Sino-Soviet 
competition for relations with the EC grew. The Chinese invited a 
Commission delegation to Beijing to begin the exploratory phase. 7 
Haferkamp responded enthusiastically and took charge. The European 
Parliament too sought to bolster its role within the Community with its work 
on the trade agreement. The fresh impetus to the rivalry between Moscow 
and Beijing that the trade talks produced meant that the Nine were quickly 
convinced of the need to move swiftly. After close consultations with 
COREPER, Haferkamp sent a high-level delegation to Beijing in July 1977.  
 
7 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, Directorate General for External Relations to Members of Commission, undated.  
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The reactivation of EEC-PRC relations caused friction between the 
Commission and the member states in defining the Commission’s room for 
manoeuvre in the trade talks. What the Commission wanted was to open the 
exploratory phase with the Chinese in Beijing. De Kergorlay summed up the 
status of the discussions with the Chinese, in a secret report to COREPER and 
expressed himself firmly in favour of a visit.8 He reassured the member states 
that under no circumstances would the visit by a delegation sent by the 
Commission constitute the start of official negotiations. He also undertook in 
case of such a visit to inform the member states’ representatives on the spot 
about the contacts with the Chinese authorities, and upon return to Brussels 
to report to COREPER. Furthermore, he insisted on the inclusion of a 
safeguard clause to reassure the member states. 9  But still it took the 
Permanent Representatives several meetings before consenting on 26 May 
1977 to the Commission’s mission.10 The French and German representatives 
sought to limit the Commission’s task to simply listening to the Chinese.11 But 
the Commission applied incessant pressure during meetings with COREPER, 
and Kawan convinced the member states because the Cold War logic came 
into play.  
 
8 CMA, Intermediate Archive, 19642/1977, Document de travail en vu de l'invitation du gouvernement chinois à la 
Commission de se rendre à Pékin pour préparer les négociations ultérieures d'un accord commercial, 15 April 1977. 
9 CMA, Historical Archive, CM2, CEE CEA 19642/1977, Communauté-Chine, de Kergorlay, 15 April 1977. 
10 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, 852ème Comité des Représentants Permanents, réunion du 28 avril 1977, Bruxelles, 
Chine, 29 April 1977. 
11 CMA, Intermediate Archive, Réunion du 6 et 16 mai 1977 du Groupe restreint 'Chine', conclusions reprises dans 
une note secrète du Conseil du 17 mai 1977, undated; AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, Relations entre la Communuate et la 
Chine, Nanteuil to Ministre de l'économie et des finances (DREE), Ministre du commerce extérieur et 'Directeurs', 9 
May 1977; NA, FCO 98/299, EEC/China, Senior Collaborators Group: 16 May, Maitland to FCO, Brussels, 16 May 
1977. 
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The Commission used to its advantage the parallelism of the new 
momentum in the EC-China connection and the Community’s relations with 
COMECON to gain leverage. Once the Chinese resumed contact with the 
Commission, COMECON replied to the Council of Ministers’ letter of 
November 1976. It now accepted what it had previously opposed: direct 
negotiations with the Commission rather than only with the Council of 
Ministers. This was significant because it meant COMECON implicitly 
recognised the competences of the Commission as a supranational institution 
speaking for the European Community.12 Consequently de Kergorlay advised 
COREPER in March 1977 to think carefully about the timing the Chinese 
envisaged for the delegation’s visit because it coincided with the CSCE 
Belgrade Conference. 13 De Kergorlay used this as a reason for changing the 
timing. His arguments reflect the dual motivations behind the Commission’s 
tactics. On the one hand it signalled to the member states its willingness to 
play the China card vis-à-vis the Soviets, and the Soviet card vis-à-vis the 
Chinese in order to maximise the benefits for the Community as a whole. On 
the other hand it reflects the tactic of using the Cold War logic in order to 
carve out the Commission’s institutional authority vis-à-vis the member 
states to shape the Community’s foreign policy activity.  
The COREPER ‘China’ working group also came to the conclusion to use 
the dynamic between the PRC and COMECON. As far as the French were 
 
12 Compare: Kansikas, 'Trade Blocs and the Cold War; Takeshi Yamamoto, 'The Road to the CSCE, 1969-1973: 
Britain, France and West Germany', International History, London School of Economics and Political Science, 2009. 
13 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, 850ème réunion du Comité des représentants permanents – 31 mars 1977, Relations 
avec la Chine, Stefani, Brussels, 5 April 1977. 
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concerned, Yves Cousein, deputy secretary-general of the prime minister, 
wrote to the French Permanent Representative in Brussels:  
‘En tout  tat de cause, la mise au point ult rieure du mandat de 
négociation proprement dit devra tenir compte de l'évolution 
globale des relations de la CEE avec les pays à commerce d'Etat, 
des discussions avec le CAEM et de la Conférence de Belgrade et 
s'inscrira donc dans le cadre d'une approche globale.’14  
On 7 May, COREPER recommended that the Commission ought to take up 
the Chinese invitation to visit Beijing fairly soon.15  
Along with the Commission, the European Parliament stepped up its 
effort to shape the new momentum of the EEC-PRC trade talks in order to 
bolster its institutional standing. Its efforts are shown by the queries during 
Question Time and the number and nature of written questions submitted 
just after the Chinese invitation of a Commission delegation to Beijing.16 Willy 
Dondelinger, from Luxembourg and MEP of the Socialist Group, asked the 
Commission, for instance, why preliminary talks on a possible trade 
agreement had been broken off a year ago, and why they were now about to 
resume.17 Berkhouwer exercised pressure upon the Commission to keep the 
Parliament informed throughout the negotiations, and stressed their political 
 
14 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, Relations de la Communauté avec la Chine, Cousin to the French Permanent 
Representative in Brussels, Paris, 16 May 1977. 
15 NA, FCO 98/299, Senior Collaborators Group: 6 May 1977: EEC/China, Maitland to FCO, Brussels, 7 May 1977. 
16 Written Question No. 8/77, by Mr Dondelinger to the Commission of the European Communities, Official 
Journal C 148, 1977; Written Question No. 12/77, by Mr. Berkhouwer to the Commission of the European 
Communities, Official Journal C 180, 1977; Written Question No. 75/77, by Mr. Cousté to the Commission of the 
European Communities, Official Journal C 180, 1977; Oral Question No. 10, by M. Dalyell to the Commission of the 
European Communities, Official Journal C 212, 1977. 
17 Written Question No. 8/77, Mr. Dondelinger to the Commission of the European Communities, Official Journal 
C 148, 23 June 1977. 
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importance.18 Some of the questions also reveal how the European Parliament 
sought to position itself in the relationship between the Commission and the 
Council of Ministers. Pierre-Bernard Cousté, French MEP of the Group of 
European Progressive Democrats, asked on 28 March 1977 if the Commission 
had already discussed the terms of reference for the trade agreement with the 
Council of Ministers. 19  And precisely at the moment the Commission’s 
delegation to China was about to head off to Beijing, the European 
Parliament Committee on External Economic Relations issued a report on 
economic and trade relations with China. 20  The French MEP Gabriel 
Kaspereit of the Group of European Progressive Democrats headed the group 
and acted as rapporteur. The report called for broad economic cooperation 
with the PRC going beyond what the Commission and the Council of 
Ministers envisaged.21 Thus, alongside the typical written and oral questions, 
the European Parliament also sought to underline its expertise via its 
working groups.  
To further increase its visibility, the European Parliament debated and 
adopted on 5 July a resolution endorsing the Kaspereit report. The resolution 
also called for the Council of Ministers and the Commission to report 
regularly on the progress of the negotiations.22 Although this resolution may 
 
18 Written Question No. 12/77, by Mr. Berkhouwer to the Commission of the European Communities, Official 
Journal C 180, 28 July 1977. 
19 Written Question No. 75/77, by Mr. Cousté to the Commission of the European Communities, Official Journal C 
180, 28 July 1977. 
20 CMA, Intermediate Archive, 19643/1977, European Parliament Working Document 76/77; Compare: Kapur, 
China and the European Economic Community, p.38. 
21 CMA, Intermediate Archive, European Parliament Working Document 76/77; Compare: Kapur, China and the 
European Economic Community, p.38. 
22 European Parliament Resolution on economic and trade relations between the EC and the PRC, Official Journal 
C 183, 1 August 1977.  
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have had little effect, it contributed to the visibility of the European 
Parliament. When the European Parliament nearly postponed the debate 
because the discussant was late, the intervention by Lucien Radoux, a Belgian 
member of the Socialist group, illustrates the importance some MEPs 
attached to the European Parliament fulfilling its role:  
‘Our relations with a country like the People’s Republic of China 
are extremely important. In spite of the late hour I would advocate 
that we discuss this report today. It would be after all rather 
strange if we were to postpone it for another three months when a 
delegation is going to China and preparations are being made to 
open negotiations. If Parliament wants to play its proper role, then 
it should be examining this report today.’23  
Other channels served the European Parliament too. Lord Frederick 
Bessborough, Deputy Leader of the European Conservative Group, for 
example sent letters to the Commission suggesting ways to finance trade with 
the PRC.24 He also suggested that the Council of Ministers organise a joint 
meeting with the Commission and the European Parliament when the 
Chinese Minister for external trade was visiting Europe. 25  Hence the 
European Parliament kept on elbowing its way into discussions about EC-
China the trade talks.  
February 1977 marked the beginning of rapid progress towards the 
conclusion of an EEC-PRC Trade Agreement. Primarily this was because the 
Chinese reinitiated contacts. On the Community side, the Commission 
 
23 Debates of the European Parliamen, sitting of Tuesday 5 July 1977. 
24 ECHA, BAC 48/1987/687, Second letter from Lord Bessborough, Brussels, 14 October 1977; see also: Debates of 
the European Parliament, Report of the Proceedings from 19 to 14 October 1977, Oral Question No. 8 and 34, 
Official Journal C 221, 1977. 
25 ECHA, BAC 48/1987/687, Second letter from Lord Bessborough, Brussels, 14 October 1977; Debates of the 
European Parliament, Report of the Proceedings from 19 to 14 October 1977, Oral Question No. 8 and 34, Official 
Journal C 221, 1977. 
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remained in the driving seat. It asserted itself successfully vis-à-vis the 
member states by resorting to Cold War logic. The European Parliament kept 
on claiming a say on the China dossier too and proved the EC institution that 
pushed for the most comprehensive version of a trade agreement with the 
PRC.  
Off to Beijing for the second time: the Commission’s skills 
On 4 July 1977 Haferkamp sent a delegation headed by de Kergorlay to 
Beijing. His decision did not lead to much debate between the 
Commissioners, to judge, at least, from the minutes of the Commission’s 
weekly meetings.26 Haferkamp and DG I were the ones that determined the 
direction and pace of EEC-PRC relations. The aim was that de Kergorlay and 
the Chinese would agree on the outline of a trade agreement on the basis of 
which the Commission would ask the Council of Ministers for a negotiation 
mandate. De Kergorlay’s successful visit allowed the Commission to send a 
recommendation to the Council of Ministers to open formal negotiations. The 
growing Sino-Soviet antagonism over contacts with the EC proved to be more 
and more of an asset for the Commission vis-à-vis the Chinese. On 21 
November the Council of Ministers gave the Commission the mandate for 
official negotiations.  
In Beijing, de Kergorlay started in a strong negotiating position because 
the Chinese made clear that they attached high economic importance to the 
rapid conclusion of an agreement.27 High-ranking Chinese officials including 
 
26 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, PV de la 436e réunion de la Commission, Bruxelles, 22 June 1977. 
27 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, Recommandation de la Commission, Exposé des motifs. 
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Zheng Dobin, the director responsible for industrialised countries at the 
foreign ministry, and even Li Jiang warmly received the Commission’s 
delegation and held extensive discussions with de Kergorlay’s team.28 Overall, 
the tone and atmosphere of the discussions, which lasted nine days, were 
warm and cooperative, and the delegation characterised the visit as useful 
and fruitful. 29  However frictions over the content of the agreement 
crystallised too.  
New controversies arose. The Chinese refused a clause that specified the 
geographic area to which the agreement would apply. The Federal Republic 
of Germany insisted on having such a clause because it wanted to remove any 
ambiguity over whether the agreement also applied to the German 
Democratic Republic. But the PRC government refused to specify anything in 
order to circumvent the dispute on whether or not Taiwan belonged under 
the jurisdiction of the PRC. Furthermore, the Chinese refused a price clause, 
because they did not want to be restricted in their ability to export their 
products at a price the PRC decided autonomously. New requests arose too. 
The PRC asked to be removed from the list of state trading countries and 
instead feature in the EEC list of GATT members. It also requested to be 
included in the Community’s GSP after the conclusion of the agreement. New 
progress also came about. This related to the two main difficulties of 
‘balanced trade’ and the safeguard clause. The Chinese made concessions on 
 
28 European Commission, Bulletin of the European Communities, 7/8, 1977, p.9; ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, 
Recommandation de la Commission, Exposé des motifs. 
29 ECHA, BAC48/1987/687, 865ème réunion du Comité des représentants permanents: 27 juillet 1977, Relations 
avec la Chine, Stefani aux MM. les membres de la Commission; European Commission, Bulletin of the European 
Communities, point 2.2.19, 7/8, 1979, p.9. 
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both issues.30 In a brief to the member states representatives in Beijing, de 
Kergorlay admitted that ‘negotiations would not be easy but that the 
problems could be overcome. The Chinese would strike a hard bargain but 
the EC side should be prepared to be tough as well.’31 All in all though, de 
Kergorlay’s mission proved crucial for a solution on the two points that the 
Commission and Coreper had identified as fundamental for progress in 
discussion. 
De Kergorlay’s mission spurred on the Sino-Soviet competition, and this 
worked to the Community’s advantage. Following de Kergorlay’s successful 
mission, Mihai Marinescu, deputy prime minister of Romania and then 
chairman of the COMECON Executive Committee, travelled to Brussels. He 
agreed to meet a Community delegation led by Haferkamp to discuss a 
possible agreement on 21 September. The meeting resulted in a joint 
communiqué, on the basis of which the two parties planned negotiations for 
early 1978.32 The British too now clearly perceived a competition between the 
PRC and COMECON. The Cabinet Official Committee on European 
Questions thought that the Chinese ‘also probably do not want their relations 
with the Community to be overtaken by any agreement that the Community 
and the CMEA might negotiate following their meeting on 21 September’. 33 
Therefore the Europeans were aware that the timing and the sudden urgency 
the Chinese displayed in concluding a trade agreement with the EEC was 
 
30 ECH , B C 259.80, P S    , Recommandation de la Commission au Conseil concernant l’ouverture de 
négociations avec la République Populaire de Chine, Exposé des motifs, 28 September 1977. 
31 NA, FCO 98/299, Visit of EEC delegation to China, Youde to FCO, Beijing, 11 July 1977. 
32 European Commission, Twelfth General Report on the Activities of the European Communities in 1978, 
(Brussels: EEC, 1979), p.272. 
33 NA, FCO 98/299, EEC/China, Commission proposal for a trade agreement, Cabinet Official Committee on 
European Questions, 14 October 1977. 
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linked to their rivalry with Moscow, which put the Europeans in a stronger 
negotiating position. 
In terms of intra-Community dealings, COREPER favourably received 
de Kergorlay’s report of his mission, but did not expect a speedy conclusion of 
the matter. Joseph van der Meulen, the Belgian representative holding the 
chair, expressed COREPER’s doubts about a rapid conclusion pointing out 
that only with pure luck would the Council of Ministers agree on a 
negotiating mandate before the end of the year.34 But these doubts did not 
match the course of the story. The reasons were the speed with which the 
Commission worked out the mandate, the ongoing pressure from the 
European Parliament, and the pronounced and forceful interest 
demonstrated by the Chinese. Reflecting on the smooth and cooperative 
working process, Ian McCluney, FCO official in the European Integration 
Department, wrote to Gerald William Hayward, FCO official in the Far 
Eastern Department, on 11 November 1977 that ‘So far as I can see there has 
been no delay at all in reaching agreement on a mandate’.35 The Commission 
remained in the driving seat. 
Although COREPER responded quickly and constructively to the 
Commission proposals, it asserted its control over the precise contents of the 
trade agreement. The Commission’s limits lay where the member states’ 
interest came in. This is illustrated in the controversy over a clause on 
maritime transports. The Commission wanted to include such a clause in the 
 
34 NA, FCO 98/299, Committee of Permanent Representatives, meeting of 27 July, EEC/China, Maitland to FCO, 
Brussels, 27 July 1977. 
35 NA, FCO 98/299, McCluney to Hayward, 11 November 1977. 
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trade agreement. 36  But France, Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium, 
Denmark and Italy had all recently concluded bilateral maritime agreements 
with China, in which the PRC granted to the Europeans specific national 
benefits. 37 Therefore most opposed the Commission. France for example had 
secured a most-favoured nation clause in the Sino-French maritime transport 
agreement of 28 September 1975. Britain also firmly obstructed the inclusion 
of such a clause in the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement. David Owen, British 
Foreign Secretary, explained that Britain was ‘anxious’ to conclude a 
maritime agreement too. He feared ‘that a reference to maritime transport in 
the EEC negotiations mandate might be used by the Chinese as an excuse to 
back out of bilateral negotiations’ with them.38 The Danish were the only ones 
who supported the Commission’s endeavour. But eventually, they rallied to 
the majority on the condition that this agreement was not a precedent for 
future arrangements with other state trading countries.39 In the end, Roy 
Denman, Wellenstein’s successor as Director General of DG I, had to give up 
the Commission’s opposition albeit reluctantly.40  
 
36 NA, FCO 98/299, Commission recommendation to the Council for the opening of negotiations with the People's 
Republic of China, report from the working party on trade questions to the Permanent Representatives Committee 
(1), Brussels, 25 October 1977; ECHA, BAC 48/1987/687, 865ème réunion du Comité des représentants 
permanents: 27 juillet 1977, relations avec la Chine, Stefani to Members of the Commission, Brussels, 29 July 1977. 
37 ECH , B C  8/1987/687, Projet de recommandation de la Commission au Conseil concernant l’ouverture de 
négociations avec la Chine, Groux to Directorate General for External Relations, Brussels, 8 September 1977. 
38 NA, FCO 98/299, Committee of Permanent Representatives, meeting of 10 November, EEC/China trade 
agreement, Owen to UK Rep Brussels, 8 November 1977. 
39 NA, FCO 98/299, Committee of Permanent Representatives, meeting of 10 November, EEC/China trade 
agreement, Maitland to FCO, 10 November 1977. 
40 NA, FCO 98/300, Committee of Permanent Representatives, meeting of 16 November 1977, EEC/China trade 
Agreement, Maitland to FCO, Brussels, 16 November 1977; CMA, Intermediate Archive, 19644/1977, 876ème 
réunion du Comité des représentants permanents, tenue à Bruxelles, du 16 au 18.11.1977, relations avec la 
République populaire de Chine, 18 November 1977. 
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But the Commission found other ways to affirm its part. For example, it 
sent the Council of Ministers only the outline of the clauses for the trade 
agreement on which its negotiation mandate was to be based, rather than a 
full draft of the clauses. This gave the Commission maximum room for 
manoeuvre in the negotiations with the Chinese. 41  Furthermore, the 
Commission first issued a press release on its recommendation to the Council 
of Ministers for a negotiating mandate, and only a day later sent off this 
recommendation to the Council of Ministers. This meant that the 
Commission sign-posted its role as a spokesman for the Community to the 
general public. Above all it meant that the Council of Ministers was now 
under more pressure to approve its mandate. If the Council refused the 
mandate, it could be publicly blamed for obstructing the trade deal with the 
Chinese. Thus the Commission again resorted to its tactic of creating a fait 
accompli vis-à-vis the Nine to advance the EC-PRC relationship and, above 
all, to reaffirm its leadership role within it.  
On 21 November 1977 the Council of Ministers adopted without 
discussion the directives for the Commission to open negotiations with the 
Chinese. 42  With the exception of the clause on maritime transport, the 
member states had essentially approved the Commission’s proposal.43 The 
French and the British welcomed the Council of Ministers’ decision. 44 
 
41 Roy Denman confirmed this tactic: ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, Note, Chine, Denman to Haferkamp, 18 November 
1977. 
42 Ibid. 
43 ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, Projet de recommendation de la Commission au Conseil concernant l'ouverture de 
négociations avec la Chine, Groux to DG I, Brussels, 8 September 1979. 
44 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, Chine-CEE, 1 December 1977; NA, FCO 98/300, Annex, Brief No. 22, Council of 
Ministers (Foreign Affairs) Brussels, 22 November 1977, EEC/China, European Integration Department, 17 
November 1977. 
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Therefore the Commission’s push for quick results by means of an early 
approach to the Council of Ministers for the mandate to begin official 
negotiations was successful. The Commission managed to complete the 
exploratory phase in record time. Such a quick authorisation was not self-
evident. The case of the trade agreement with Yugoslavia shows that the 
Council of Ministers delayed time and time again in 1978 to give the 
Commission a mandate for negotiations.45 Similarly, the case of agreements 
with the Mediterranean states, Spain and Israel, the Maghreb states, 
Morocco, Tunisia and Algeria, and the Mashrek states, Egypt, Jordan, 
Lebanon and Syria, show the restricted role of the Commission. The member 
states decided by means of arduous discussions the detailed negotiating 
directives for the Commission to follow and abide by.46 
By the end of 1977, the Commission was ready to lead formal 
negotiations with the PRC government. The Commission had acted quickly. 
The main result of de Kergorlay’s mission to Beijing had been to find a 
solution to the technical deadlock over safeguard measures and a balanced 
trade clause. The Commission then completed the exploratory phase and 
secured a Council of Ministers mandate for official negotiations in almost 
record time. Still the limits of the Commission’s room for manoeuvre lay 
where the national interest of the member states came in. Yet in the case of 
the PRC, the interests of the different member states and the Commission 
vis-à-vis China were largely congruent, and therefore the Commission could 
 
45 HAEU, EN 1092/1978, Yugoslavia, Tickell to Froschmaier, Brussels, 18 December 1978. 
46 McAllister, European Union, p.104. 
  
 
182 
go ahead as quickly and as far as it did. Its tactic of fait accompli served the 
Commission well once more.  
The final negotiation phase: playing the Soviet card 
On 22 December 1977 the official negotiations started in Brussels. On the 
Community side, the Commission led the negotiations in close contact with 
the Nine working through COREPER and the  rticle 113 ‘China’ Committee. 
This last included representatives from both the Commission and the 
member states. It was responsible for overseeing the negotiations. The 
Chinese and the Commission eventually worked out a deal because both sides 
wanted to make it work.  
Within the Community, the workings of the  rticle 113 ‘China’ 
Committee reflected the constructive working relationship which had been 
established between the Commission and the Nine. Denman reported once 
the negotiations concluded that:  
‘We were able to carry the member states with us; indeed their 
help and advice throughout the long night of February 2 and 3 
proved extremely valuable; they were kind enough to say at the 
end that they thought we had got more than had seemed to them 
at the outset likely.’47  
The French also put it down to Denman’s negotiating skills and the 
unanimity of the member states that the negotiations had ended so 
satisfactorily.48 The  rticle 113 ‘China’ Committee also shows how the parties 
dealt with national and Community interests. One example was the conflict 
 
47 HAEU, EN 1092/1978, Trade agreement with China, Denman to Haferkamp, Brussels, 6 February 1978. 
48 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, Accord CEE-Chine, Nanteuil to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, Brussels, 6 February 
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over the safeguard clause. At the meetings on 8 and 15 December the Belgian 
representatives brought back an issue which the British had tabled 
previously.49 They called for the re-introduction of the national right to apply 
interim protective measures in the case of an emergency. This right had 
ceased when the Community took over the administration of the trade 
agreements with third countries on 1 January 1975. Kawan reiterated that the 
question of the national application of such emergency measures constituted 
an internal problem which ought to be examined in a different forum. But on 
6 January the British delegation had its way by including in the Council of 
Ministers’ minutes a statement that, irrespective of a safeguard clause, the 
member states could still individually apply their own measures on 
protection against dumping.50 The conflict indicates how many pitfalls existed 
on the road to a successful EEC-PRC agreement. In the end the Commission’s 
ability to lead the negotiations with the Chinese to a successful conclusion 
was down to the member states essentially wanting the agreement too. 
The final stage of negotiations began in Brussels on 30 January 1978 
upon the arrival of a Chinese delegation from Beijing. The negotiations 
proved intense: they lasted four days, comprising five sessions, of which the 
last one started at 15:30 on 2 February and continued through the night until 
8:30 the following morning.51 The challenging nature of the talks is further 
illustrated in a note by Denman to Haferkamp a few days after the 
 
49 ECH , B C  8/198 /687, Comit  113 ‘Chine’ du 15.12.1977, Hasselhoff, Brussels, 19 December 1977  CM , 
Intermediate Archive, 19645/1979, Outcome of the proceedings of the Article 113 Committee (China), Brussels, 19 
December 1977. 
50 CMA, Intermediate Archive, 19645/1979, Outcome of the meeting of the Article 113 Committee on 5 and 6 
January 1978, Brussels, 10 January 1978. 
51 HAEU, EN 1092/1978, Trade agreement with China, Denman to Haferkamp, Brussels, 6 February 1978. 
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completion of negotiations describing the atmosphere as ‘at times dense’ so 
that ‘[i]ndeed at about 4 a.m. on the morning of February 3 the Head of the 
Chinese delegation leapt from his chair in rage and seemed about to break.’52 
Difficulties with the Chinese arose on the one hand for linguistic reasons, on 
the other hand because of substance. Almost every article led to lengthy 
discussions. The Commission ‘had to press hard’ and ‘fight very hard’. On the 
liberalisation clause the Commission prevented formulations that implied the 
rapid removal of quantitative restrictions of imports from China to the 
Community. It also battled to include a reference to the promotion of 
contacts, trade fairs and visits. Finally and most importantly, regarding the 
safeguard clause, the Commission fought to include a reference which 
allowed the Community to take emergency action without prior consultation.  
The Commission’s tactic vis-à-vis the Chinese was grounded in the 
belief that they ‘could afford to play it fairly rough’ because the PRC 
government obviously wanted to reach a deal. This tactic proved to be a 
consistent one throughout the three negotiation phases. For example in the 
exploratory phase, in order to include a price clause, which the Chinese 
initially refused completely, Denman had written to Haferkamp that  
‘Il y aura lieu, je crois, de lui faire comprendre que les directives de 
négociation qui furent élaborées dans un temps record par la 
Communauté ne pourront être facilement changées. Dès lors si 
l’on veut conclure vite, il conviendra de trouver une solution dans 
le cadre de ces directives.’53  
The Commission was prepared to play a tight game with the Chinese. 
 
52 HAEU, EN 1092/1978, Trade agreement with China, Denman to Haferkamp, Brussels, 6 February 1978. 
53 Kawan received the Chinese commercial councillor Li regarding the negotiations, see: ECHA, BAC 48/1984/687, 
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 n additional factor that worked to the Commission’s advantage and 
spurred on the negotiations was the now openly irritated and adversial 
reaction of the Soviets regarding the EC-PRC relationship. And as the 
opening quote of this chapter shows, the Commission did play the China 
card. The quote is taken from a note in which Sir Crispin Tickell, the chef de 
cabinet of the new Commission President, Roy Jenkins records his 
discussions over lunch with Mr Kouznetsov, the first secretary of the Soviet 
embassy in Brussels in December 1977.54 On 31 January, Bruno de Leusse, 
French ambassador in Moscow, informed the Quai d’Orsay: 
‘ insi les Sovi tiques ne cachent plus leur irritation devant le 
développement des contacts entre l'Europe occidentale et la Chine. 
Ce n'est pas un hasard si la presse multiplie en même temps les 
attaques contre les dangers que les "provocateurs de Pékin" font 
courir à la consolidation de la détente (articles de la Pravda du 28 
janvier - citant le rudo pravo - sur les liens que la Chine cherche, 
via la CEE, a établir avec l'OTAN, et du 31 janvier sur les 
encouragements de la Chine à la fabrication de la bombe à 
neutrons). Rien n'est négligé pour montrer aux pays membres de 
la Communauté européenne et en particulier au notre, qu'il n'est 
pas de leur intérêt de se prêter aux « manœuvres chinoises ».’55  
The increasingly fierce Sino-Soviet competition allowed Denman to 
adopt a firmer negotiating position vis-à-vis the Chinese. During the final 
negotiations, Denman read out to the Chinese a communication by the Soviet 
news agency TASS, which fiercely condemned the Chinese for reaching out to 
the Community. 56 The French Permanent Representative reported how this 
provoked anger amongst the Chinese which spurred them on to conclude the 
 
54 Private papers shown by N. Piers Ludlow, Note for the record, Tickell, Brussels, 14 December 1977. 
55 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, Négociation d'un accord commercial entre la Chine et le marché commun, Leusse 
to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, Moscow, 31 January 1978. 
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negotiations ‘coute que coute’ so as to out-do the Soviets.57 This enabled 
Denman ‘d'arracher in extremis dans la nuit du 2 au 3 février des conditions 
inesp r es’.58 Hence, Denman played the Soviet card to good effect. 
The Commission made two main concessions to the Chinese. The first 
one was to include a ‘balance clause’ which stipulated that the party recording 
a surplus had to seek ways to re-establish equilibrium in trade exchanges. But 
in effect no obligations to take action existed, and the Commission ensured 
the insertion of the formula ‘each by its own means’ to take account of its 
market economy system. The second concession regarded quantitative 
restrictions. 59  The Community agreed to an increasing liberalisation and 
enlargement of the trade quotas applying to Chinese goods. Apart from these 
two main concessions, others were the exclusion of a clause on the supply of 
raw materials. The Community also agreed to leave out a definition of 
Chinese territory. The EC granted China MFN status in Article 2. This carried 
strong political overtones because this status had proved elusive to the Soviet 
Union within the CSCE framework and the negotiations for the Helsinki Final 
Act.60 Granting the MFN clause looked like a concession, but was not. In the 
absence of a Community trade agreement, the Community had officially 
stated that it would continue to apply MFN rates.61 The MFN clause therefore 
did no more than prolong the status quo. Moreover the MFN treatment did 
 
57 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, Accord CEE-Chine, Nanteuil to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, Brussels, 6 February 
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60 Ebinger, 'The Politics of Potential', p.338. 
61 CMA, Intermediate Archive,19648/1978, EEC-China trade agreement, Council General Secretariat, Brussels, 9 
March 1978. 
  
 
187 
not apply to quantitative restrictions. Therefore, in the final analysis, the 
Community’s most important commitment to China was to increasingly 
liberalise the EC market. 
The Chinese side also conceded on two major issues. The first one was 
to accept a safeguard clause (Article 7). Though the agreement did not make 
specific use of the term ‘safeguard measures’ and instead referred to ‘friendly 
consultations’ (Article 5), in essence this was no different to the usual 
safeguard clauses the Community applied. The parties could take unilateral 
measures in an emergency without prior consultation. ‘Friendly 
consultations’ would then follow. The second major concession was the 
inclusion of a price clause: however, it turned out to be less detailed than that 
which the Council of Ministers had outlined in its mandate to the 
Commission.62 Next to these two main issues, the Chinese pledged to show 
‘favourable consideration’ towards Community exports (Article 4). They also 
committed to support trade fairs, industrial and technical contacts between 
the two parties (Article 6). The Community regarded this as an important 
provision in relations with state trading countries consistent with the stance 
it took at the CSCE.63 On balance and at specific time in the history of the EC-
PRC relationship, the trade agreement leaned in favour of the Community.  
On the basis of these mutual concessions, Denman, on behalf of the 
Community, and Sun Suzhang, director of the Department of Foreign Trade, 
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on behalf of the PRC, initialled the Draft Trade Agreement on 3 February.64 It 
was a non-preferential trade agreement concluded for a period of five years 
with provisions for its renewal. Its aim was to promote and intensify trade 
between the two sides. Article 9 stipulated that a Joint Committee set up after 
the signature of the agreement was in charge of administering the agreement 
and was to meet normally once a year. The agreement proved to be just a 
general framework agreement, and a Joint Committee had to work out the 
details subsequently.  
The Soviet reaction to the initialling of the trade agreement was severe.65 
For the first time a Soviet embassy representative, E. Plakhotnyi, visited the 
Commission in the Berlaymont, the Commission’s office in Brussels. On 20 
February 1978, Plakhotnyi discussed the EC-PRC relationship and aired the 
Soviet irritation directly to Umberto Stefani, First Counsellor of the 
Commission’s General Secretariat. He stressed that as his government had 
predicted and feared, the Commission had given a particular political 
significance to the agreement. 66  Similarly, the Soviet minister-counsellor 
expressed his anger to the French Director of Far Eastern Affairs about the 
recent trade agreement and the absence of a clause that prohibited the sales 
of strategic materials.67 The hostility between Moscow and Beijing grew ever 
more intense. 
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With the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement initialed, the next step within the 
EC was the Council of Minister’s endorsement of the deal. The negotiations 
had shown the basic political willingness from both the Community and the 
Chinese to conclude a trade agreement. Therefore they found compromises 
on all of the main issues in dispute. On the Community side, the close 
cooperation between the member states and the Commission was 
fundamental to its effective negotiations with the Chinese. The tactic that 
succeeded vis-à-vis the Chinese was Denman playing the Soviet card. 
Signature and ratification: the many dimensions of the trade 
agreement 
On 3 April 1978 Haferkamp and the President of the Council of Ministers 
Knud Andersen signed the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement with Li Jiang in 
Brussels. Throughout the trade talks, the European Parliament had kept its 
eyes on the ball. On 1 June 1978, with the ratification procedure completed 
for both parties, the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement, the first one between the 
Community and a state trading country based on the 1974 Outline 
Agreement, entered into force. 
Within the Community, the constructive working relationship between 
the Commission and the Nine continued. Haferkamp decided to inform the 
Council of Ministers himself on 7 February rather than just instructing 
Denman to do so at COREPER level. This also reflects the political 
importance the Commission attached to the deal.68 More importantly, the 
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Commission pushed for a speedy signature. At the next COREPER meeting 
on 9 February, Denman suggested using the visit of a Chinese ministerial 
delegation to Europe at the end of March as the occasion to sign the 
agreement.69 In parallel, DG I drafted a recommendation for a Council of 
Ministers regulation on the conclusion of the agreement. In order to have the 
Council of Ministers decide on the matter at its session on 7 March, DG I 
used a ‘proc dure acc l r e’.  s a result, the recommendation was ready on 
21 February and sent to the Council of Ministers President Andersen the next 
day.70 The Nine responded at a similarly quick pace. On 2 March COREPER 
agreed on the results of the negotiations and recommended that the Council 
of Ministers decide to sign the agreement. 71  The Council of Ministers 
approved the agreement on 7 March without further discussion.  
During the signature ceremony on 3 April 1978, both Andersen and 
Haferkamp made clear that for the Community the significance of the EEC-
PRC Trade Agreement went beyond the purely commercial and beyond the 
Community’s relationship to China. Andersen declared:  
‘Chacun est conscient que la c r monie d’aujourd’hui a une port e 
qui dépasse le cadre purement commercial. Dès 1973, les Chefs 
d’Etat et de Gouvernement des Neuf, r unis à Copenhague, avaient 
exprim  leur volont  d’intensifier leurs relations avec le 
Gouvernement chinois. […] Cette politique, les Neuf la poursuivent 
dans le respect de leurs amitiés traditionnelles, avec la conviction 
que la société européenne de demain doit répondre aux aspirations 
profondes de ses peuples et avec l’espoir que la Communaut  
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pourra jouer le rôle d’un facteur d’ quilibre et repr senter un pôle 
de coopération avec toutes les nations, quels que soient leur 
dimension, leur culture et leur système  conomique et social.’72  
Haferkamp emphasised that the agreement reflected not just China’s 
support of the political project of the Community, but was also a symbol of 
the trust between the two parties crucial to overcoming the economic and 
political tensions in the current international climate. Furthermore: 
‘Ce principe de la coop ration d termine aussi les relations 
extérieures de la Communauté européenne. Notre accord est un 
nouveau t moignage de cette d termination positive et il n’est 
dirig  contre personne.’73 
The Soviet Union was the implicit target of this last sentence. Both speeches 
indicate the politicised way the Community as a whole treated the 
negotiations for the EEC-PRC trade agreement, always viewing them in 
relation to the Soviet bloc. 
Significantly, the Community's success in signing the trade agreement 
with China paralleled renewed advances by COMECON towards the 
Community. Just before the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement entered into force, 
Nicolai Fadeyev, COMECON secretary, received a Community delegation led 
by Haferkamp in Moscow on 29 and 30 May. As a result Haferkamp and 
Fadeyev issued a joint memorandum in which they agreed a number of 
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principles and reiterated the wish to set up official relations between the 
Community and COMECON.74  
Notably, the Commission not only used the China relationship to put 
forward its authority internally within the Community, and externally vis-à-
vis the Soviet bloc, but also in relation to the United States. When Roy 
Jenkins visited American President Jimmy Carter, it was the Commission 
that put relations with the PRC on the agenda. A brief recommended Jenkins 
to ask about the prospects for development in Sino-American relations. It 
included as a defensive point the content of the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement 
advising the Commission President not to tell Washington too much. 75 
Thereafter, over a lunchtime conversation with Secretary of State Cyrus 
Vance on 18 April, it was the Commission which set the agenda on relations 
with China. Vance admitted that the Sino-American relationship had reached 
a deadlock.76 The Community was set to outpace the United States not only in 
the establishment of official relations, but also the conclusion of a trade 
agreement. Indeed, back in Brussels, Huan Hsiang confirmed this for the 
Chinese side too. He remarked to Jenkins that trade with the United States 
was diminishing mainly for political reasons and that ‘there were no 
prospects for […] the establishment of full diplomatic relations.’ 77 
 ichitsorasatra rightly points out: ‘The fact that the EC and China managed 
to reach an agreement while this was not the case with the Americans is an 
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indication of a high degree of willingness to cooperate between the Chinese 
and the Europeans.’78 The Community’s relations with the PRC suggest that 
the Commission was willing to move far ahead of the United States. 
At the signing ceremony the European Parliament was not present but it 
did play a role in the intra-Community politics regarding the trade 
negotiations. It used the relations with China to implement an inter-
institutional agreement, the so-called Luns-Westerterp procedure. This 
agreement had no legal basis in the Rome Treaties and showcases the way the 
European Parliament increasingly elbowed its way into EC decision-making. 
The agreement obliged the Council of Ministers to inform the European 
Parliament of all decisive steps during the negotiations of a trade agreement. 
Therefore, when the Commission began official negotiations, Nicolas 
Hommel, Secretary-General of the Council of Ministers, had to forward to the 
EP President a memorandum on the negotiations.79 And the day the Council 
of Ministers decided on the signature of the agreement, on 7 March, the 
General Secretariat sent another memorandum this time analysing the 
content of the agreement with a copy of the draft agreement attached. 80 
Finally, the Council of Ministers’ President himself spoke in front of the EP 
Political Affairs Committee on 14 March about the EEC-PRC trade 
agreement.81 Even if these steps did not lead to any fundamental changes in 
the content of the trade agreement itself, they still deepened the links 
between the European Parliament and the Council of Ministers.  
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The European Parliament also used the China dossier to increase its 
exchanges with the member states meeting through the EPC. 82  The 
Luxembourg Report of 1970 that set up the EPC stipulated that the foreign 
ministers and the members of the EP Political Commission were to meet 
several times a year for a colloquium. The intention was to associate the 
EPC’s work more closely with the representatives of the European people and 
give a democratic character to political unification.83 In preparation for such a 
colloquium, the EP Political Affairs Committee examined the negotiations 
with the Chinese government at its session on 21 and 22 February 1978.84 The 
discussion centred on the possible reactions of the Soviet Union, and 
reflected divergent points of views. Lord Brimelow of the Socialist Group, for 
instance commented that the Soviet Union could only react negatively. He 
advised not to insist on the political aspects of the agreement which could 
provoke the Soviet Union further. In contrast Carlo Alberto Galluzzi, a 
member of the Communist Group, thought that this agreement represented a 
development profitable for the Soviet Union since the Soviet government 
could counteract the ideological rigidity of the PRC. In the end the committee 
set out a list of questions including what the attitude the United States to the 
agreement was, what guarantees for protection the safeguard clause offered 
to the Community, what kind of trade development the EC could expect, and 
if the agreement was considered as a precedent for example in relation to 
Romania. The workings of the European Parliament, the deliberations, the 
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rhetoric and the political orientation of the intervening parties, further 
indicate the impact of the Cold War upon European integration. And similar 
to the Commission, the European Parliament brought the Cold War into play 
to bolster its role vis-à-vis the member states. 
Parliamentary debates were a further way in which the European 
Parliament manifested its role within the Community. The sitting on 11 April 
1978 in particular demonstrates the ‘sense of excitement and urgency’ which 
the developments in relation to China provoked.85 The session is also useful 
in showing the significance attached to the agreement, ranging from the 
political to the economic, from the bilateral to the multilateral and global. 
Those who emphasised the geopolitical aspect came from across the entire 
political spectrum, including from the European Conservative Group, the 
Liberal and Democratic Group, the Christian Democratic Group, and the 
Communist and Allies Group. But there were also those who emphasised the 
economic aspects much more, such as Lord Kennet from the Socialist Group 
or John Alexander Corrie from the European Conservative Group. The debate 
is also revealing of the Parliament‘s aspiration to see the Community’s role in 
world affairs further elevated. In particular Berkhouwer hoped that this 
agreement would contribute towards Europe’s fulfilment of its world role, 
and put forward the Third Force argument.86 
The April debate is relevant too in terms of the European Parliament’s 
views on how the Community ought to operate in external relations. By 
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discussing concrete ways to implement the trade agreement, the European 
Parliament claimed its part in shaping the EC-PRC relationship. It continued 
to assume its role in holding the Commission accountable for its actions. 
Lord Bessborough for example insisted ‘It would be useful to know from the 
Commissioner by what material criteria the Commission will judge the 
effectiveness of this agreement.’ Yet, the MEPs recognised the limited impact 
they had upon the actual decision-making. When the treaty entered into force 
on 1 June, the EP Political Affairs Committee expressed its regret that the 
Commission and the Council of Ministers had not taken into account its 
recommendations on the scope and content of the agreement. 87  But it 
scheduled another debate on the trade agreement, which further suggests the 
importance the European Parliament attached to the subject and the way it 
used the issue to position itself.88  
With the ratification procedure for both parties completed on 2 May 
1978, the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement entered into force on 1 June 1978.89 The 
signature ceremony had shown the politicised way in which the Chinese and 
the Community had conducted the trade talks. The Soviets reacted with new 
fervour in seeking official relations between the EC and COMECON. Within 
the Community, the European Parliament muscled its way further into the 
decision-making process via the Luns-Westerterp procedure, and it even 
bridged the gap to the EPC.  
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Conclusion 
The Cold War, and particularly the Sino-Soviet rivalry, is essential to explain 
why between February 1977 and April 1978 the Community and the Chinese 
so swiftly signed a trade agreement. The same factor also accounts for why 
the Commission and the Nine in the end overcame intra-Community conflicts 
so quickly. The overriding importance of the agreement was political. For the 
Community this encompassed several dimensions: in respect of its external 
relations, the agreement constituted a precedent in the EC’s relations with 
the Communist countries. It represented the implementation of some 
fundamental aspects of the agenda it had pursued during the CSCE: 
conducting both commercial and human relations independently of the 
political and ideological nature of a system. The agreement also showed that 
the Community had managed to establish a closer relationship to the PRC 
than Washington had been able to up to that point not only diplomatically 
but also commercially.  
In terms of intra-Community dynamics, the negotiations proved that 
Haferkamp and DG I continued asserting the Commission’s leadership role 
which Soames had established on the China dossier. The episode is also one 
which demonstrates best the length to which the EP had gone in pushing its 
way into the EC decision-making regarding its foreign policy activity. Next to 
the parliamentary debates and question time, it associated itself to the 
negotiations via the Luns-Westerterp procedure. What is more, it discussed 
with the nine foreign ministers at the EPC. Again, the Cold War was 
instrumental for both the Commission and the EP to boost their role vis-à-vis 
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the member states. The question is whether the Cold War factor continued to 
play such a defining role now that the task was to implement the agreement.  
.  
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 Towards more substance  
(June 1978 – January 1980) 
‘The question of follow-up raises the same question of 
balance and realism as emerged earlier. The long term 
possibilities are immense and it is politically important, 
given the success of our visit, that vigorous follow-up 
action is seen to be happening. On the other hand the 
Chinese side has made it clear - and our partners in the 
private sector here are now well aware of this - that the 
operation is going to be not a quick dash but a long haul 
and therefore it would be easy and counter-productive 
to overreach ourselves by trying to do too much too 
quickly.’1 
Wilhelm Haferkamp, October 1978 
‘La Communaut  a pu mieux montrer qu'elle existe r ellement. […] Mais ce 
n'est qu'un premier pas.’2 Such was the Commission’s judgement regarding 
Haferkamp’s follow-up mission on the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement when he 
visited China in autumn 1978. But it encapsulates more than that. It reveals 
the meaning the Commission gave to the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement: the 
agreement was a political statement – not just about the relationship between 
Brussels and Beijing, but also about the way the Community sought to 
position itself in international affairs. And fundamentally it reflected how the 
Commission claimed the role of a diplomatic actor speaking for the 
Community. None of the works adopting transnational network approaches 
to write European integration history have picked up on Haferkamp’s visit – 
the first in the Community’s history to include representatives of the private 
 
1 BAK, BKA, B 136/16619, Visit of European Community delegation to China September 24 - October 2, 1978, 
Haferkamp, Brussels, 9 October 1978. 
2 ECHA, BAC 379/1991/86, Projet de conférence de presse à Bruxelles, author unknown, date unknown. 
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and public sector. Similarly, the historiography has also failed to 
acknowledge Jenkin’s visit to Beijing in February 1979 just as the Sino-
Vietnam war had broken out, and where the President of the Commission 
talked politics with the Chinese leaders.   
The period between June 1978 and January 1980 is important because 
it reveals how the Community addressed the challenge of giving substance to 
a trade agreement that merely laid down a series of general principles. It 
shows that one of the purposes of the China missions by Haferkamp, the EP 
President Emilio Colombo and Jenkins was to smooth political relations in 
order to facilitate the implementation of the agreement. It also indicates 
other ways in which the EC sought to demonstrate political good will towards 
the Chinese. The Community took concrete measures on issues that had been 
lingering even before the 1978 trade agreement: a further liberalisation of the 
EC autonomous import regime, which also meant treating the PRC 
differently to the Soviet Union, and the inclusion of the PRC into its GSP. The 
period shows too, how the textile sector required a more concrete 
arrangement. The negotiations between the Chinese and the EC for a 
separate textile agreement proved difficult. And they brought to surface more 
intra-Community conflicts. The Cold War continued to be a defining external 
factor in shaping the relationship. However the economic competition with 
the United States and Japan became an increasingly important one also.  
First, this chapter analyses the Community’s interpretation of  rticle 6 
of the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement, which aimed at facilitating contacts 
between individuals, groups and delegations from the economic, commercial 
and industrial spheres. It looks at the EC’s visiting diplomacy and the role the 
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private sector came to play in it. Second, it examines the way the Community 
interpreted Article 4, in which the Community committed itself to 
progressively liberalise its market for Chinese imports. Third, it investigates 
the negotiations for a textile agreement that operated within the framework 
of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA), which derived from the EEC-PRC 
Trade Agreement and supplemented it at a sectoral level.   
Practising diplomacy: the Commission’s and the EP’s visits to 
Beijing 
One highly visible way to implement the trade agreement was to follow-up on 
Article 6 and engage in visiting diplomacy. The time was a peculiar one in 
China’s history, and the Europeans were highly aware of it. The PRC gave 
priority to achieving an ambitious economic development programme. China 
therefore encouraged foreign investment and international confidence. 
Although inflexible government plans controlled the industry, China 
signalled with some key achievements the modernisation plans for its 
economy. It drastically developed its domestic and international airline 
systems, completed an immense dry-dock facility at the Hebei port of 
Shanhaiguan, and built and launched its first oil tanker in the 50,000-ton 
class.3 But the most important change in Chinese Communist policy since the 
outbreak of the Cultural Revolution was the policy of Four Modernisations, 
laid out at the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Central Committee of the CCP in 
December 1978.4 It involved developing industry, agriculture, science and 
 
3 Spence, The Search for Modern China, pp.618–619. 
4 Spence, The Search for Modern China, p.621. 
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technology, and national defence. It marked the beginning of the reform era 
led by Deng Xiaoping. Both the Commission and the European Parliament 
viewed the visiting diplomacy as an opportune way to continue enhancing 
their role not only vis-à-vis the Chinese government, but also in relation to 
the member states, the business community, and particularly in the light of 
impending direct elections to the European Parliament, the public at large. 
Haferkamp’s visit, which lasted from 24 September to 2 October 1978, 
was a symbolic one to prove to the Chinese government the Community’s 
commitment to the trade agreement. The idea was ‘that Willi Haferkamp 
should first play John the Baptist and make a preparatory visit’ for the one by 
Jenkins.5 Subjects to be discussed by the Commission vice-president while in 
China included how the future joint committee, which Article 9 had called 
for, should operate, and what other areas of cooperation existed apart from 
trade, such as energy, and science and technology. 6  The visit exceeded 
Haferkamp’s expectations in terms of the number and rank of Chinese 
political leaders that he met. 7 He sat down with the Minister for Foreign 
Trade Li Jiang, the Deputy Foreign Minister Zhang Wenqin, and the Deputy 
Prime Minister Li Xienian. Even Chairman Hua received and discussed with 
him for a full hour and a half. The atmosphere throughout was positive and 
friendly, and was not purely ‘protocolaire’.8 These contacts were an emphatic 
demonstration of the political importance the Chinese government attached 
to the relationship with the Community. 
 
5 Private papers shown by N. Piers Ludlow, Visit to China, Tickell, April 1979. 
6 ECHA, BAC379/1991/86, Mission en Chine, Kawan, Brussels, 20 September 1978. 
7 BAK, BKA, B136/16619, Visit of European Community delegation to China September 24 - October 2, 1978, 
Haferkamp, Brussels, 9 October 1978.  
8 Ibid.; ECHA, BAC 379/1991/86, Denman to Tickell, 29 September 1978. 
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In order to impress the Chinese and bolster the significance of his visit, 
Haferkamp included representatives from the private and public sector in his 
delegation. Members of the delegation included representatives of the 
Economic and Social Committee, the Union of Industries of the European 
Community, the European Trade Union Confederation, the European 
Banking Federation, and prominent industrialists and businessmen from all 
nine member states. The most important were Roger Martin, Chairman of 
France’s Saint Gobin Pont-à-Mousson, Dirk de Bruyne, President of Royal 
Dutch Shell, Sir Peter Fennan, Chairman of the London Chamber of 
Commerce, and Helmut Hausegen, President of the European Confederation 
of Banks.9 The Commission therefore signalled to the Chinese the European 
intention to make concrete use of the economic opportunities opened up by 
the trade accord.10  
At the same time, Haferkamp used his visit to demonstrate to the 
European private sector the virtues of trade with China, and the relevance of 
the EC in facilitating business contacts. This was one of Haferkamp’s 
continuous endeavours. 11 Speaking at the Foreign Affairs Club in London 
later in April 1979 for example, the Commissioner used his visit to China to 
show-case to the British the advantages of EC membership, and the 
importance that other countries attached to the Community. 12 One of the 
messages Haferkamp consistently sent out to European business people, the 
 
9 ECHA, BAC 379/1991/86, Adressenliste der Teilnehmer China-Reise, undated. 
10 ECHA, BAC 379/1991/86, Le thème politique de base (sous forme d'allocation), Kawan, Brussels, 15 Septembre 
1978. 
11 ECHA, BAC 379/1991/86, Meeting with Chinese mission on 2nd June, Maslen, Brussels, 5 June 1978. 
12 ECHA, Speech collection, Haferkamp, "Some aspects of Community trade policy", Foreign Affairs Club, London, 
5 April 1979.  
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banking sector, the agricultural trade unions and even political foundations, 
was the necessity to open the EC market to Chinese products. The 
competition from Japan and the United States were the main arguments he 
used to convince.13 Haferkamp also urged industries to organise more on a 
European level to face this competition.14 
It is this competition that prompted Haferkamp to schedule his visit to 
the PRC in September 1978. Japan and China had signed the Sino-Japanese 
Treaty of Peace and Friendship in August 1978. And they were also making 
preparations to sign an agreement that promised to give the Japanese a 30% 
share in Chinese external trade.15 Before that the Chinese government had 
already negotiated a new US $ 10 billion industrial agreement with Japan, 
and it also agreed on a joint Sino-Japanese exploration of oil in the North 
China Sea.16 Haferkamp sought to signal with his delegation that that the 
Community was in the game too, competing for a share of the Chinese 
market.  
Similar to his predecessor, Haferkamp used the tactic of fait accompli in 
order to assure the Commission’s room for manoeuvre vis-à-vis the member 
states, but also to realise personal interests. He made clear that it was up to 
the Commission to decide on whom he included on his China mission. In fact, 
the selection rested upon Haferkamp’s personal decision. COREPER 
 
13 ECHA, Speech collection, Haferkamp, Bank für Gemeinwirtschaft, Frankfurt, 22 March 1979; ECHA, Speech 
collection, Haferkamp, Verbindungsstelle Landwirtschaft und Industrie, Essen, 1 February 1979; ECHA, Speech 
collection, Haferkamp, Chancen des Ausbaus der Wirtschaftsbeziehungen der EG in Asien: Japan, China, ASEAN, 
Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Bonn, 8 November 1979. 
14 ECHA, Speech collection, Haferkamp, Verbindungsstelle Landwirtschaft und Industrie, Essen, 1 February 1979. 
15 ECHA, BAC379/1991/86, Mission en Chine, Kawan, Brussels, 20 September 1978. 
16 Spence, The Search for Modern China, p.618.  
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protested about this, but to little effect. Haferkamp simply brushed aside the 
criticism and went ahead. 17 Once his mission concluded, he wrote to the 
ambassadors of the member states:  
‘the mission as it was represented a gamble. We had never 
included businessmen on this scale in a Community mission 
before. We were not certain of getting the right people or making 
the right contacts when we got to China. But on both counts the 
mission worked; not only was there a strong Chinese willingness to 
develop their relations with us. But we went with the right people 
and at the right time. Thus we showed our colleagues in the private 
sector in particular - and I hope member governments - that the 
Commission can perform a valuable role in circumstances such as 
this.’18  
Similar too, was Haferkamp’s analysis regarding the Chinese, as is reflected 
in the opening quote of this chapter.  ll in all, Haferkamp’s visit reveals the 
Commission’s successful use of transnational networks to carry out its 
ambitions regarding the field of foreign policy.19 
What had profoundly changed compared to Soames’ time in office was 
the role of the European Parliament. The President of the European 
Parliament had also featured on Haferkamp’s list of people to invite onto his 
delegation. This shows how the Commissioner took account of the changing 
realities in intra-Community politics. Colombo’s reply also reflects this 
change and the EP’s new confidence. He politely thanked Haferkamp, but 
 
17 ECHA, BAC379/1991/86, Déjeuner de travail du COREPER, 22 juin 1978, Prochain voyage officiel de M. 
Haferkamp en Chine, Noel to Beck, Brussels, 22 June 1978. 
18 BAK, BKA, B136/16619, Visit of European Community delegation to China September 24 - October 2, 1978, 
Haferkamp, Brussels, 9 October 1978.  
19 On the role of transnational networks see for example: Morten Rasmussen, 'European Rescue of the Nation-
State? Tracing the Role of Economics and Business', in Wolfram Kaiser and Antonio Varsori (eds.), European 
History: Themes and Debates, (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Wolfram Kaiser, Brigitte Leucht and 
Michael Gehler (eds.), Transnational Networks in Regional Integration: Governing Europe, 1945-83, 
(Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Leucht Brigitte, 'Transatlantic Policy Networks and the Formation of Core 
Europe', University of Portsmouth, 2008. 
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made the point that the European Parliament intended to follow up its own 
contacts made with the PRC rather than participating as the Commission’s 
guest.20 Having refused to accompany Haferkamp, the EP again asserted its 
role in relation to the Commission by scheduling Colombo’s visit to Beijing 
just before Jenkins was due to travel there. Colombo visited the PRC from 3 
to 8 January 1979 upon the invitation of the Chinese National Popular 
Assembly. He was invited because the Chinese government regarded the EP 
as crucial in the European integration process it supported against the Soviet 
Union. Colombo’s high-level meetings with Zhi Pengfei, Deng Xiaoping and 
Hua Guofeng demonstrated the rising role of the European Parliament in the 
EC-PRC relationship, which neither the member states nor the Commission 
could afford to ignore any longer.21  
Jenkin’s visit, the first of a Commission President to China, meant that 
the Commission could prove itself at a moment of international crisis. Three 
days before his visit, scheduled for 21 February to 1 March 1979, the Chinese 
launched a border offensive against  ietnam in response to  ietnam’s 
invasion of Cambodia. All nine EC foreign ministers called in the respective 
Chinese ambassadors and asked China to end the incursions into Vietnam.22 
Jenkins, who already had visited China as Labour MP in 1973, noted in his 
diary on 17 February: ‘I learnt that war had broken out between China and 
Vietnam, which was a highly inconvenient time and raised a question of 
 
20 CARDOC, PE1 P1 223/RICM RICM/1977/617, Colombo to Haferkamp, Luxembourg, 17 July 1978. 
21 AMAE, AO, prov. 2159, visite en Chine du Président de l'Assemblée Parlementaire Européenne, Arnaud to 
Francois-Poncet, Beijing, 10 January 1979. 
22 Louven, 'The European Community and Asia'. 
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whether we should still go to Peking on Tuesday.’23 In the end, he decided to 
go ahead. The discussions Jenkins had with Hua Guofeng, Deng Xiaoping, Gu 
Mu, Foreign Minister Huang Hua and Li Jiang, were characterised by 
political and geopolitical issues, as much if not more than economic ones. 24 
Therefore his visit further strengthened Commission’s role in international 
diplomacy.  
Unsurprisingly, the Soviets condemned the Commission’s diplomacy 
forcefully. Regarding Haferkamp’s visit an article in T SS, the leading Soviet 
news agency, directed its polemic mainly at the PRC and Western pro-PRC 
circles. What most surprised the German diplomat evaluating the press was 
that the article asserted that the Nine agreed to arms sales with the PRC, that 
anti-Soviet circles gained more and more influence in the Community, and 
that Haferkamp’s visit was linked to enhancing cooperation in the area of 
military and defence. This was to be seen in relation to Beijing’s long-term 
objective of using a rapprochement with the Common Market to establish a 
closer relationship with the NATO-bloc.25 The French picked up on the same 
T SS article and also highlighted the connection made between Haferkamp’s 
 
23 Jenkins, European Diary, p.401. 
24 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, Visite de M. Jenkins, Relations Chine-CEE, Arnaud to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, 
Beijing, 28 February 1979; ECHA, BAC 379/1991/77, Conversation between the President of the European 
Commission and Vice-President Deng Xiaoping: Great Hall of the People, Beijing, 23 February 1979, Tickell, 5 
March 1979; ECHA, BAC 379/1991/77, Record of conversation between the President of the European Commission 
and Chairman Hua Guofeng: Great Hall of the People, Beijing, 24 February 1979, Tickell, 6 March 1979; ECHA, BAC 
379/1991/77, Record of conversation between the President of the European Commission and the Minister of 
FOreign Trade of China, Beijing, 23 February 1979, Reuter, 5 March 1979; ECHA, BAC 379/1991/77, Record of 
conversation between the President of the European Commission and Vice-Premier Gu Mu: Great Hall of the 
People, Beijing, 22 February 1979, Crispin Tickell, 8 March 1979. 
25 PAAA, B37, Zwischenarchiv 107519, Besuch von Kommissionsvizepräsident Haferkamp in China, hier: 
Sowjetische Kritik an westlicher Chinapolitik, Wieck to Bonn AA, Moscow, 7 October 1978.  
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visit and NATO. 26  The Commission’s activity spurred the Soviet fear of 
encirclement. 
The reaction to and effect of Jenkins’ visit was similar. De Leusse 
reported that the Soviets found Jenkins’ visit inadmissible particularly at a 
time when China had attacked Vietnam militarily. 27  Even more virulent 
criticism came from Albania: ‘Pour atteindre leurs objectifs de 
superpuissance les "social-impérialistes chinois", qui en avril 1978 avaient 
signé un accord commercial avec la CEE, n'hésitent pas, outre les liens établis 
avec l'impérialisme américain et les militaristes japonais "rechercher toute la 
collaboration possible" avec les milieux les plus réactionnaires et bellicistes 
de l'Europe occidentale dans le cadre de l'OT N et du march  commun.’ 28 In 
Brussels, Mr. Kouznetsov, counsellor at the Soviet embassy, called upon 
Tickell on 15 February 1979.29 He asked about the purpose of Jenkins’ visit to 
the PRC, and wanted to know precisely what the Commission intended to 
offer the Chinese in any trade negotiations. He expressed his concern about 
member states, such as Britain, selling arms to the PRC. Moreover he asked if 
the Nine would take any position on the crisis between China and Vietnam. A 
few days later, Mr. Babenkov, the secretary at the Soviet embassy in Brussels, 
and Stehno, also called upon the Commission to assert that Jenkins’ visit 
assumed a regrettable significance in the light of the Chinese intervention in 
the military conflict between Cambodia and Vietnam. Babenkov even raised 
 
26 AMAE, Série DE-CE, NC, 1369, Visite à Pékin d'une délégation de la CEE, Dupont to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, 
Moscow, 4 October 1978. 
27 AMAE, AO, prov. 2130, Visite en Chine de M. Roy Jenkins, Leusse to Adresse Diplomatie Paris, Moscow, 21 
February 1979. 
28 CAC, SGCI files, Versement 19930085, Article 30, Une délégation de la CEE à Pékin, Lecompte to Adresse 
Diplomatie Paris, Tirana, 24 February 1979. 
29 HAEU, EN 1149, Call of counsellor from Soviet embassy, Brussels, Tickell to Jenkins, Brussels, 15 February 1979. 
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the question of whether Jenkin’s decision to go was not a choice directed 
against the Soviet Union.30 The reaction from the Soviet bloc shows that the 
Commission at all times had to expect and manage an antagonistic reception 
to its expanding foreign policy activity with China. 
In less than a year following the signature of the EEC-PRC Trade 
Agreement, the two EC institutions that had proven most active and 
committed to forging the links with the Chinese government had staged three 
key diplomatic visits to Beijing. Thereby the Commission and the European 
Parliament continued to explore ways to bolster their own position in intra-
Community politics. The pattern of visits also reflected the European 
Parliament’s further emancipation in light of its direct elections. They also 
showed how the Commission acted as a broker for business contacts between 
the Europeans and the Chinese. It demonstrated a critical presence at the 
height of the Sino-Vietnamese war. With the enthusiastic Chinese response, 
the objectives of the missions had been met, and a positive European 
reception ensured that the Commission gained further credentials as EC 
spokesperson in diplomacy. And via the banking and private sector, it had 
found a new instrument for its foreign policy activity.  
The EC’s unilateral trade liberalisation 
The volume of trade between the PRC and the Community was in fact very 
small. The Europeans were well aware of this. Kawan noted:  
 
30 HAEU, EN 1149, Call of counsellor from Soviet embassy, Brussels, Tickell to Jenkins, Brussels, 15 February 1979. 
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‘Les importations en provenance de Chine vers la Communaut  
étaient, en 1977, de EAU 855 millions [approx. US $ 1118 million]. 
A titre de comparaison, notons que celles de la 
Pologne étaient de EAU  2,122 milliards  
[approx. US $ 2775 million] 
Hongrie 1 milliards  
[approx. US $ 1308 million] 
Suède 8 milliards  
[approx. US $ 10462 million] 
Suisse 7 milliards  
[approx. US $ 9154 million] 
URSS 6 milliards  
[approx. US $ 7846 million] 
Inde 1,6 milliards  
[approx. US $ 2092 million] 
Nos ventes à la Chine étaient, en 1977, de EAU 794 millions 
[approx. US $ 1038. ] Celles vers la  
Pologne s'élevaient à  2,5 milliards  
[approx. US $ 3269 million] 
URSS 5,8 milliards  
[approx. US $ 7585 million] 
Suisse 12 milliards  
[approx. US $ 15692 million] 
Inde 1,  milliards’31 [approx. US $1831 million ] 
  
 
31 ECHA, BAC 379/1991/86, Mission en Chine, Kawan, Brussels, 20 September 1978. 
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The IMF data support this view: 
Table 0-1:  Direction of trade of the Nine for 1976 to 1979 in 
million US $32 
Exports of the Nine 
to 
1976 1977 1978 1979 
the PRC 1314 907 1908 2879 
Hungary 1194 1529 1971 2028 
Sweden 9613 10115 10489 13297 
the United States 18246 22903 28631 34325 
 
Imports by the 
Nine from  
1976 1977 1978 1979 
the PRC 949 999 1226 1861 
Hungary 943 1148 1305 1730 
Sweden 8730 9436 11366 14292 
United States 27623 29190 35310 46565 
Kawan also commented that in the short term the Community was not 
expecting a massive increase in trade. Nonetheless, two external factors 
proved strong incentives for the Community to follow-through Article 6 of the 
EEC-PRC Trade Agreement, and satisfy the Chinese demands to open up the 
EC markets: the oil shocks and the increasing competition from Japan and 
the United States in the Chinese market.  
The second oil shock meant that the Community kept a close eye on the 
PRC’s oil exports. In April 1979 the Auswärtiges Amt remarked regarding the 
 
32 International Monetary Fund (2006): Direction of Trade Statistics (Edition: 1948-1980). ESDS International, 
University of Manchester. 
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advantages of a more active EC economic policy towards the East that ‘Die 
Energie- und Rohstoffprobleme Westeuropas werden es längerfristig sinnvoll 
erscheinen lassen, die enormen Reserven einiger RGW-Länder und der VR 
China in ein kooperatives Konzept einzubeziehen.’ 33  For example, Claude 
Mont, from the Christian Democratic Group, pointed out that ‘the Europe of 
the Nine is very keen on getting Chinese oil.’34 At the same time, international 
competition in the Chinese market grew. The commercial counsellors 
emphasised in their report of 30 June 1979 the EC had to open itself up to 
Chinese products. They also argued that the Community had to use a lot of 
imagination and determination if it wanted to face up to the increasing 
competition from Japan and the United States.35  
The first measure the Community took was to introduce a new 
regulation that widened the range of products that the PRC could export to 
the EC without restriction. The new list allowed China to export about 20 
more products to the Community. On 19 September 1978 the Council of 
Ministers agreed to this new regulation. 36  Up to that point, restrictive 
regulations applicable to all state trading countries which the Nine had 
adopted on 19 December 1969 governed trade with the PRC. In effect the new 
regulation was a diplomatic tool by which the Community signalled that it 
 
33 Debates of the European Parliament, Report by Mr. Müller-Hermann, on behalf of the Committee on External 
Economic Relations, on the trade agreement between the European Economic Community and the People's 
Republic of China, Official Journal C 239, 1978. 
34 Ibid.; see also: ECHA, Speech collection, Les problèmes économiques extérieurs de la CEE, 30 May 1979. 
35 PAAA, B21/200, Zwischenarchiv 110507, Rapport commun des conseillers commerciaux des pays membres de la 
CEE en Chine, Beijing, 30 June 1979.  
36 Règlement (CEE) n° 2532/78 du Conseil, du 16 octobre 1978, relatif au régime commun applicable aux 
importations en provenance de la République populaire de Chine; AMAE, AO, prov. 2130, La République populaire 
de Chine et la Communauté europénne, Europe Information, Commission des Communautés européennes, Groupe 
du Porte Parole et Direction Général de l'Information, 17/79. 
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considered the PRC in a different category to the other state trading 
countries, above all differently to the Soviet Union.  
Several reasons explain the Community’s decision. First, Beijing had 
long pressed to be treated differently than the Soviet bloc.37 The Chinese 
based their request on the fact that the other state trading countries had not 
engaged with the EC offer of 1974 to conclude a Community trade agreement. 
Second, the specific timing was important. Haferkamp’s visit to the PRC was 
imminent, and adopting this new regulation was intended to contribute to 
the diplomatic success of his mission. 38  Third, the Japanese had just 
announced a 20 billion US$ credit offer to the PRC. To remain in a 
competitive position, the Community needed to offer the Chinese something 
concrete too. 39  Finally, the Commission viewed the new regulation as a 
possible bargaining chip in any future negotiations with the Eastern 
European countries and the Soviets.  
Whereas the Commission and the majority of the Nine supported the 
special regulation, only Germany was initially against it. 40  For political 
reasons the Auswärtiges Amt supported the regulation. But the 
Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft did not, because it did not want to 
complicate the EC trade regime by establishing different procedures for 
 
37 BAK, BKA, B136/34643, EG-VR China, Zeller to Staatsminister, Bonn, 13 July 1978; BAK, BKA, B136/34643, 
Handelspolitik EG-VR China, hier: Anwendung der Verordnung 109, Bonn, 28 June 1978. 
38 BAK, BKA, B136/34643, 910. Tagung des Astv, Teil 1, am 06.09.1978, Änderung der von 1439'74 und 109'70, 
insbesondere Frage der VO 109 China (Verfahren), Kittel to Bonn AA, 6 September 1978.  
39 Ibid. 
40 Ibid. 
  
 
214 
different economic partners.41 Eventually the Germans lifted their objections 
in the face of complete isolation.42 In addition, they felt under pressure to join 
the majority given the nationality of Haferkamp. Germany did not want to 
appear to be taking advantage of one of their countrymen being the 
Commission vice-president, or spoil his success.43  
Next to the new EC regulation, the second measure the Community took 
to open its market to China was to include the PRC in the Community’s 
GSP.44  The measure was significant because the Community granted this 
preferential treatment in principle only to the developing countries that were 
part of the G-77, the organisation of developing countries created during the 
first session of UNCTAD.45 The GSP had been an important instrument in the 
Community’s development policy since 1 July 1971. Cuba, Vietnam and 
Romania were the only state trading countries the EC had included in the 
GSP hitherto.46 Therefore the inclusion meant a qualitative shift in the way 
the Community treated China. Even if the inclusion did not mean that the 
Community recognised the PRC as a developing country it once more 
signalled that the EC treated the PRC differently from the Soviet Union.  
 
41 BAK, BKA B136, 34643, Handelspolitik EG-VR China, hier: Anwendung der Verordnung 109, 411-423-CHN, 
Bonn, 28. June 1978, BAK, BKA B136, 34643, Liberalisierungsaktion der Gemeisnchaft gegenüber China, hier: 
Stand der Erörterung in Brüssel, Steeg (Die Leiterin der Abteilung V) to Staatssekretär Dr. Rohwedder, Bonn, 27. 
June 1978. 
42 Ibid. 
43 BAK, BKA B136, 34643, telegram, 911. Tagung des Astv, teil 1 vom 13.09.1978, top: op: Änderung der voen 
1439'74 und 109'70, insbesondere Frage der VO 109 a' China (dok. s 1375'78 (comer 149), Bericht der Gruppe 
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The EEC-PRC Trade  greement was a catalyst for the Community’s 
decision. Including the PRC into the GSP meant the EC responded to a long-
standing Chinese request. Already in 1975, Beijing used London as a 
sounding board on the matter. At that time the FCO did not think that a 
positive response would pose any political difficulties.47 But the FCO proved 
wrong because including the PRC into the GSP could be a precedent for other 
state trading countries asking to be granted similarly advantageous EC 
treatment. Since then the question had periodically resurfaced when the Nine 
dealt bilaterally with the PRC. 48  With the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement 
concluded, the PRC government argued that it had not cost the Community 
much to grant the MFN status, but the trade accord had meant a substantial 
loss in customs revenues for the PRC. Therefore, in return, the EC ought to 
include China in its GSP. 49  During Jenkins’ visit in February 1979, the 
Chinese once more made clear that they expected the Community to answer 
their request.50  
Therefore the Commission proposed to the Council of Ministers in 
March 1979 to include China in its GSP. It backed up its proposal with a 
detailed economic analysis of the effects of such an inclusion. It concluded 
that an examination of the most important economic factors had shown that 
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the EC had to regard the PRC as a developing country.51 It emphasised in 
particular that the GDP per capita in China in 1976 amounted to 410 US$, 
which put the PRC on the same level as other developing countries such as 
Honduras or Zambia. In addition, despite recent efforts to industrialise, the 
economy was still based on agricultural production, and 68% of the working 
population were employed in the agricultural sector. The energy 
consumption stood in 1975 at 693kg per person, which was similar to 
countries such as Peru and Iraq. Moreover, since 1958 the balance of trade 
with the Community had been in deficit, with the exception of 1977. In the 
first eleven months of 1978, the deficit amounted to 471 Million RE, which 
represented 56% of the Chinese exports to the Community. And the 
Commission did not expect any change in the deficit situation in the near 
future.  
 s to the effects of the PRC’s inclusion in the GSP scheme, the 
Commission did not think that the type of agricultural produce the Chinese 
exported to the Community would cause any problem if included in the GSP. 
What was more difficult was the fact that the Chinese would be able to export 
sensitive industrial products to the EC such as leather, shoes and textiles, and 
these were precisely the industries in crisis in Europe. But the Commission 
also pointed out that amongst the developed countries, and fiercest 
competitors with the EC on the Chinese market, Australia had granted China 
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GSP without the PRC having to apply for it, and Japan was also examining 
the question in a positive light.52 
In the discussions on whether or not to include the PRC, it was 
Bulgaria’s 1977 application to the GSP that caused the main problem for the 
Nine. The Community had refused Bulgaria’s application.53 The Commission 
argued that because of the Chinese level of poverty and the establishment of 
official relations, the PRC was a more deserving country than Bulgaria.54 The 
British thought that unlike China, Bulgaria was not the type of country 
intended for the GSP.55 They supported the inclusion, based on the view that 
it was politically almost impossible to refuse it to the Chinese. They attached 
the greatest weight to the psychological effect, but pointed out that it was 
unlikely to cause serious damage to their national industry.56  
Germany had supported Bulgaria’s inclusion although the country did 
not have any official relations with the EEC and had a higher GDP than 
China. But like the British, the Germans agreed to the PRC’s inclusion for 
political reasons. 57  Bonn also argued that the recent increase in German 
exports to the PRC meant that it was in its interest to establish the conditions 
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for an increase in Chinese imports to Germany.58 Whereas initially it had 
insisted that the PRC put in an application and explicitly state in its 
application that it was a developing country, it eventually accepted that the 
EC granted the PRC inclusion without the PRC having formally applied for 
it.59  Just in time for the first joint committee meeting in July 1979, the 
member states agreed to include the PRC into the Community’s GSP.60 This 
meant that from 1 January 1980 onwards the PRC benefitted from 
preferential treatment for all products covered except for agricultural 
products subject to quotas and sensitive industrial products such as textiles.61 
Politics rather than economics had decided the matter. 
The EEC-PRC Trade Agreement spurred the Community to respond to a 
long-standing political request by the PRC: namely that the Community treat 
China differently to the Soviet bloc. The EC responded in two ways. First it 
adopted a new regulation which increased the number of products the PRC 
could export to the EC without restrictions. Second, it included the PRC into 
its GSP. In both instances the timing of the decision reveals the essentially 
political motives of the Community. The Council adopted the new regulation 
just before Haferkamp’s mission to China in September 1978.  nd the Nine 
agreed on the GSP just before the first joint committee meeting took place in 
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Beijing in July 1979. Therefore the Community’s perceived need to smooth 
the political relations with the PRC drove economic change.  
A delicate task: negotiating the textile agreement  
On 5 December 1978, the PRC asked to open negotiations with the 
Community for an agreement on trade in textile products.62 For China a wider 
access to the EC market was important because textiles were one of its main 
export articles to Europe. In 1977 textiles accounted for a third of China's 
exports to the Community (260 million European units of account, i.e. 
approximately $US 340 million).63 The textile trade was a crucial means to 
finance the import of other more technologically advanced goods to China 
that were necessary to fulfil the Four Modernisation Programme. 64 
Problematically, the European textile and clothing industry had fallen into a 
deep crisis in the 1970s. Changing consumer behaviour, technological 
standardisation, a lack of innovation and increasing competition from lower-
labour cost countries all contributed to the critical situation for the sector. 
Textiles were amongst the most stagnant industrial sectors, next to 
aeronautics and defence-related high technology, for which the Community 
had defined goals for an emergency reconstruction.65 The challenge posed to 
the EC negotiators were multi-level and related to Beijing, the member states’ 
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governments who sought to protect their national industries, and other EC 
suppliers such as Turkey, Greece, India and Pakistan.66  
A year and a half later, on 18 July 1979, the Commission and the 
Chinese managed to initial a textile agreement which replaced the 
Community’s unilateral regime. The agreement provided a five-year 
framework for imports into the Community of Chinese textiles. Whereas the 
member states on average had restricted 60 out of the 114 categories 
autonomously (Germany 41, France 55, Benelux 61, Britain 81), now an 
autonomous self-restriction was foreseen in only 16 categories.67 A further 9 
categories of products which were particularly sensitive in different member 
states remained subject to regional limitations. 68 For the rest of the categories 
the agreement set out a procedure that would ensure that the Chinese exports 
to the EC did not surpass a certain limit.  
In exchange for the substantial additional access provided for Chinese 
textiles to the EC market, the Chinese negotiators agreed to reinforce the 
safeguard clause for products not subject to limitation. This was to ensure 
that the Community was able where necessary to keep Chinese exports of 
textile and garments to the EC at levels not exceeding certain thresholds, 
which were equal to the highest levels granted to the EC suppliers under the 
MFA. This offered essential protection for the Community industries, and 
also provided security of access to the EC market for Chinese exporters. The 
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Chinese authorities also committed to provide for guaranteed minimum 
supplies of certain textile raw materials needed by Community processors 
(namely raw silk, angora and cashmere). 69  Both parties viewed the final 
outcome as true progress in their economic policies. It represented a major 
step in the liberalisation of the textile trade between the EC and the PRC. 
Even so, the Chinese expectations, judged by the German representative as 
excessively high, had not been met. Bonn thought that the concerns of the 
German industry had been safeguarded.70 London’s reaction was one of relief 
but limited enthusiasm.71 
The negotiations were difficult. The Chinese demands imposed a severe 
test on the integrity of the Community's textile policy. The Community faced 
a dilemma, as the Foreign Ministers summed up at their meeting on 2 and 3 
April 1979. 72 On the one hand if the Community did not offer China access 
beyond the existing Community and regional global ceilings, the negotiations 
would break down without agreement. The Chinese would regard this as a 
significant political rebuff, which would affect the development of the 
Community's overall trade with China. But the Community had already 
broken the global ceilings once, in 1978, in order to accommodate the 
Mediterranean suppliers. Additional breaches for China would further 
weaken the credibility of the Community's textile policy in the eyes of 
European industry. Thus the conflict was that on the one hand the EC had the 
responsibility to protect the Community’s textile industry and the agreements 
 
69 Ibid. 
70 PAAA, B201/411/434, Textilhandelsregelung EG/China, Leyser and Mohrmann to Außenminister, Bonn, 27 July 
1979. 
71 NA, FV58/298, EEC/China: Foreign Affairs Council 24 July, Crompton to Willis, 20 July 1979. 
72 NA, FV 58/297, Council of Ministers (Foreign Affairs) Luxembourg 2/3 April 1979, 30 March 1979. 
  
 
222 
with other external suppliers. On the other hand it did not want to jeopardise 
any trade opportunities with the PRC. 
Indeed the EC negotiators had to take into account the interests of other 
suppliers to the EC who had concluded agreements with the Community 
under the MFA since 1977.73 Community and member state officials, like 
British Secretary of State for Trade John Smith, were concerned that a textile 
agreement would curb the EC export opportunities available to developing 
countries, especially India and Pakistan. The Community was able to 
persuade the developing countries to negotiate multilateral agreements, 
limiting the growth of their textile exports, only by promising them that they 
would enjoy a guaranteed share of European markets under the 
arrangements. If these supplier countries were to lose out to Chinese 
competition, Community officials feared that the Community’s relations with 
the developing world would be severely damaged.74 
The other challenge was to deal with protests from the European trade 
unions and textile companies. In Germany, Berthold Keller, Hauptvorstand 
Gewerkschaft Textil-Bekleidung, for example wrote to Chancellor Schmidt to 
urge him to personally protect the industry. Whereas the French and British 
governments were protecting their industries, Keller criticized that ‘die 
Bundesrepublik offensichtlich wieder superliberal glänzt.‘ 75  Other textile 
businesses also protested. They mainly used the argument that an agreement 
 
73 NA, FV59/298, Text of press guidance on textiles agreement with China, Peking to UK Rep Brussels, Beijing, 18 
July 1979. 
74 NA, FV58/297, China seeking to treble sales of textiles to EEC, Guy de Jonquieres, 15 March 1979; NA, 
FV58/297, from the Minister of overseas development, Smith, London, 2 April 1979. 
75 BAK, BKA, B136/34643, Textilabkommen mit der VR China, Keller to Schmidt, Düsseldorf, 19 March 1979. 
  
 
223 
with China threatened employment. 76  The French industry reacted 
vehemently too, as illustrated in letters by the Président du Syndicat Général 
de l’Industrie Cotonnière Française, Roger Sauvegrain, and L. C. Bary, the 
vice-president Déléguée Union des industries textiles. 77  In Britain, such 
protests were seen for example in the actions of the Derby Group and the 
British Clothing Industry’s Council for Europe Limited.78 Additionally, the 
lobbying activity organised itself at a European level, as illustrated by the 
General Assembly of the Coordination Committee for the Textile Industries 
in the European Economic Community (Comitextil).79 The textile industry’s 
outcry against an EEC-PRC Textile Agreement proved fierce, and neither the 
member states nor the Commission could afford to disregard them. 
The protests also reveal how the Commission did not leave it to the 
national governments to handle matters. The Commission engaged directly 
with the industry to address their concerns. For instance, when the French 
government blocked the negotiations in July 1979 because it refused the 
Chinese demands, Tran van Tinh, the Commission’s special representative 
for textile negotiations, addressed a telegram directly to the Syndicat Général 
des industries cotonnières in Paris. He urged the French trade union to back 
a compromise: ‘En tant qu'ami, je pense que le mieux est ennemi du bien et 
qu'il faut se battre pour des réalités tangibles et non pour se protéger des 
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craintes.’80 Another example is when Haferkamp addressed the fears of the 
textile industry, speaking at the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung in Bonn on 8 
November 1979. Yet, Haferkamp also made a point of alerting the industry to 
the negative consequences for the entire economy, if it did not show some 
flexibility.81 He warned against protectionism, and of the danger that the 
Community would lose out on significant trade opportunities, if it kept on 
using red-tape and obstructing regulations. He pleaded: ‘Sorgen wir alle mit 
dafür, daß wir die größten Schwierigeiten nicht uns selber machen!‘ The 
Commission wanted a deal with the Chinese and its message to the national 
textile industries was clear. 
The intra-Community politics involved in the negotiations show how 
the Commission continuously sought to assert its role in relation to the 
member states. At first, it attempted to maximise its room for manoeuvre by 
simply assuming that the Council of Ministers had already given it a 
negotiating mandate deriving from that for the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement.82 
However the member states called the Commission back and it had to ask for 
a new mandate. Furthermore, it sought to link the specific negotiations for 
the textile agreement with the formulation of general guidelines for a 
Community textile and clothing policy which would have increased its 
authority. Here again, the member states put the brakes on. 83  But the 
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Commission was successful in leading the textile negotiations, and it proved 
crucial in brokering a deal with the Chinese. The Commission held that the 
conclusion of an EEC-PRC textile agreement was an absolute political 
necessity independent of the possible incurred economic cost.84 And Jenkins 
explained to the Foreign Ministers on 2 and 3  pril that ‘it was obvious that 
there was wide-spread interest among the member states in the potential of 
the Chinese market, but it was obvious too that China had to increase her 
exports to pay for her modernisation programme. It was inconsistent to 
expect the Commission to act as the apostle of protectionism in these 
circumstances.’ 85  When the negotiations stagnated because the member 
states refused to increase the import quota, Jenkins pleaded angrily at an 
informal meeting of the Foreign Ministers at the Chateau de Mercuès on 12 
and 13 May: ‘the member states were being short-sighted in their attitude 
towards an agreement between China and the Community, particularly over 
textiles. […] If it continued to be so niggardly, there was a danger that the 
 mericans would scoop the pool.’86 Jenkins’ push produced results.  t the 
Council of Ministers meeting on 12 June, the ministers gave a mandate for 
the Commission to resume negotiations for a sui generis agreement, precisely 
the formula which the Commission had advocated.87  
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Furthermore, the Commission was the key player in putting pressure on 
the French to give up their obstructionist position. At the heart of the 
negotiations until their very end stood the EC quota for cotton garments, 
because the PRC wanted to surpass at least 20200 tonnes, and the French 
refused to go beyond 14000t or 16000t. When a Commission delegation 
travelled to Beijing for the first joint committee meeting in July, all parties, 
except the French, viewed it as paramount to conclude a textile agreement. 
Just before leaving for Beijing, Kawan, acting President of the Community 
delegation at the joint committee, made an error, which was presumably 
unintentional. He let slip the minimum negotiating position the French 
internally said that they would accept. This bottom-line on the cotton quota 
lay at 18000 tonnes. Consequently if the French continued to be inflexible, 
and the negotiations failed, the French could be blamed for the breakdown.88 
The French were furious, but in the end they did accept the Commission’s 
proposal, and agreed to a deal with the Chinese.89 
A general feature of the Commission which the textile negotiations 
brought out and that was a consistent one throughout the 1969-1979 period is 
that the Commission proved to be a coherent actor. The internal 
organisational structure and division of competencies between the different 
Directorates did not have a significant impact upon the Commission’s 
workings. Potential ‘border conflicts’ between the DG I, the Directorate 
General for Economic and Finance (DG II), the Directorate General for 
Development (DG VIII), and the Directorate General Information (DG XIII) 
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did not occur. The Commission’s input to the Community’s foreign policy 
activity towards the PRC lay firmly in the hands of the cabinet of the vice-
president responsible for external relations and DGI. This coherence 
contributed to the Commission’s efficiency, effectiveness and its capacity to 
assert its role in policy-making. 
The French impeded the negotiations due to political reasons. Giscard 
d'Estaing visited Moscow in April 1979, and blocking negotiations with China 
certainly made a favourable impression on the Soviet Union.90 André Giraud, 
Minister of Industry, travelled to Beijing in July 1979. He wanted to have the 
French blockage at a Community level as a potential lever for the Sino-French 
bilateral negotiations on industrial deals.91 The main reason however lay in 
domestic politics. As Pierre Achard, Conseiller technique to the Prime 
Minister, remarked, from an economic point of view it was clear to everyone 
that an additional import by 4000t or 5000t of cotton to the EC would not 
have any major effect on the situation of the French textile sector. And after 
all it was normal that the PRC would find its place in the MFA arrangements, 
even if it had not been part of it initially.92  
But the real issue was the political necessity of protecting the French 
textile industry, particularly the cotton sector. The letters by Maurice 
Schumann, then acting Deputy President of the Senate, to Raymond Barre, 
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the Prime Minister, and Giraud, showed the politicised nature of the issue.93 
Schumann forcefully called for the protection of French industry. In the end, 
Barre accepted the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement as negotiated by the 
Commission because France found itself isolated at the EC, the domestic 
industry came to accept the 18000t cotton deal, and because the agreement 
provided significant protection of all other areas in the textile and clothing 
industry.94  
Bonn consistently urged for a compromise with the Chinese mainly 
because of national economic imperatives. The German economy could not 
afford losing Chinese trade deals in other sectors if it started to adopt 
protectionist measures on textiles. 95  Germany was prepared to grant the 
Chinese wider access to the European market based on the Commission’s 
proposals. It was firm in its position that the first joint committee meeting 
should not fail. 96  However, there were also political arguments behind 
Germany’s support. China had consistently supported European integration. 
The PRC was gradually assuming an important role amongst the state trading 
countries. Contrary to the vast majority of the other Communist countries, 
Beijing had agreed to negotiate a trade agreement with the Community, and 
 
93 CAC, Versement 19930085, Article 33, Schumann to Barre, Paris, 17 janvier 1979; AN, 5 AG 3, 921, Schumann to 
Giraud, Paris, 29 May 1979; AN, 5 AG 3, 921, Schumann to de Panafieu, Paris, 29 May 1979. 
94 CAC, Versement 19930085, Article 33, négociation de l'accord 'Textiles' ente la Communauté et la République 
populaire de Chine, Achard to Prime Minister, Paris, 5 July 1979. 
95 BAK, BKA, B136/34643, Verhandlungen zwischen der EG und der Volksrepublic China über ein 
Textilhandelsabkommen, Schwinne to Chef des Bundeskanzleramtes, undated. 
96 See for example, PAAA, B21/200 Zwischenarchiv 110507, 583. Tagung des EG-Rates am 12. Juni, 
Textilabkommen EG/VRChina, Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Bonn, 7 June 1979. 
  
 
229 
therefore it was politically important for the Community to follow-up this 
trade agreement. 97  
The British were also supportive of the Commission’s proposals despite 
London’s concern about the implications for their trade relations with the 
developing countries and those of the Mediterranean. 98  Writing to the 
Secretary of State for Trade on 26 March 1979, Owen recommended a 
strategy to counter the fears of the British textile industry. He suggested a 
deal with China and other textile suppliers such as Bulgaria, Malta, Cyprus 
and Turkey in ‘one clean sweep rather than in a piecemeal [fashion]’.99 In 
terms of working out a Community position, the British strategy was not to 
take any sort of lead in putting pressure on the French, but rather to leave 
this to the Commission.100 London’s reaction to the conclusion of the textile 
agreement was that it was ‘the best of a bad job’ – it was politically necessary 
but increased the access of Chinese products to an already saturated EC 
market. Hence ‘while it is a relief to have a textile agreement we do not think 
that the UK should be too enthusiastic in congratulating the Commission. A 
lower profile might serve us better in future textile negotiations with other 
suppliers.’101 
The Cold War dimension played less of a role in the positions and 
strategies of the French, Germans, British, and the Commission than it had in 
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previous decisions on the EC-PRC relationship. Paris’ main concern was not 
to let down the French national textile industry. Bonn was mainly interested 
in assuring future trade opportunities with China. London’s priority was not 
to damage the relations with the developing and Mediterranean countries. 
 nd the Commission’s motive was to strengthen its hand in relation to the 
member states, the industries and the trade unions. 
Conclusion 
The EEC-PRC Trade Agreement proved a landmark in moving the 
relationship between the Community and China from symbolism to concrete 
policy measures. Within one and a half years the Community had made 
major leeway in the implementation of the agreement through its visiting 
diplomacy, the liberalisation of its market, and the EEC-PRC textile 
agreement.  
Despite the explicit Soviet antagonism, the Community continued to 
strengthen its links with Beijing. The inherently political statement of the 
trade agreement spurred the EC to respond to a long-standing request by the 
PRC: namely that the Community treat China distinctly from the Soviet bloc. 
The EC did so using two economic instruments, autonomous quota 
regulations, and the GSP. However next to the Cold War dimension, the 
economic competition by Japan and the United States became an 
increasingly important factor in the Community’s decision-making, even 
more so as the Deng Xiaoping reform era began. 
The Commission continued as the principal motor of the EC-PRC 
relations. It used the trade agreement as a launch pad to gain further 
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credentials as EC spokesperson in international affairs. By brokering contacts 
between the Chinese and the European banking and business sector, the 
Commission had found a new instrument for its foreign policy activity with 
China. By discussing politics with the Chinese leaders in Beijing just as the 
Sino-Vietnamese war had broken out, the Commission demonstrated 
political presence. The intra-Community politics regarding the textile 
agreement showed that with the relationship to the PRC becoming more 
concrete, the member states also proved more touchy and involved on the EC 
level. Nevertheless the Commission managed the intra-Community conflicts 
to its institutional advantage, and succeeded in brokering a deal with the 
Chinese in the name of the Community. It achieved this by using on the one 
hand the political argument of the East-West conflict, on the other hand the 
economic argument of international competition for the lucrative Chinese 
market. 
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Conclusion A new multi-level diplomacy 
‘The speed of progress will no doubt disappoint those 
anxious to see quick results. But the Community 
procedures, complex and cumbrous though they may 
be, do represent a genuine effort to reconcile conflicting 
viewpoints and to ensure that no-one's vital interests 
are disregarded or overborne. If they are slow, they are 
also pretty sure: a deal once struck generally sticks. 
What is done cannot be undone.’102  
FCO Planning Committee, 1973 
In the midst of the crises of the 1970s, the Community’s opening to China 
brought about new dynamics in intra-Community politics and the Cold War. 
From its inception the relationship was politicised – contrary to the view that 
this occurred only in the 1980s.103 Two main reasons account for this. First, 
the opening linked to the wrangle for competencies within the EC 
institutional system. Second, the opening was inextricably intertwined with 
the relationship to both superpowers. The interplay of these reasons 
characterises the origins of the Community’s relationship to China.  
In light of the quote from the FCO Planning Committee above, the end 
of the Cold War, the establishment of an EU diplomatic service, and the 
present-day relevance of the EU-China relations, this thesis makes a 
significant contribution to the history of European integration and the Cold 
War by analysing the origins of the Community’s opening to the PRC. With 
its use of a supranational approach to EU history and recently declassified 
archival sources, this study contributes to a better understanding of the 
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Community’s foreign policy activity, European integration in the 1970s, and 
the intersection of European integration and the Cold War. This conclusion 
draws together the main findings of these three dimensions. 
Boosting the Community’s foreign policy activity 
The Chinese perception of the EC as an actor in its own right as well as 
Beijing’s demand to establish official relations and to have greater access to 
the EC market meant that the member states had limited scope to go it alone, 
even if they had so wanted. These two key demands by Beijing implied that 
the issues arising could only emerge within the Community context and could 
only be handled in that context. The debates at the European Parliament 
illustrate best the sense of excitement that China generated, and the 
perceived need by the Europeans to catch the Zeitgeist and establish closer 
relations with the PRC as it emerged from its self-imposed introspection of 
the Cultural Revolution. Only the Community-centred and multi-lateral 
approach which this research has chosen can fully illustrate these 
developments and offer an adequate level of analysis and explanation.  
This study shows that European officials were very aware of China 
generally calling the shots.104 It adheres to the existing literature to the extent 
that that the Chinese urge for Community action was the most important 
source of external pressure. In this respect, a milestone was Zhou Enlai’s 
interview with Agence France Presse in May 1972 because for the first time a 
Chinese representative expressed publicly the PRC’s interest in official 
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relations.105 Beijing generally set the pace, and this pace largely depended on 
the domestic political situation in China.106  
But the Community did not simply respond defensively to Beijing. The 
EC also pursued its own interest, on its own initiative. As far as the two major 
milestones are concerned – that is, the establishment of official relations in 
May 1975, and the signature of the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement in April 1978 
– the Community determined the timing. The Community’s foreign policy 
activity was an incremental process. Yet the opening to China was not simply 
a matter of ‘spill-over’ which functionalists such as Ernst Haas identify, 
implying an almost automatic and passive process of further European 
integration. The opening required conscious political decisions.107 And in the 
final analysis, intra-Community politics explain the Community’s response to 
the PRC. In this respect, the Community was purposeful and active, rather 
than simply reactive.  
The Commission was the principal architect and motor of the 
Community’s opening to the PRC. It acted as initiator and mediator to 
advance the relationship to China. Soames was primarily responsible for 
setting up official EC-PRC relations.108 The thesis also sheds new light on 
Soames’ motives in initiating the EC-PRC relationship. At the root of his 
actions were first, his world-view characterised by the East-West conflict, in 
which the European Community as such had to have official relations with 
the People’s Republic  second, his personal ambition to be the one 
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orchestrating the opening, emulating at the European level what his personal 
friend Kissinger had helped to do for the United States. Geopolitics were key, 
however the main factor in his decision to take the initiative, travel to Beijing 
and set up official relations with the PRC was inter-institutional jockeying for 
power. And it was this last motive that continued to characterise the 
particular manner and timing of Community engagement with the PRC.109  
The thesis shows that Soames chose to initiate official relations with 
China at the time that he did for three reasons: because of the imminent 
British referendum on EC membership, the first meeting of the European 
Council, and the culmination of the CSCE in Helsinki.110 Soames used China 
as diplomatic leverage outside superpower politics to bolster the 
Commission’s role in world politics and in intra-Community politics. 
Moreover, directly engaging with Beijing was a case where the Commission 
could demonstrate that it did not merely react in ineffective manner to 
exceptional crises in world politics such as the Yom Kippur War in October 
1973. The Commission employed the relationship also to the PRC to 
demonstrate its political stamina. 
From its inception, the Community’s relationship with China was about 
politics more than economics. In the context of the economic crisis, the fact 
that the PRC held the potential to complement the EC economy made it 
easier for Soames to give up his initial opposition to taking the initiative vis-
à-vis Beijing.111 But contrary to Kapur’s emphasis on the general mood of 
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economic optimism amongst the Europeans, the thesis demonstrates that the 
member states and the Commission were well aware that in fact the volume 
of trade between the Nine and the PRC was relatively small and likely to 
remain so for the foreseeable future. 112 Xiyu, Vichitsoratsa, Redmond and Zou 
thus overstate the economic motives, which served only served to justify 
broader political ends.113 
The Commission employed a wide spectrum of tactics to assert its role 
in the EC’s foreign policy activity. In relation to Beijing, this included 
signalling to the Chinese that it was up to them to come to Brussels and 
initiate official relations.114 When this did not work out, the change in tactics 
was for Soames to physically seek the contact by travelling to the PRC and 
offering the political act of setting up diplomatic links.115 During the trade 
negotiations the tactic was to ‘play it fairly rough’, use the Soviet card, and 
exploit the Chinese being under political pressure to conclude a deal.116  
Vis-à-vis the member states, the Commission successfully used 
stratagems of secrecy and creating fait accompli117. It worked through the 
newly created European Council to push for progress. The European Council 
proved a channel which the Commission used to assert its role within the 
Community in external relations, rather than a political actor in its own right 
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that set the agenda. 118  During the trade negotiations, the Commission 
published decisions in the press before submitting them to the Council of 
Ministers. And it presented only the structure of the trade agreement rather 
than a full draft to the Council of Ministers to preserve maximum room for 
manoeuvre.119 Furthermore, the Commission used the trade agreement as a 
launch pad to gain further credentials as the EC spokesperson. By brokering 
contacts between the Chinese and the European banking and business 
sectors, the Commission had found a new instrument for its foreign policy 
activity with China.120 During the textile negotiations it simply assumed it 
already had a negotiating mandate and sought to link the negotiations for the 
specific textile agreement with China to general guidelines for a Community 
policy. 121  Moreover, the Commission used on the one hand the political 
argument of the East-West conflict, on the other hand the economic 
argument of international competition to overcome conflicts between and 
with the member states. The thesis highlights the uniqueness of the case of 
China not only because the Commission enjoyed particularly large room for 
manoeuvre, but also because it grasped and used it successfully. Therefore, 
the case of China challenges the conventional narrative of the member states 
simply side-lining the Commission generally, and specifically in the foreign 
policy area. 
The European Parliament was the first to identify the China issue as one 
to use to position itself within the EC. In contrast to the Council of Ministers 
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and the Commission, the EP persistently advocated for an active rather than 
reactive policy of closer relations between the EC and Beijing. The European 
Parliament asserted itself against the Commission. Whereas in 1965 the latter 
essentially ignored the MEPs queries, by 1979 Haferkamp invited the EP 
President to coordinate an official visit to the PRC.122 The biggest diplomatic 
coup was that Colombo visited China even before Jenkins did.123 Similarly, in 
relation to the Council of Ministers the EP also employed the China issue to 
bolster its position. Initially, the EP was not even allowed to put questions to 
the member states on foreign policy issues, because this was a policy area 
confined to EPC. But the European Parliament kept pushing. It turned for 
example the member states’ vote on the PRC’s accession to the UN into a 
Community matter. 124  A further result was that by 1978, the Council of 
Ministers kept the EP informed about the negotiation stages of the EEC-PRC 
Trade Agreement without the EP having to ask for this expressis verbis.125 
Even if the MEPs recognised the limited impact they had upon the decision-
making, the case of China illustrates that the EP unilaterally assumed a role 
and created a reality which the member states and the Commission were in 
the long term hard pressed to ignore. 
A hands-off approach by the member states was characteristic of the 
period of the Community’s opening to China. Contrary to Möckli’s and 
Romano’s work, this thesis demonstrates that EPC was not the principal 
forum were decisions for concerted European policy activity took place. After 
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the decision of 16 March 1973, EPC continued to be a mechanism for the Nine 
to exchange and evaluate information only.126 Furthermore it was not just 
EPC that saw its role as being to push for European détente, but the 
Commission too.127 Despite the Declaration of European Identity of December 
1973 which specifically identified the EC-Chinese relationship as a target to 
aim at, the establishment of official EC-PRC relations was not a foregone 
conclusion. After the Declaration of European Identity, the Nine reverted to 
their passive behaviour.  
COREPER did not prove to be the institution that enacted the member 
states control over the Community’s external relations. 128  Not even 
Tindemans’ call for a concerted European approach to China in his report on 
a European Union in December 1976 changed the member states’ laissez-
faire attitude.129 The absence of the Heads of State and Government allowed 
for the Community’s response. Therefore the use of the auto-biographies and 
political diaries of the respective statesmen proved of little relevance in 
explaining the opening. A Franco-German tandem is not discernible in the 
beginnings of the EC-PRC relationship either. Against Daddow’s claim that 
‘Britain has consistently acted as an impediment to supranationalism’ this 
research shows otherwise. 130  The British were key in supporting the 
Commission’s role in liaising with China. And Soames after all was a British 
national who retained exceptionally close ties with the FCO as this thesis has 
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demonstrated. On this issue, therefore, enlargement did not lead to a 
stronger emphasis on intergovernmentalism.131 
Whereas European business communities, financial institutions and 
civil society were active in relation to China, this study does not detect their 
influence on the decision-making at a Community level. A possible reason for 
this might be that foreign policy is an area that by definition tends to be 
secretive and not involve the public. Moreover, in the 1970s China only just 
started to open to the outside world, and all foreign activity related to forging 
links with the PRC were still in their infancy. In addition interest groups 
began only in the 1970s to organise themselves as what today is termed 
‘lobbyists’. 
In conclusion, the EC’s response to China is an example of how foreign 
policy became subject to the policy-making regime of the ‘Community 
method’. The Commission steered the EC’s foreign policy activity, and the 
Commission proved competent. 132  Overall, this does not mean the 
Community had a ‘China policy’. The EC did not have a clearly defined, 
coherent set of objectives, and a geopolitical strategy with different political 
options analysed. But still, a remarkable institutional cooperation allowed 
overall for smooth and swift decision-making and implementation. What this 
research also shows is that no matter how bureaucratic the Community 
system, personal beliefs, ambitions and initiative fundamentally mattered.133 
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Whereas the thesis does not suggest that the Community was immensely 
successful, it points out that it achieved some relevant and lasting steps as the 
opening quote of this chapter implies. With the benefit of hindsight, the 
Community’s response to the PRC foreshadows the European External Action 
Service (EEAS), formed on 1 January 2011 which merged the Commission 
and Council foreign policy departments and brought in diplomats from 
national diplomatic services.134 
European integration and the 1970s 
A second striking feature about the China case is that it reveals how the 
Community achieved a degree of cooperation and a level of action in the area 
of foreign policy – an area where coordination, let alone cooperation, was ‘a 
luxury rather than an absolute necessity.’135 Rather than external relations 
being ‘sterilised’, because it revealed too many frictions and threatened the 
cohesion of the Community, the case of China shows how cooperation 
intensified, and contributed to cement the supranational loci of power.136 The 
main implications of the opening were a furthering and deepening of 
European integration, and an acceleration of European détente and détente 
in Europe. 
Adding to the puzzlement, the EC achieved setting up relations with 
China in a decade commonly associated with ‘Eurosclerosis’.137 The case of the 
PRC therefore adds to the growing number of examples that qualify the 
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portrayal of the 1970s as a dismal decade, alongside the activity of the Court 
of Justice, the creation of the European Council, the direct elections of the 
EP, the inauguration of the EMS, the first enlargement and Greece’s 
accession to the EC.138 This would suggest that boom times are far from being 
an essential condition for European integration to continue.139 Crises can be 
conducive too. 
European integration and the Cold War 
The analysis of the Community’s opening to China demonstrates that 
European integration and the Cold War did not evolve separately, but 
intersected.140 The intersection becomes apparent in four main ways. First, 
the European decision-makers operated in a mentality which naturally 
squared the Cold War and European integration. Second, individual EC 
institutions, particularly the European Parliament and the Commission, 
capitalised on détente using it to assert their own role in EC decision-making. 
Third, superpower détente meant that the EC could act vis-à-vis a country 
where Cold War politics had previously restricted its room for manoeuvre. 
The Community generated its own meaning of d tente and acted as a ‘Third 
Force’. Lastly, the extension of the Community’s foreign policy activity to 
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China furthered détente in Europe. It contributed to increased contacts with 
the Soviet bloc.  
All the interviews conducted for the purpose of this study evoked the 
ubiquitous Cold War prism, in which the European decision-makers 
operated, and which ran alongside their commitment to European 
integration. This did not merely colour attitudes, but more so, it defined 
actions towards China. The conviction was that the Community as such 
simply had to liaise with China if it wanted to matter. The archival sources, 
especially those by the Commission and the Council of Ministers, very rarely 
allude to, and even less explicitly state this motivation. This might be due to 
their bureaucratic nature, and the fact that many key discussions over 
lunches, dinners, teas and drinks went unrecorded – the historian’s challenge 
and a call for imagination.  
The Community’s opening to China reveals the impact of the Cold War 
on intra-Community politics. Not only Third World political elites, but also 
European ones instrumentalised the East-West conflict for power political 
interests.141 Seeking European détente beyond Europe allowed the European 
Parliament and above all the Commission to assert their say against the 
member states, who operated through the Council of Ministers, COREPER, 
the EPC and the European Council. Détente gave the EP and the Commission 
leverage in defining the future role of the Community in external relations. 
Thus this study qualifies in important respect Ludlow’s argument that ‘the 
minimal nature of the European Community’s direct involvement in the Cold 
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War was not […] a fluke or accident. Instead it reflected both a degree of 
bureaucratic logic and the two underlying realities of Western Europe’s on-
going security dependence on the United States and its deep internal division 
about its foreign policy choices.’142 Instead it shows how the Community had a 
direct involvement in the Cold War because first it sought to emancipate itself 
from the dependence on the United States, second the supranational 
institutions proved to be the most adept in testing the waters in this respect, 
and third the decision-makers operated with a Cold War mentality. 
This research substantiates the claim that the Cold War is an essential 
factor to explain how and why the Community and the Chinese set up official 
relations concluded a trade agreement and followed it up swiftly in less than a 
decade. The thesis adds that the Cold War factor also accounts for why the 
Commission and the Nine overcame intra-Community conflicts so quickly. 
This thesis therefore shows that the wrangle for competencies within the EC 
institutional system intertwined with broader trends of history, the end of the 
PRC’s isolation from international affairs and d tente. 
Nixon’s visit to China in 1972 made it possible for the Nine to agree that 
the Community as such should have official relations with the People’s 
Republic.143 In contrast to the EC-Japan and the EC-South Korea relations 
however, the Community and China established a relationship without the 
direct involvement of the United States. 144  Furthermore, the Community 
proved more successful than Washington in forging diplomatic and economic 
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links with Beijing. The EC positioned itself against the United States as a 
unified actor who pursued global and not merely regional interests.145 Thus 
this research supports Trachtenberg’s view that European integration ‘was a 
way for the Europeans to reclaim their political autonomy’ against Waltz’s 
argument that the relations with the United States were largely de-
politicised.146 
The Sino-Soviet rivalry enabled the Commission on the one hand to play 
the Soviet card vis-à-vis the Chinese. On the other hand, it meant the 
Commission also played the China card vis-à-vis the Soviet Union in order to 
increase the EC’s weight in international affairs.147 Despite Soviet antagonism 
the Community strengthened its links to Beijing. Both, the establishment of 
diplomatic relations with the accreditation of a Chinese diplomat to the 
Community and the EEC-PRC Trade Agreement, set political precedents for 
the EC’s interaction with the Soviet Union and the Communist countries of 
Eastern Europe. Therefore the relationship with China is an essential piece in 
the puzzle of the EC’s external relations with the Communist world which so 
far the historiography both on the Cold War and European integration has 
neglected.  
The analysis shows that the Community successfully liaised with the 
PRC even though the latter did not share the EC’s aspirations for d tente in 
Europe – meaning the relaxing of the East-West bloc confrontation in order 
to overcome the division on the European continent. It highlights how the 
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Commission implemented in relation to China some essential aspects of the 
agenda the Community pursued during the CSCE: conducting both 
commercial and human relations independently of the political and 
ideological nature of a system. The Europeans proved to adopt a very 
pragmatic strategy towards Communist China. In this sense, the concept of 
Europe acting as a ‘Third Force’ acquired a new meaning.  
Furthering European integration, meaning here extending EC foreign 
policy activity to China, contributed to détente in Europe. The Europeans 
interpreted COMECON’s new approaches to the EC as partly motivated by 
Soviet fears of losing out against China, and losing control over Eastern 
European bilateral dealings with the Community. The burgeoning EC-PRC 
relationship featured regularly on the agenda of the increasing contacts 
between the Commission and the Soviet and Eastern European 
representatives. Thus a truly global Cold War history needs to take into 
account new actors – the European Community and its individual 
institutions, in particular the European Parliament and the Commission. It 
has to acknowledge a new form of diplomacy – a collective European one. 
And a truly global Cold War history needs to incorporate a new relationship – 
the EC-China one. 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: World map in 1979 
 
Color scheme: blue: EC; yellow: PRC and its allies; red: Warsaw Pact member 
states 
Source: adapted from Chabacano, World map in 1980, during the later stages 
of the Cold War, 7 July 2007, licensed under the Creative Commons 
Attribution-Share Alike 3.0 Unported, 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en 
<http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-sa/3.0/deed.en>  
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Appendix 2: European Community of the Six and Nine, USSR and 
Socialist countries aligned with the USSR in Europe, 
1979 
 
Color scheme: blue: EC founding member states, light blue: EC member 
states of the first enlargement, red: Soviet Union; light red: Socialist 
countries aligned with the Soviet Union; pink: Soviet influence; Karo symbol: 
COMECON member states active in 1969-1979 
Source: adapted from Kolja21, European Community 
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/European_Communities> (EC), USSR and 
satellite states (1957/58), 29 May 2009, licensed under the Creative 
Commons Attribution 3.0 Unported, 
http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/3.0/deed.en 
 
